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Introduction: Everyday Life in 
(Post-)Neoliberal Latin America
Daniel Nehring, Gerardo Gómez Michel and Magdalena López
This book explores the cultural dynamics of neoliberalism and 
anti-neoliberal resistance in Latin America. While Latin American 
neoliberalisms and the region’s transition—perhaps temporary—to 
post-neoliberalism have been extensively debated (Dávila, 2012; Flores-
Macias, 2012; Goodale and Postero, 2013), extant research has largely 
focused on relevant political and socioeconomic processes. The cultural 
dynamics of neoliberalism, anti-neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism, 
in terms of the discursive construction of neoliberal common sense 
and the organization of everyday beliefs, norms, values, and systems 
of meaning, have received far less attention.
Together, the studies in this volume seek to address this gap. They 
pursue three objectives. First, they seek to explore how neoliberal 
narratives of self and social relationships have transformed everyday 
life in contemporary Latin America. Second, they examine how 
these narratives are being contested and supplanted by a diversity of 
alternative modes of experience and practices in a diversity of settings, 
in the context of anti-neoliberal and post-neoliberal sociopolitical 
programs. In this context, the studies in this book examine to what 
extent contemporary Latin America might in fact be described as post-
neoliberal, given the crisis of political challenges to neoliberalism in 
societies such as Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia. Third, the following 
chapters interrogate the discourses and cultural practices through 
which a societal consensus for the pursuit of neoliberal politics may 
be established, defended and contested.
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Neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism in Latin America
At the beginning of the 21th century, nations such as Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela have attracted international 
attention for their forceful critique of neoliberalism and their pursuit 
of alternative developmental models. Until the turn of the century, 
neoliberal theories had dominated political and economic life at the 
global level (Harvey, 2005; Davies, 2014). The end of the neoliberal 
cycle of the 1990s in much of the Latin American region has led to 
what John Beverley (2011) called a post-neoliberal moment. However, 
these post-neoliberal political programs have recently entered a period 
of crisis. The beginning of this crisis was marked by the early death 
of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (2013), and it has continued with the 
electoral defeat of Argentina’s left-wing government in 2015, the 
escalating economic and political crisis in Venezuela, and the removal 
from office of Dilma Roussef in Brazil in mid-2016. The current 
social, economic and political unrest has been heavily intensified by 
the worldwide financial crisis that began in 2007–08 and its lasting 
repercussions. Even though Bolivia and Ecuador are politically relatively 
stable now, there are clear signs of public disillusionment with both 
country’s governments and the political and ideological models they 
represent. The failures of these programs and ongoing conflicts among 
neoliberal and anti-neoliberal elites and social movements have by the 
mid-2010s resulted in growing social instability. This book examines 
cultural responses to this instability. It looks at a wide range of cultural 
forms, such as literature, underground cinema, street fairs and self-
help books to explore how Latin Americans construct subjectivities, 
build communities and make meaning in their everyday lives during a 
profound crisis of the social. In this context, it is important to emphasize 
the role that neoliberal and post-neoliberal narratives of self and social 
relationships may come to play in popular culture and everyday lived 
experience in Latin America today.
David Harvey (2005) defines neoliberalism as:
in the first instance a theory of political economic practices 
that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced 
by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong 
private property rights, free markets, and free trade.
The global hegemony of neoliberalism has turned out to be 
extraordinarily durable even throughout the contemporary period 
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of profound socioeconomic crisis brought about by a far-reaching 
deregulation of financial markets (Mirowski, 2013). At the same time, 
it is essential to acknowledge that the global dominance of neoliberal 
theoretical dogma has resulted in a diversity of sometimes only loosely 
connected policy programs, forms of political practice, institutional 
dynamics, and cultural narratives. In Latin America, obvious examples 
of this diversity are the infamous experiments with neoliberal economic 
policy during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet in Chile and 
the far-reaching privatization of public services in Mexico that took 
place from the 1990s onwards under conditions of formal democracy 
(Harvey, 2005). Roy et al (2007) accordingly describe neoliberalism 
as a shared mental model with potentially heterogeneous institutional 
consequences:
Neoliberalism as a shared mental model refers to the spread 
of market-oriented ideas across the globe that has been 
occurring over the past three decades. … while these ideas 
have had an important effect in shaping global economic 
reform, this importance has varied greatly across countries 
and regions. Additionally, in cases where neoliberal ideas 
have been influential, they have not always been successful.
This diverse account of neoliberalism marks a central point. How 
have neoliberal narratives of self and social relationships transformed 
everyday life in contemporary Latin America?
How are these narratives being contested and supplanted by 
alternative modes of experience and practice in a diversity of sites and 
cultural fields? To what extent can contemporary Latin America be 
described as post-neoliberal? We intend to raise these questions through 
the case studies presented in this book.
In the field of Latin American studies, neoliberal hegemony was 
contested by decolonial theory in the late 20th century. Departing 
from what Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (1992) called the 
“coloniality of power” in the early 1990s, this line of research has 
explored how modernity’s matrix of global power manifested itself 
throughout the Latin American social fabric and formulated cognitive 
alternatives. Some of the merits of decolonial theory lay in its concrete 
referentiality, and in its appreciation of forms of coexistence and 
indigenous organization, as reflected by the studies of Walsh (2013), 
Escobar (2008), Coronil (1997), Mignolo (2005), and Castro Gómez 
(2009). However, alternative forms of knowledge and constructions 
of local power could not be applied to larger cultural contexts within 
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the region, and they had little applicability to the political changes of 
the 21st century, when the interests of leftist governments began to 
distance themselves from the subaltern demands that initially fed them. 
The end of the neoliberal cycle in much of the region has led to the 
present time being identified as post-neoliberal.
However, contrary to what one might expect, secular power 
asymmetries remain alive. If there was and still is a critical, anti-
neoliberal consensus, disagreements regarding possible alternatives have 
worsened as the left became increasingly hegemonic. Laclau’s theory 
of populism (2005) came to displace decolonial theory in much of the 
academic debate over the past decade. Laclau provided a conceptual 
basis for sympathizers of pink tide governments who needed to escape 
from the negative stigma of the liberal tradition about populism. From 
this perspective, populism provides a discursive tool to think about 
changes in hegemony. However, to the extent that the pink tide did not 
entirely meet the social, political, economic and cultural expectations 
of countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Nicaragua, debates 
about whether it is even desirable to capture the state have emerged. 
As Jon Beasley-Murray argued, Laclau “took the state for granted, 
and never questioned its power” (2010, p.69). In recent years we have 
witnessed the restoration of new exclusions to sustain the hegemony 
of the pink tide, while the definition of the “people” is becoming 
more restrictive.
What are alternatives are there, then, for thinking about Latin 
American communities that are emancipatory? To exit the 
dichotomous choice between hegemony and counter-hegemony, and 
recognizing similar practices of power between the right and the left, 
scholars like George Yúdice (2004), Alberto Moreiras (2013) and Jon 
Beasley-Murray (2010) prefer to blur the boundaries of hegemony or 
dispense with concept of ideology at all. While Moreiras (2013) calls 
for an “infrapolitics” which is situated at the very edge of the political, 
prior to any subjectivity, Beasley-Murray (2010) argues that politics is 
not moved by ideology, but by habits and affects. Neither the people 
nor the subaltern, both Moreiras and Beasley-Murray propose the 
concept of “multitude” to talk about a collective that would function 
as a kind of autarchic social power. However, these latest proposals are 
not exempt from questioning either. There is a difficulty in linking 
post-hegemony and concepts like “multitude” and “infrapolitics” with 
concrete practices in Latin America. The contribution of these theories 
will be tested in the next decade.
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Neoliberalism, politics and culture
Recent events raise important questions about the dynamics of 
neoliberal and post-neoliberal politics in Latin America today, and 
about the future viability of political programs that seek to occupy post-
neoliberal discursive spaces (Gago, 2017). In the most basic terms, these 
questions result from the current and ongoing crisis of post-neoliberal 
parties and political movements and the re-emergence of governments 
led by political parties and sectors of Latin America’s elites that have 
been closely associated with neoliberal political projects. Important 
crisis moments include (but are not limited to): the escalation of social, 
economic and political conflict in Venezuela, following the death of 
Hugo Chávez in 2013; Mauricio Macri’s rise to the presidency in 
Argentina in 2015; the electoral defeat of Kirchnerism; and the decline 
of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in Brazil, manifest 
in acrimonious public debates about corruption and the impeachment 
of Dilma Roussef in 2016. At the same time, political programs that can 
be described as both anti- and post-neoliberal continue to exert a strong 
influence in Latin America, particularly through the governments of 
Evo Morales in Bolivia and Lenín Moreno in Ecuador.
The complexity of questions about post-neoliberalism’s presents 
and futures is thus visible across Latin America. In Venezuela, a 
nation that attempted perhaps Latin America’s most radical program 
of societal reorganization, scholars have called into question the future 
of progressive societal development, given the recent and ongoing 
retrenchment of Chavism. Thus, in a recent analysis, Spanakos and 
Pantoulas argue:
The concern about survivals of neoliberalism among 
political activists within Bolivarianism has been accentuated 
since the death of Chávez. Many activists at the base 
level fear that the post-Chávez PSUV and government 
leadership are moving toward greater centralization and 
institutionalization—that they are returning politics to the 
technically trained bureaucrats and elected officials. This 
means a decided movement against the creative and more 
free-flowing politics of the street (post-neoliberalism as 
ontological project), and this has important implications 
for the legitimacy that key support groups accord the 
government. (Spanakos and Pantoulas 2017, p.49)
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Spanakos and Pantoulas here draw attention to shifts in the relationship 
between government and political grassroots, and between state and 
citizen, that have recently emerged in Venezuela, and they suggest that 
Chavism’s continued political legitimacy will reside in its ability to 
retain its links to the “free-flowing politics of the street.” At the same 
time, Spanakos and Pantoulas also highlight a lack of clarity with regards 
to a long-term political vision, beyond anti-neoliberal resistance:
The legacy of one of Latin America’s most strident anti-
neoliberals, Hugo Chávez, provides a valuable opportunity 
to do that. Analyzing post-neoliberalism during and 
following the presidencies of Hugo Chávez confirms 
what careful observers have noted: that anti-neoliberal 
movements are clearer about what they oppose than about 
what they propose …. (Spanakos and Pantoulas, 2017, p.49)
Spanakos and Pantoulas’s concerns are echoed in Elbert’s equally recent 
analysis of post-neoliberal politics in Argentina. Drawing on empirical 
research on unionization and political solidarities in two factories in 
Greater Buenos Aires, Elbert finds:
There has been a growing debate about the characterization 
of political regimes that emerged in Latin America after the 
crisis of neoliberalism …. In Argentina, unemployment 
was drastically reduced, and the government allowed the 
comeback of national level collective bargaining. However, 
the Argentine state tolerated labor informality in order to 
foster capital investments. In this context, the present study 
provided evidence of union solidarity strategies toward 
informal workers. In a broader sense, it showed that workers 
were not passive victims of labor fragmentation policies 
but did have agency and were fundamental in developing 
strategies of resistance to the persistent inequality of 
capitalism in Argentina. (Elbert, 2017, p.141f)
Elbert’s analysis again conceptualizes the viability of post-neoliberal 
political programs in terms of the relationship between government and 
political grassroots, and between state and citizen. Taking this argument 
further, Errejón and Guijarro emphasize the need for post-neoliberal 
movements to achieve a coherent sociopolitical vision, and to give this 
vision roots in a coherent social base. In this context, they highlight 
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the achievements and limitations of post-neoliberal government in 
Bolivia and Ecuador:
In this sense, the MAS’s hegemony seems more 
comprehensive, capable of dismantling opponents and 
mediated by organized social sectors—largely campesinos, 
but also popular-urban and near-middle-class ones on 
which they rely and by which they expand. The hegemony 
of the PAIS movement seems subject to greater challenges. 
Although Correa’s leadership remains uncontested in the 
electoral domain, it has not formed a social bloc around 
itself, and it is more dependent on the charismatic game 
that confronts, in addition, the traditional powers that came 
out of the regime crisis less weakened than in Bolivia and 
therefore retain a greater ability to resist. The flexibility 
to incorporate formerly alien issues and demands into its 
discourse thus seems to be a core feature of hegemony. It 
is this tension between openness-inclusion/closedness-
exclusion that will mark the future directions of political 
processes in Bolivia and in Ecuador. (Errejón and Guijarro, 
2016, p.50)
Errejón and Guijarro add to the conceptualization of post-neoliberalism 
in terms of the relationships between government and political 
grassroots and between state and citizen in so far as they draw attention 
to the long-term viability of relatively new and fiercely contested 
political movements. While MAS and PAIS have fared well and 
managed to retain power at the national level, recent developments in 
Argentina and Brazil have been more complicated. Thus, Grigera ties 
the past successes and subsequent decline of Lulism and Kircherism to 
short-term commodity booms, in line with older, historical populist 
movements in Latin America:
We have thus explained the emergence of Kirchnerism 
and Lulism as responses to the crisis of neoliberalism. We 
have opted to use the term ‘Pink Tide neopopulism’ to 
distinguish them from classical post-war populism, and 
‘neopopulism’ from neoliberal populism. The differences 
between both were traced in the nature of the mobilized 
subject, the enabling condition, and the depth and type of 
the crisis. (Grigera, 2017, p.452)
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Finally, explaining the dynamics of post-neoliberal politics in Latin 
America, it is important to account for the ability of neoliberal political 
programs and the constituencies that support them to creatively 
reconstitute themselves. Weinberg is mindful of this when she writes 
of the “thousand faces of neoliberalism” and Mauricio Macri’s ascent 
to the presidency in Argentina:
In the new scenario under Macri, we will have to observe 
the impact of this change on negotiations with the new 
government and on the ways in which possible new 
policies and strategies are developed for this sector. One 
of the main problems we have observed in these years has 
been the negative impact of institutional fragility on the 
development of medium- and long-term policy, with the 
constant creation and disappearance of state structures that 
we are witnessing nowadays. While remaining hopeful 
and supporting political activism, we might keep in mind 
the thousands of faces of neoliberalism. It seems that we 
are witnessing new arrangements and combinations of old 
structures. (Weinberg, 2017, p.165)
The permutations of neoliberalism at the level of national political and 
economic programs and its diffusion into everyday social relationships 
are further rendered visible by recent research in Mexico. Here, a range 
of studies has emphasized developmental trajectories and sociopolitical 
continuity between the stringent implementation of neoliberal 
structural adjustment programs from the 1980s onwards, the radical 
privatization of public goods that began in the 1990s, and the escalation 
of violence initiated in the mid-2000s through the disintegration of 
everyday social relationships and the growing power struggle between a 
weakened state and drug cartels seeking territorial and political control 
(Gaytán and Bowen, 2015; Laurell, 2015; Martin, 2005; Paley, 2015).
How, then, can we make sense of post-neoliberalism presents and 
futures across the region? A useful point of departure in answering 
this question lies in Verónica Gago’s observations as to the limits 
of progressive government in Latin America and the persistence of 
neoliberalism in new permutations:
The progressive governments’ perspective, which attempts to 
neutralize the practices from below while the governments 
present themselves as overcoming an era of popular 
resistance, closes of a more complex and realistic image of 
9
INTRODUCTION
neoliberalism. … The progressive governments, despite 
their rhetoric, do not signal the end of neoliberalism. 
Further, they severely complicate the characterization of 
what is understood as postneoliberalism …. My thesis is 
that neoliberalism survives as a set of conditions that are 
manifested, from above, as the renewal of the extractive-
dispossessive from in a new moment of financialized 
sovereignty and, from below, as a rationality that negotiates 
profits in this context of dispossession, in a contractual 
dynamic that mixes forms of servitude and conflict. (Gago, 
2017, Introduction)
Gago’s argument usefully returns us to an understanding of neoliberalism 
not just in terms of large-scale socioeconomic and political programs, 
but rather in terms of the rationality that organizes social interaction 
in everyday life. In this sense, and in line with sociology’s longstanding 
lines of sociological enquiry (Adorno, 1991; Marcuse, 2002; Weber, 
1992), in this book we approach neoliberalism as a cultural process. 
We adopt Alain Touraine’s (2007) notion of cultural paradigms as a 
point of departure to develop our argument from an international 
comparative perspective. Following Touraine (2007), we see a cultural 
paradigm as a structure of symbolic coordinates with which subjects 
construct a horizon of expectations, an image of the surrounding world 
and especially an ethical language that facilitates self-identification in 
a social context.
This analytical standpoint is useful in three ways. First, it allows us to 
conceptualize neoliberalism, anti-neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism 
as cultural processes, in terms of the construction of distinctive sets of 
norms, values and beliefs that may be mutually exclusive and opposed 
but, at the same time, are implicated with each other in complex 
ways. Second, this perspective makes it possible to conceptualize post-
neoliberalism as a long-term process, beyond short-term achievements 
in the electoral and economic arenas. In this sense, Weinberg concludes:
Is it possible to talk about a post-neoliberal era in Latin 
America? Is it possible to talk about post-neoliberalism in 
Argentina? Many writers have proposed, and I agree, that 
the “post-” prefix might be understood not as signifying 
the complete end of the prior phase and the starting of a 
new one but as part of an ongoing process. (Weinberg, 
2017, p.153)
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This conceptualization of post-neoliberalism as a long-term process 
is useful, third, in so far as it may render apparent developmental 
disjunctures at the political, economic, and cultural levels. In this 
context, specifically, it seems important to be attentive to neoliberalism’s 
capacity to organize common sense and to define, therefore, everyday 
norms, beliefs, and values even in times of ostensible political defeat 
(Bröckling, 2007; Dardot and Laval, 2013). The deep roots and 
persistence of neoliberal common sense become apparent both in 
public discourse, in genres such as literature or film (Blanco-Cano, 
2014; Nehring, 2009; Ruiz, 2014), and in the vocabularies of motive 
that individuals bring to everyday social interaction (Nehring and 
Kerrigan, 2018).
Outline of the book
The chapters in this book explore different responses that have resulted 
from Latin American society’s efforts at reconstructing sociocultural 
paradigms that might render a changed world intelligible. The book 
comprises a range of case studies that explore how cultural and artistic 
narratives, such as literature and cinema, construct alternative visions 
of reality that challenge hegemonic discourses, whether neoliberal or 
anti-neoliberal. In this sense, these case studies analyze how memory 
and silence are deployed in cultural narratives to overcome social 
trauma, imagine new forms of constructing community, and give 
voice to cultural and ethnic groups that have been marginalized for 
long periods of Latin America’s postcolonial history. While there is a 
substantial body of scholarship on neoliberal politics and economics in 
the region, research on the cultural dimensions of neoliberalism and 
anti-neoliberal resistance has largely limited to small-scale case studies. 
There is a dearth of texts that explore how neoliberalism in its various 
localized manifestations has entailed cultural transformations across 
the region. By exploring neoliberalism as a set of interrelated cultural 
forms, we seek to address this gap. It is our aim to offer a transnational 
and comparative perspective on the ways in which neoliberalism has 
transformed public discourses of self and social relationships, popular 
cultures, and modes of everyday experience. To this end, this book 
combines contributions from a range of disciplinary perspectives in the 
humanities and social sciences. At the same time, it offers a broad cross-
regional perspective by bringing together scholarship on Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela, and 
Latin Americans in the USA.
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These case studies analyze how memory and silence are deployed 
in cultural narratives to overcome social trauma, imagine new forms 
of constructing community, and give voice to cultural and ethnic 
groups that have been marginalized for long periods of Latin America’s 
postcolonial history. These case studies fall into four thematic parts: 
Subjectivities and Imaginaries of the Social; Popular Culture and 
Resistance; Memory and Society; and Religion and Popular Faith. 
The first four chapters (Contreras Natera, Nehring, López de la 
Roche, and Ponce Cordero) consider experiences and discourses 
of everyday subjectivity in the context of hegemonic, subaltern and 
emergent imaginaries of the social in Latin America. The following 
three chapters (Silva Ferraz, Padilla and Chaguaceda, and del Percio) 
examine modes of engagement, resistance and contestation of 
neoliberal politics through popular culture. Magdalena López and 
Gerardo Gómez Michel then explore how contemporary sociopolitical 
discourses and practices are grounded in culturally situated modes of 
historical memory. Finally, Emmanuel Alvarado and Jungwon Park 
draw attention to the central role that popular religious attitudes and 
practices may play in the everyday politics of neoliberalism and anti-
neoliberalism in Latin America.
Chapter 2, by Miguel Ángel Contreras Natera, reviews how, from 
the final years of the 20th century onwards, radical changes in forms 
of political subject formation have taken shape in Venezuela. These 
changes have displaced the dominant forms of economic and political 
regulation of the past 50 years. He proposes that the emergence 
of political imaginaries rooted in social and political struggles has 
entailed the constructions of new forms of sociability, new cultural 
paradigms, and new modes of historical memory. The Venezuelan 
experience, in Contreras Natera’s analysis, amounts to a turning 
point in the political development of the region. However, the far-
reaching consequences of the global crisis that began in 2008 have 
entailed problematic consequences across Latin America. Tensions 
caused by fragmented practices of consumption, the extension of 
criminal networks, and the dislocation of social policy have had 
profoundly destabilizing consequences. In this sense, this chapter seeks 
to formulate a comprehensive analysis of the tensions, divisions and 
uncertainties in popular imaginaries of the social in Latin America. 
Its argument will focus on Argentina, Paraguay, and Venezuela, 
contrasting divergent modes of social change, from the moderate and 
progressive development of Argentine society to radical transformation 
of Venezuela. Against this backdrop, the chapter will explore alternative 
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modes of social development in the context of the widening social 
structural heterogeneity of Latin America.
Daniel Nehring, in Chapter 3, revises how the roles of psychological 
discourses play in contemporary popular cultures in Latin America, 
particularly since the neoliberal socioeconomic model has been 
imposed—and in many ways embraced—in the region. Nehring uses 
an analysis of the Mexican self-help publishing industry to examine the 
roles that psychological narratives may play in constructing, bolstering 
or subverting neoliberal subjectivities. In Mexico, self-help publishing 
involves, first, the translation and sale of texts written elsewhere, often 
in the USA, Europe and other Latin American nations, and, second, 
the sale of books by Mexican authors. Nehring argues that the Mexican 
self-help industry has a distinctively hybrid character, since a variety 
of interpretations of self-improvement compete for a readership. The 
author contrasts self-help texts that blend psychological concepts 
with Christian nationalism with secular accounts that rely on pseudo-
scientific and philosophical arguments to formulate a moral vision 
of a successful life. Despite their narrative diversity, he proposes that 
neoliberal understandings of self, choice, and personal responsibility 
are pervasive in self-help texts. Nehring concludes that, given their 
popularity, these texts may be read as indicators of much broader public 
discourses that manifest in a variety of narrative forms and media—in 
political rhetoric and policy discourse, in news media, in TV talk shows, 
in online social media, in popular psychological texts, and so forth. 
Read this way, self-help books speak to the pervasiveness of neoliberal 
common sense in contemporary Mexican society.
In Chapter 4, López de la Roche first presents explanatory factors 
concerning Colombian divergence from the recent tendency in several 
Latin American countries toward 21st century models of political 
socialism or in conjunction with post-neoliberal development. He 
then explores the complex legacy of political culture bequeathed by 
the governments of Álvaro Uribe Velez (2002–06 and 2006–10), which 
involved an important military effort to combat the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC) 
but was not able to defeat them, although their debilitation constituted 
one of the factors that led to the negotiations in Havana. López de la 
Roche deals with redefinitions in the political culture and hegemonic 
communicative regime promoted by President Juan Manuel Santos 
(2010–14 and 2014–17), which favored promoting successful 
conclusion of the peace process with the FARC and the initiation 
of a new, complex and still uncertain phase of national reconciliation 
among Colombians, notwithstanding obstinate Uribistic loathing of 
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both the FARC and President Santos, and President Uribe’s systematic 
and ideological delegitimization of the peace process. De la Roche 
also focuses on issues concerning the October 2, 2016 ratification 
plebiscite of the Havana Accords, the triumph of the rejectionists, the 
renegotiation of the Accords with representatives of the rejectionists by 
the government’s negotiating team, the mobilization of the citizenry 
in defense of the Accords, and the ratification of the revised accord 
by the Congress at the Colon Theater. Finally, he outlines some of 
the challenges and possible alternatives for the country’s political 
development during the post-Accord era.
In Chapter 5, Rafael Ponce Cordero examines the phenomenon 
of underground cinema industry growth in recent years in Ecuador. 
He reasons that the vigor around these productions relies on three 
key factors: first, its strong independence from the traditional and 
centralized film industry—the production is in most of the cases 
run by non-professional crews (from script writing and direction to 
acting and post-production). Second, these films have located their 
production and screenings away from the economic and political 
centers of Quito and Guayaquil, giving space to “the local world” 
to be represented, but also to be watched on the screen by the same 
people in their own space. This is due the use of mostly local, legal 
and pirate, distribution channels. Finally, as Ponce-Cordero analyses 
this movement, he proposes that what is behind the success of the new 
“Cine Bajo Tierra” is a vigorous response to, and sometimes a critique 
of, the disastrous consequences of the application of neoliberal policies 
in Ecuador. Boasting titles such as Sicarios manabitas (Hitmen from 
Manabí), Doble trampa (Double trap), El regreso del llanero vengador (The 
return of the avenging cowboy), Drogas: el comienzo del fin (Drugs: the 
beginning of the end), Avaricia (Greed), and El ángel de los sicarios (The 
hitmen’s angel), these films depict scenarios of crude violence, poverty, 
and merciless surviving behaviors that have found an “appreciation” 
from their local viewers as a dialectical relationship of self-awareness 
between filmmakers and audiences who ultimately have suffered the 
same under neoliberal policies.
Next, Adilson Silva Ferraz (Chapter 6) shows how complex 
neoliberal dynamics are expressed in a case study: the displacement of 
the traditional Brazilian Caruaru Market, in the State of Pernambuco, 
from the center of the city to its periphery. This relocation will cause 
the homogenization of the traditional market with a global model that 
satisfies the increasingly competitive demands of the region. Although 
this market has been an emblem of the city and its cultural values, 
Ferraz’s study shows that the relocation was supported by a good 
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part of local civil society in conjunction with the state authorities. 
This demonstrates that collective mechanisms of deliberation do not 
necessarily guarantee strategies of resistance against neoliberalism. 
Since neoliberalism is not only an economic theory but also a form of 
hegemonic subjectivity, different groups or communities can legitimize 
it through democratic mechanism. Without a change of consciousness, 
the author concludes, there can be no post-neoliberal momentum.
The chapter by Armando Chaguaceda and Alexei Padilla (Chapter 
7) exposes the difficulties of creating public spheres through meetings, 
magazines, blogs, or talks in a country like Cuba, where the liberal 
concept of civil society has no place. The authors turn to the historical 
experience of other single-party socialist countries in Europe to 
compare the Cuban case. They expose the similarities between the 
Cuban constitution promulgated in 1976 and the one of the Soviet 
Union of 1936, which subordinated freedom of the press and of 
speech to the construction of socialism. Such limitations produce the 
precariousness, fragmentation and reduction of the various public 
spheres that have arisen in the Caribbean country under intermittent 
periods of opening and closing of governmental tolerance. The article 
highlights the singularity of the magazine Espacio Laical during the years 
2008 to 2014 under the aegis of the Catholic Church. This publication 
was a form of public sphere that welcomed some ideological diversity 
to debate the economic reforms initiated by Raul Castro and the social 
problems of the island. However, its impact on Cuban civil society 
remains to be seen.
In line with decolonial theory, Enrique del Percio argues that 
there is a Latin American thought of indigenous, Creole or African 
background, different from what he calls the “European matrix” of 
philosophy. The difference lies in a conception of the world in terms of 
relations and not of essences. Under this relational logic, concepts such 
as fraternity, sovereignty, freedom and equality are redefined outside 
Western logic, without eluding the existence of conflicts. According to 
the author, this conception of the world is characteristic of Argentine 
politics; where popular principles have been misunderstood by the 
European and neoliberal matrix.
From a literary criticism approach, Magdalena López analyses the 
most paradigmatic case of the pink tide anti-neoliberal states: Venezuela, 
where after 17 years of Chavismo in power, much its recent literature 
has focused on representing the 1990s. This phenomenon responds to 
a dispute over memory regarding the meaning of the period before the 
ascent of Chavismo. It is a dispute that remains confined to national 
paradigms of political polarization. In this chapter, Magdalena López 
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proposes the concept of a Black Friday Generation to talk about 
juvenile subjectivities of the late 20th century that escape the nostalgic 
views embraced by both the official discourse and the Venezuelan 
lettered city. Through the analysis of the novels Pim Pam Pum (1998) 
by Alejandro Rebolledo, La última vez (2007) by Héctor Bujanda, 
Bajo tierra by Gustavo Valle (2009) and Valle zamuro (2011) by Camilo 
Pino, she shows a constitutive uprooting that allows for a notion of 
historical continuity between the neoliberalism of the 20th century 
and the Bolivarian Revolution of the 21st. Thus, López concludes, 
the perspective of the Black Friday Generation offers a vision of the 
nation different from binary ideological definitions that violently 
fracture the social fabric.
Indigenous peoples across the region are perhaps the most affected by 
neoliberal policies. In Chapter 10, Gómez Michel reviews some of the 
most severe points on the conflict between the Chilean state and the 
Mapuche nation, their challenges and responses to state repression, and 
how they project a possible future for their people within the Chilean 
nation. First, he resumes the origins of the eviction and consequent 
dispossession suffered by the Mapuche people after their military 
defeat of 1883. Going over the deepening of this problem during the 
Pinochet dictatorship, the author reaches the present time to review 
the Mapuche’s struggles for the recovery of their ancestral territories, 
their direct confrontation with the extractive projects promoted by the 
Chilean state, and the neoliberal economic policies that, regardless of 
the ideological positioning of those in power, have been uninterrupted 
since the coup of September 11, 1973. The reaction to the protests 
allows him to explore the ubiquitous face of the neoliberal states: 
repression and social discipline through the exclusive use of force and 
the implementation of the emergency rule in the face of any threat 
(or protest) to the status quo. Gómez Michel analyzes some of the 
resistance strategies used by diverse Mapuche collectives and examines 
some literary expressions articulated by Mapuche poets, scholars 
and journalists that are re-imagining the Mapuche nation and their 
historical struggle to resist the disintegration of their identity through 
forced migration to urban centers.
In Chapter 11, Emmanuel Alvarado and Jenifer Skolnick examine 
the relationship between Christian religiosity and attitudes toward 
social safety-net policies over the past three decades among Latinos 
in the US. Over the past 30 years, the US has experienced notable 
reductions in social safety-net coverage, in the context of successive 
waves of neoliberal economic reforms. This has left members of the 
Latino and Black community particularly vulnerable to economic 
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cycles and downturns. Within this context, this chapter analyses the 
nexus between neoliberal political discourse, potent cultural narratives 
found within American Christianity and public support for social 
protection policies. Alvarado and Skolnick address the way in which 
Christian themes interact with the formation of public attitudes toward 
greater or lesser support for social safety-net policies among American 
Latinos. Looking at beliefs, attitudes and everyday experiences among 
American Latinos in the USA, it considers how religious beliefs may 
reinforce, contradict and challenge neoliberal policy programs that 
emphasize individual self-reliance and entrepreneurialism over public 
welfare provision. Lastly, the authors propose a broad framework 
through which to interpret their findings grounded on the existence 
and interaction of two counterpoised cultural narratives on social 
protection found within Latino American Christianity.
Jungwon Park tackles the controversial phenomenon of the religious 
devotion for ungodly figures in the final chapter. Popular religion is 
frequently considered as the remains of “pre-modern” times. To some it 
may seem anachronistic in an era of highly developed technologies and 
urban life styles. However, in Mexican society, new types of religious 
practices and the devotion to secular saints are associated with the 
drug world and the informal sector at the margins of urban life. Park 
affirms that these new forms of popular religion are a sign of a changing 
Mexican society that has been deeply impacted by globalization and 
neoliberal economics. His chapter explores this contemporary religious 
phenomenon by using Giorgio Agamben’s notion of “bare life”, 
underlining how the worship of Jesús Malverde, La Santa Muerte and 
other laic figures is gaining popularity among those who are abandoned 
by the mainstream and involved in the informal sector, where they 
remain exposed to danger and violence and abandoned by the law. 
Park argues that the role of new religious icons is to provide protection, 
identification and a sense of community without authorization by the 
Catholic Church, the traditional system of Christianity. Practitioners 
of these forms of popular religion may be accused of justifying illicit 
activities and reproducing the culture of fear and everyday violence. 
The author discusses these controversial practices to examine a social 
environment in which the informal sectors have been condemned 
while constructing their own culture, identity and ways of life.
This book rethinks the uses of neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism 
in analyzing the cultures and politics of contemporary Latin America. 
While these two concepts have well-established trajectories and are still 
current in academic debates, present political upheaval—the decline 
of Latin America’s ‘pink tide’, the rise of right-wing governments in 
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Argentina, Brazil, and elsewhere, and the regional impact of the right-
wing political turn in the US and Europe—entails an urgent need to 
re-appraise their theoretical significance and limitations, and to reflect 
on new and alternative conceptual tools that could make sense of the 
far-reaching changes that Latin America faces today.
This book contributes to attendant debates by adopting a distinctly 
cultural focus, looking at the ways in which neoliberalism and 
alternative constructions of self and social relationships are grounded 
in cultural objects, cultural models, and everyday uses of these models 
and meanings. Departing from this cultural focus, the chapters in this 
volume move beyond established lines of debate in Latin American 
studies, which all too often have foregrounded the analysis of political 
and economic process over the need to be attentive to the locally 
grounded construction and contestation of common sense. It is here 
that the intended contribution of this volume lies.
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Imaginaries, Sociability and 
Cultural Patterns in the Post-
Neoliberal Era: A Glance at the 
Argentinean, Paraguayan, and 
Venezuelan Experiences
Miguel Ángel Contreras Natera
Introduction
Toward the mid-1980s, the intersection between developmental 
cepalismo and the foreign debt crisis destabilized the political and 
cultural consensus regarding development in the region. This allowed 
the emergence of adjustment policies that leaned toward neoliberal 
measures as anti-crisis economic programs. Neoliberalism presented 
itself as a vast economic, political, and legislative redevelopment plan, 
providing the right answers when it came to the economic policies 
needed to target the systemic chaos in the region. The new bureaucrats 
managed to turn their structural adjustment program into a new mantra 
and into economic policies through the construction of meaning as 
a powerful offensive strategy. This was mainly due to the historic 
consequences that gave their creed a new epochal meaning. The 
introduction of disciplinary neoliberalism into governments brought 
about the austerity, docility, and repression of the emergent new age. 
It presented itself as a structural adjustment policy for democratic 
transitions, implying the closure, crisis, and death of developmentalism.
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The breakdown of “development” as a tool for social integration, 
and the simultaneous neoliberal discourse based around economic 
growth becoming the new center, implied the strengthening of a 
market-based austerity model. The symbolic effectiveness of neoliberal 
discourse was achieved through links between think-tanks funded by 
transnational corporations and the mass media, and the conversion of 
important intellectual segments in the region. The political-spiritual 
union of neoliberalism as the discourse of the accumulation of wealth, 
and of postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism managed 
to produce a radical mutation in the global system of culture. From 
this pattern, a variety of ways to act, think, and feel emerged, and 
they modulated subjectivities, territories, and institutions, producing 
spiritual neoliberalization (Contreras Natera, 2013, p.254).
Social imaginaries became fields of symbolic contention, negotiation, 
and interpellation where the subjects, individual and collective, re-
signified their concepts of “happiness,” “dignity,” and “personhood” 
along consumerist lines. Subjects’ modes of reception included a 
negotiation field distinguished by the ambivalence, porosity, and 
mutation of the social imaginaries, themselves oscillating between 
adaptation and resistance. In topological terms, the discourse’s 
interpellation-reception-negotiation acted as a conflictive combination 
of cultural patterns, modes of sociability, and imaginaries. All of this 
produced molecular changes within a global process of implantation, 
union, and consolidation of this new awareness:
• a political-cultural offensive from mechanisms, practices, and 
discourses of transnational mediation;
• a production of a molecular mutation that expands, combines, and 
adjusts inside the middle class and popular sectors of the population; 
and finally,
• a “proliferation of the ways of life that reorganize the notions of 
freedom, calculation, and obedience, projecting a new rationality 
and collective affectivity.” (Gago, 2014, p.10)
The end of history as a regressive utopia represents the political and 
economic transition to the consolidation of the Washington Consensus’ 
structural reforms in the context of a profound symbolic unraveling 
in the continent.1 This change coincided with the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, the end of the Eastern European socialist regimes, 
the promotion of liberal-democratic regimes, the re-evaluation of the 
United Nations, and the strengthening of the United States’ unipolarity. 
The emergent political-economic landscape consolidated as an 
23
IMAGINARIES, SOCIABILITY AND CULTURAL PATTERNS ...
interpellator of a subjectivity anchored in the social representations of 
possessive individualism. Popular uprisings in Caracas, Buenos Aires, and 
Quito in 1989 represented, along with the Zapatista movement in 1994 
Chiapas and the election of Hugo Chávez Frías in 1998, the foundations 
for the confrontation against the neoliberal episteme. These popular 
uprisings showed the reactive, multitudinous, and localized forms of 
political conflict against the new spirit of capitalism, consolidating the 
emergence of modular subjectivities in social networks, and disrupting 
the historically capitalist system. In the words of Sidney Tarrow, it 
would seem as if
the foundation for a society of movement was being set, 
in which the disruptive, even catastrophic, conflicts would 
become quotidian to a large part of the population … 
The world could be experimenting a new, far-reaching, 
mobilization ability in our time. (Tarrow, 1997, p.29)
This way, intensely popular movements began to dismantle the 
Washington Consensus, an act that pointed toward the critical 
construction of new intersubjective universes. This shift in the 
neoliberal agenda coincided with the development of transformative 
forces in the plurified relations that eroded the statehood of the 
Washington Consensus, strengthening popular subjectivity. The 
historic novum generated a “before” and “after” in the field of political-
cultural forces that faced off against each other, freeing previously 
stagnant processes which surpassed the experiences of individuals and 
generations, connecting with the long memory as deposits of experiences 
grafted onto the strata of time. The dual crisis (of economics and 
legitimacy) of the neoliberal hegemony at the beginning of the 21st 
century followed the intense popular protests campaigning for isonomy 
that unfolded in the region at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The symbolic split of neoliberal regulation mechanisms coincided 
with the activation of popular movements inscribed in the long memory 
of political-cultural processes of resistance against colonial-modern 
logos.2 The idea of projecting new institutions into the imaginaries 
opened up the possibility for a creative force to emerge in Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, and Paraguay, and to a lesser extent in 
Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The debate was set for a 
National Constituent Assembly, which rolled back colonizing processes, 
going beyond demo-liberal premises and radicalizing the criticisms 
aimed at neoliberalism. At the start of the 21st century, an ascending 
economic cycle, coinciding with increasing prices of commodities, 
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allowed for the reevaluation of the state’s role in political maneuvering 
of the region. At the same time, a creative process of social mobilizations 
started, as did changes in the repertoire of popular demonstrations, the 
revisiting of cultural practices embedded in the long memory, and a 
restructuration of political-cultural forces. In short, the configuration of 
an agenda antithetical to the neoliberal grammar helped to strengthen a 
post-neoliberal epochal spirit as a way to criticize, overcome, and generate 
an alternative to neoliberalism.
This chapter centers on a genealogical reconstruction of popular 
experiences in Argentina (moderate change), Paraguay (containment 
of change), and Venezuela (radicalization of change), social imaginaries, 
modes of sociability and cultural patterns, all in their variations, 
resemblances, and transformations. We know of the theoretical-
methodological importance of these concepts for understanding 
the stability, expansion, or transformation of this historic totality in 
the global system. In the words of Cornelius Castoriadis, the social 
imaginary is sociohistorical magma, incessant and indeterminate 
creations that are embodied in institutions. “What we call reality and 
rationality are a product of it ... This action and that representation/
verbalization are historically instituted.” (Castoriadis, 2013, pp.12–
13) Therefore, imaginaries as instituted norms intersect in their 
historicity by an instituting imaginary, within which a potential 
alterity is contained. A duality always exists: the instituted, a relative 
stabilization of a set of institutions, and the instituting, the dynamics 
that drive its transformations. Sociability as a spontaneous, ludic, and 
relational relationship not ascribed to material interests finds its form 
in the instituting, constantly proposing self-alterations. Sociability as a 
reciprocal action mediated by the common good is reconstituted in the 
solidarity of expansive community networks that are not mediated by 
the westernization of America. Likewise, imaginaries as intersubjective 
universes contain in their constituent form “structural patterns whose 
origins and nature” (Quijano, 1989, p.29) are plural, conflicting, and 
opposed. The long memory as critical anamnesis is opposed to the 
processes of ontological erasure established since the uncovering of 
America, and it is taken over by indigenous, peasant, and popular 
movements of the region.
Argentina: moderation politics
Peronism in the 1960s and 1970s, with its ability to build unlimited 
chains of equivalence, allowed for the subversion of the principle 
of equivalence. The journey of the descamisado toward an organized 
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community implied an ideological movement’s takeover, which tied 
the initial stages of the revolutionary process together. It was also 
a moment of institutionalization for the revolutionary process that 
was supposed to be completed at a third stage, as proposed by Juan 
Domingo Perón.3 Both the repertoire and depth of social and economic 
policies put into place during the Peronista term built the necessary 
material base for the Argentinian populist’s peculiar discourse (Boron, 
2000, p.191). The coup d’état in 1955 transformed the debate on 
new revolutionary policies, contributing to turn Perón’s long exile 
into a new form of populism4 that signified a symbolic rupture with 
classical political-institutional forms. The massive emergence of two 
new characters from within Argentinian society builds a radically 
new demos: “Perón-the workers; and a literally unclassifiable situation 
in terms of political tradition” (Barciela, 2015, p.162). Retroactive 
foundation of this symbolic union establishes an identity inside the 
workers’ subjectivation as Peronistas. Undoubtedly, the space for this 
policy was built on ethnic homogeneity, consequence of the indigenous 
population’s extermination, which in the big urban centers allowed for 
a wide distribution and influence of Perón’s statements. The division 
between the declaration’s content and the action that took place allowed 
for a multiplicity of meanings to emerge, which established a symbolic 
wholeness, unifying the popular field around Perón’s expected return.
The most contradictory meanings can be gathered together, 
as long as the subordination of all of them to the empty 
signifier is maintained … this would be the extreme 
situation in which the love of the father is the only bond 
between brothers. (Laclau 2005, p.270)
The polysemic character, ambiguous and multiple, that resulted from 
the uncoupling between the action and content of Perón’s declarations 
loses its symbolic effectiveness with his return to the presidency in 1973. 
Internal differences between various factions of Peronism expanded, 
producing an accelerated deinstitutionalization that intersected with 
the disruption of neoliberalism, culminating in the 1976 military coup 
d’état. Jorge Videla’s dictatorship in Argentina constitutes, along with 
the de facto coups in Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Uruguay, an experience 
of systemic violence embedded in the instrumentation of a diagram 
of terror, anchored in the vanguard of disciplinarian neoliberalism. The 
instrumentalization of fear, repression, and exclusion as a political-
cultural strategy became one of the main mechanisms for generating 
social discipline. The state of siege and the establishment of a curfew, 
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forced entry into people’s homes and arrests, forced disappearances and 
kidnappings, all embodied the deepest fears of a political society. A 
culture of fear is produced, segmenting gathering spaces, fragmenting 
social conversations, and inoculating experiences with existential 
insecurity; both social retraction and resigned disenchantment emerge.
The official acknowledgment of the social and political consequences 
of forced disappearances “contributed in making authoritarianism and 
its political overcoming the decisive problem of the seventies” (Franco, 
1998, p.122). The path from dictatorship to democracy implied 
strengthening the symbolic nuclei bound with a subjectivity centered 
on political stability. This Schmittian realism, which regarded the 
democratic pact as sovereign will, capable of ensuring civil peace, had 
as a central premise a normative consensus that could be summarized in 
the following formula: order arises out of power bound by rules. In the 
words of Norbert Lechner, “the goal of materializing a political system 
is undercut and even contradicted by the necessity to govern” (Lechner, 
1990, p.32). This shift in perspective reconfigures the transformation 
of society to the demand for a change in political power. In the field of 
subjectivity, the conflict to recover their respective historical plotlines, 
fragmented because of the military dictatorship, refers to a field of 
representation where knowing one’s self and being known became 
an essential objective of politics found in the democratic transition 
period. In the prologue to the Nunca Más report, Ernesto Sábato said
from justice, we should expect the definitive word, we 
cannot stay silent in the face of what we have heard, read and 
registered; everything which goes beyond that which could 
be considered criminal, achieving the shadowy category of 
“crimes against humanity”. (Sábato, 1984, p.7)
The debate regarding past disputes and subjectivity, for memory and 
justice, for memory and politics, conflicts with the depoliticization 
strategies of the dictatorship’s victims, integrating them to a neutral 
field of liberal rules and values. Particularly, the political-moral content 
of popular struggles begins to be recovered, where the singularity 
of the memories and the possibility to activate the past-present is 
inserted into the networks of relationships, groups, institutions, and 
cultures. The discussion on memory transforms into representations 
of unexplored possibilities and forbidden roads resulting from lived 
experiences (Jelin, 2002). This sign is inscribed into dilemmas of 
historic truth and faithfulness of memory as a field for political dispute. 
“The return of the past is not always a moment which frees memory, 
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but instead an advent, a capture of the present.” (Sarlo, 2006, p.9) Justice 
as collective experience and repair as subjective experience become 
central, anchoring points for the democratic transition. Paradoxically, 
as mundane sociability becomes dominant, the frailty present in the 
exchanges regarding the policies of fear remains and is introduced into 
cultural practices.
The ghostly specter of the military dictatorship, fear of public disorder, 
a First World country’s social imaginary, and access to differentiated 
forms of consumption constituted naturalized representations when 
faced against the symbolic violence of capital (Bloj, 2004, p.135). In 
the 1990s, stability as a significant articulator for a threatened order 
became consolidated when facing uncertainty and political instability. 
“Daily tasks acquire unusual meaning. … To reestablish normality is to 
reestablish routines.” (Lechner 1990, p.95, p.98) The trek of a socially 
constructed subject built on the universalist political promises of an 
individual subject, branded by social disappointment and focused on 
political stability and consumption, represents the place where the 
neoliberal discourse knots itself symbolically. This subjective shift of 
the political-economic scene embeds itself in a double political-cultural 
movement. On one hand, it supposes the loss of the state’s central role as 
the warrantor of social rights and, on the other, it implies a reevaluation 
of the discourse found in a civil society. The solid neoliberal consensus 
in the party system that included Peronism gravitated toward the 
necessity to consolidate political stability in the same way as it contributed 
to the conformation of neoliberal common sense.
Menem’s government, as a shining example of neoliberal 
programming, managed to spread through the popular imaginaries the 
idea that the patient wait for the “trickle down” effect resultant from 
economic policies would have the expected result promised by the 
media. The visual proliferation of hunger, poverty, and pain contrasted 
with media framing, where “the fatal combination of devaluation, 
recession and inflation led to a desolate panorama, accentuated with 
the already dramatic hues of millions of lives” (Arfuch, 2008, p.101). 
The pluralization of spaces where pots and pans were signs of weariness, 
protest, and politicization coincided with the massive protest of the 
piqueteros and the unemployed, as well as the blocking of roads, along 
with a new repertoire of protests, interrupting neoliberalism’s symbolic 
density. Massive rejection of the neoliberal program, evidenced 
by the popular prominence of emergent neighborhood assemblies 
in December 2001, contrasts with the privatized and fragmentary 
character of the 1990s’ civil citizenship.
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The conquest of public space as a symbolic space for confrontation, 
construction and creation of meaning made visible debates regarding 
common rights, associative and enterprising, that overflowed and 
infringed on civic liberal identities. The participatory transformation 
of the imaginary as an undifferentiated unit gives way when faced with 
“union in diversity” as the field for constructing collective policies. The 
ludic and festive spirit manifests in dynamic and changing modes of 
expression, fluctuating and active, spreading throughout the plurality 
of popular spaces. Inside the context of the assembly, the slogan 
“que se vayan todos” acquires a global stamp that immediately defines 
the subjective acts of popular movements. Efficiency in the public 
administration becomes essential in politics as a necessary condition 
for good government. Imposing itself as an idea-force, paying attention 
to cultural change became indispensable when building new forms of 
government.
The political legitimacy crisis was characterized by successive changes 
in government, repression, and political prosecution brought upon 
militants belonging to popular movements. The government and 
banking system’s collapse, as a civilization meta-tale, brought into view 
the profound epochal break of the neoliberal political-economic crisis. 
The growing tension between economic and social rights, which had 
been restricted because of the Washington Consensus program and 
the defenders of neoliberalism, volatilized the political environment. 
The confrontations found in the political sphere regarding democracy 
radicalized inside the neighborhood movements’ imaginaries with 
modular, assembly, and experimental forms in regard to the instituted 
liberal structures of political representation. Tensions in this political 
force field were provisionally solved during the elections of May 
2003, where a radical variant of instituted imaginaries imposed itself as 
macro-policy. In this political-intellectual dispute, popular movements 
are expropriated from political protagonism, being circumscribed into 
the pre-political sphere.
Nestor Kirchner’s victory in the 2003 elections meant a double process 
of political normalization and economic restructuration. Undoubtedly 
inspired by an agonistic political model, his triumph emerged from 
the impossibility of eradicating antagonism, even as it established the 
construction of a new democratic order as a plausible objective. In 
other words, he made the immanent contradictions between political 
stability and economic reform strategically compatible, as a conflictual 
consensus. Coming out of the hegemonic, practical, and contingent 
character of all social order, society would be a product of practices 
that had as an objective the establishment of an order in a context 
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of contingencies. In the words of Chantal Mouffe, “an effective 
democracy demands a confrontation of democratic political positions 
… it recognizes the constitutive character of social division, and the 
impossibility of a final reconciliation” (Mouffe 2014, p.26, p.33).
This paradigm shift meant the construction of a political consensus 
answering the need of government institutions to strengthen their 
abilities to face the challenges of poverty and inequality. The rupture of 
political legitimacy in 2001 managed to interrupt neoliberal symbolic 
influence in that it would inscribe itself into the continental critical 
sequence and challenge of the Washington Consensus. Its mutative 
capacity allowed combination, recreation, and reorganization with 
other social imaginaries, managing to adapt to political contestations, 
inscribing its symbolic persistence into the folds of state institutions, 
which were revitalized through the language of the numerous 
dissatisfactions of 2001. The conflicting duality of macropolitics as 
a discourse for the recuperation of sovereignty before the economic 
crisis, and the proliferation of new modes of work (slave, informal, 
clandestine, subversive) established a new paradigmatic situation.
The overlap in the diversity found in the modes of labor configures 
a fragmented, destabilized, and heterogeneous sociability. “This makes 
it possible to conceive the job market as a pluricultural group where 
mixed and hybrid forms coexist.” (Gago, 2014, p.32) In this context, 
post-neoliberalism would not mean overcoming the policies inspired by 
the Washington Consensus, but instead creating new forms of political 
and economic articulation of the transnational capital in the region. 
An essential trait of the popular economy developing in the capital 
city, structurally connected with globalization, is that it is indelibly 
branded by the migrant presence, as well as by the innovation of modes 
of production, circulation, and organization of its collective dynamics. 
The simultaneous nature of the informal and the underground, the 
legal and the illegal, in the transnational value chains combines both 
destabilization and high levels of economic expansion.
Even the massive unemployment rate contrasts with high levels of 
political organization and the public problematization of labor. The 
pluralization of informalization spaces, as spaces of intersection and 
crossing, as laboratories of collective construction, turns the informal 
experiences of big urban centers into places of new political and 
economic articulation. Presenting itself as new modes where the 
community, the family, and the individual weave rationalities, it is 
ambivalent in that it is “a new territory in which the new regimes of 
submission and new places of social innovation are seen” (Gago, 2014, 
p.34). Neoliberalism as a producer of radical mutations in subjectivity 
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survives in interlocking and growing informalization, with enterprising 
dynamics in a context of flexibilization and dispossession of rights. 
The dialectic between movement and insubordination, servitude 
and exploitation, expresses the complex polyphony of the economy, 
movements, and popular subjectivities in Argentina. The irony of this 
process is the persistence of deepening social exclusion, generalized 
violence, and the emergence of a criminal economy, among other 
things. But above all, we see the “intercrossing of vectors which 
coincide in their emergence as the double metamorphosis of social 
matters, and the crisis of political representation” (Biardeau, 2015, 
p.101).
Paraguay: contention politics
The Triple Alliance War5 consolidated a field of exclusion—in Roland 
Barthes’ sense—in the Paraguayan subjectivity that persists even now 
in its political-cultural performance6 as a tendency toward repetition.7 
Expressed in its dramatic dimensions, the effects of the war set up 
subjective forms of relating, both among the elites as in the popular 
field. The Guerra del Chaco, the long military dictatorship of General 
Alfredo Stroessner, and the agreed upon transition to democracy in 
1989 (Arditi 1993, p.161), strengthened the role of political violence 
as a central mechanism of political change. Historical facticity has 
configured an exclusive regime where both the large part of the social 
majority, as well as the ethnic, linguistic or cultural minorities,8 lack 
real incidence in the construction of a democratic will. “More than 
a republic … the form in which our institutional order functions is, 
in practice, that of an autocracy.” (Arditi and Rodríguez, 1987, p.23)
When transitioning toward democracy, the state is configured as a 
space of discord, where the client-based devices of traditional political 
parties are privileged as the means of constructing political consensus. 
Using this logic, the coloradismo operates as a patronage party that filters, 
selects, and places its political scene in essential places inside the state 
bureaucracy. Democratic demands confront institutional weakness, 
displacing the political debates toward new problems. In counterfactual 
terms, the emerging social movements overflowed by acting on their 
localities, building political subjectivations that counter the client-
based, corporate, institutional framework. The liberalization of the 
economy, the announcement of a new constitution (1992), and the 
transition from a military government to a civil one (1993) define the 
characteristics of the shift toward democracy. The economic measures 
inspired by the Washington Consensus included: liberalization of the 
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exchange rate, internal costs, and the interest rate; tariff reductions; 
restructuring and privatization of public companies; suspension of 
credit; and a state-subsidized currency exchange.
The reciprocal interactions between economic adjustment, opening 
up politically, and long-postponed needs all allowed for the confluence 
of critical subjectivities as a consequence of the emergence of new 
forms of social and political organization. As society became more 
political, social mobilizations—of workers and peasants—increased. 
Social and cultural exclusion of subaltern subjectivities became more 
visible, along with the demands of inclusion and participation which 
countered neoliberal policies. “The first great peasant demonstration 
happened in Asunción, 1994, as did the first general strike to be held 
in more than 30 years. There were three additional strikes between 
1994 and 1997.” (Quevedo, 2015, p.49)
The deepening social, economic, and political crisis, visible through 
the accentuation of inequality, the neoliberal economic model’s failure, 
and the corrosion of the client-based apparatus, coincided with the 
region’s epochal, post-neoliberal spirit. In June 2002, the peasant 
movement blocked roads off en-masse, demanding the repeal of laws 
that brought about the privatization of water, telecommunications, 
and train systems. This defense of common goods was aligned with 
historical struggles of peasant and popular organizations of different 
ideological orientations, all of which confronted oligarchical and 
neoliberal policies. Social mobilizations denounced the concentration 
and foreignization of lands,9 dispossession of local knowledge, 
intensification of agro-export monoculture, loss of native seeds, rise of 
illnesses, and intoxication of both the communities and the territory. 
Above all, they mobilized because the expansion of the “agro-business 
in Paraguay promotes the uneven distribution of land, and impinges 
against the agricultural system of subsistence and cooperation of small 
producers” (Winer, 2015, p.195).
Through their collective action, peasant demands question the 
oligarchic state, embedding their struggles in the need for an integral 
agricultural reform. The paradox of the peasant efforts presents 
a fundamental division between social demands for access to the 
democratization of lands, and the conservative character of their 
political demands. “The political process isn’t represented as being 
linked to the social process, and their struggles aren’t represented as 
being political.” (Ortiz, 2014, p.77) The structural contradictions of 
the land monopoly, irregular foreign occupation, smallholder peasants, 
who were impoverished as a residual effect of the oligarchic state, are 
all maintained by the decoupling between the social and economic 
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spheres, and the policies of peasant organizations (Fogel, 1998, p.197). 
Fights, mobilizations, and the building of alternative subjectivities 
become more radical, consolidating the post neoliberal spirit found 
at the beginning of the century.
Fernando Lugo’s candidacy held the promise of political change, 
which crystallized the desires, dreams, and imagination of a society 
repressed by the state. These political forces translated into the historic 
election, asserting that
it could be the final blow to the oligarchic Paraguayan State, 
pointing to its imminent collapse, in a critical situation 
that is reminiscent of March 2, 1860, in which a country 
in ruins was reborn, as the Phoenix rises from the ashes. 
(Ortiz, 2014, p.148)
Lugo’s election meant the fall of the Partido Colorado, the first peaceful 
alternative in power, and the emergence of a middle-left government. 
President Fernando Lugo,10 along with the Teko Porä plan, managed 
to implement a series of policies that attempted to revert inequality 
by means of a social pact centered on redistribution policies. The 
renegotiation of the Itaiput Treaty started with Lula da Silva’s 
government in Brazil,11 aiming to favor Paraguayan interest. Above all, 
it attempted to set in motion policies of global reform, which meant 
confronting the factional oligarchic power in the National Congress.
Internal divisions, interests pitted against each other, and political 
renegotiations became unavoidable obstacles for the Alianza Patriotica 
Para el Cambio, and for a public administration that reproduced in 
its governing logic the oligarchic state’s client-based co-optation of 
mobilized actors. The parliamentary coup d’état carried out on June 
22, 2012, against Lugo’s government managed to translate oligarchic 
interests into a political-mediatic offensive, aligning its political 
questioning with the Curuguaty peasant massacre. President Lugo, 
“by not undertaking decisive action to solve the agrarian problem 
favored the tension that supported it” (Ortiz, 2014, p.178). The 
Curuguaty massacre as a political event condenses in its gory facticity 
the colonial-modern dispossession that installed itself as the way of being 
for the Paraguayan oligarchy. Policies of death, silence, and impunity 
that emerge from the massacre are faced with the previously postponed 
necessity for democratization of the popular subjectivity and, above all, 
with the desires of transhistorical justice, where movements are inscribed 
by the long memory. The Curuguaty massacre has the indelible sign of 
a return to policies of terror12 as intermittent collusion of force and fear in 
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the programmed demobilization of society. “Irrefutable proof: deaths 
and urns that legitimize Cartes’ government.” (Soto and Carbone, 
2015, p.289)
Tensions in the internal struggles of the oligarchy ran high as 
conflicts linked to the transnational economic project erupted between 
landowner patrimonialism and other emergent factions. The conflict 
works its way up to the legislative power where, through the practice 
of orekuete,13 the landowner oligarchy found an effective symbolic 
and historical political cohesion. This way, two objectives that are 
incommensurable among each other become consolidated: on one 
hand, President Lugo’s political trial revalidates mechanisms for the 
patrimonialista faction; and, on the other hand, these mechanisms, 
by promoting skepticism, make room for social representations of 
neoliberal antipolitics. Thus, the oligarchy managed to secure its 
interests, interrupting the timid agrarian reforms set in motion by the 
Lugo administration. The democratic demand’s chain of equivalence 
cracked, gravitating toward more atomized, de-ideologized, and client-
like participation. The transition from redemptive messianism (Lugo) to 
corporate bonapartism (Cartes) would define the essential characteristics 
of Paraguay’s neoliberal restoration.
President Horacio Cartes, with his previous Acuerdo Por Paraguay,14 
quickly allowed for a neoliberal restoration by approving militarization 
laws. The Armed Forces were given powers not bound by legislative 
control, laws of fiscal responsibility or the private-public alliance 
(APP/PPA). This allowed for the privatization of common property, 
as well as the limiting of public and fiscal spending, creating a favorable 
environment for foreign investment and a new political program 
called Un Nuevo Rumbo. Debates regarding social issues15 became 
aligned along with the post-liberal integration policies of popular 
sectors, to circuits of accumulation of wealth through consumption. In 
other words, the policy seeking to lower poverty opts to reduce shift 
policies, looking to increase the labor supply (unstable labor) instead of 
favoring consumption in popular sectors. This project contradicts the 
oligarchy’s patrimonialista factions by opening up national markets to 
big capital. First, Cartismo’s Nuevo Rumbo establishes a new diagram 
of political alliances with traditional oligarchic sectors,16 centering its 
new architecture on enterprise instead of the state. Second, it unfolds 
a collection of mechanisms that damage traditional client-based 
devices used by the patrimonialista faction. Lastly, the integration of 
a transnational economic project that goes against the landowner 
oligarchy’s interests opens up new political horizons of confrontation 
for the political subjectivity of popular movements. The consolidation 
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of new methods of oppression of the territories, along with the 
deepening of agro-business, acts as a platform for the transnational 
capital of global domination.
Venezuela: politics of radicalization
In Venezuela, “development” as an imaginary of social and cultural 
integration, represented through the different variants of the 
modernizing discourse, was the guiding and legitimizing force 
for policies in the 20th century. Despite limited achievements and 
constant failures, there was a general belief that the country had 
progressed gradually toward that objective since the reestablishment of 
democracy in 1959. The Pacto de Punto Fijo,17 as a political-institutional 
arrangement which intertwined foundational agreements on wealth, 
labor, and political parties, became the legitimizing mechanism used 
by political-economic actors. Above all, as the compromise settled on 
the appropriation of income from the state’s extraordinary oil revenue, 
it solidified rentist bonapartism. Representative democracy, another name 
for the state’s authoritarian regime; political parties, the mediators 
of political representation; the state itself, a promoter of economic 
development processes and distributor of the oil revenue: all of these 
have been found in the country’s modernizing discourse since then.
Venezuela advanced gradually but constantly toward modernity until 
the 1980s, when “the awareness of the necessity to introduce changes 
on the management of the development process, and even its objectives” 
(Gómez Calcaño and López Maya, 1990, p.53) spread through the 
political system. The exhaustion of the developmental model was 
manifested in the “collapse of the formula that had guaranteed the 
modern economy and political life: a vast oil income distributed 
through an enormous central State, and strong political parties to pay 
clients with and satisfy demands” (Levine, 2001, p.12). In global terms, 
a crisis, which undermined the fundamental pillars of a system that 
had guided the discourse on economic, social, military and political 
action, was expressed through “economic recession, paralysis, political 
stagnation, and growing protests” (Levine, 2001, p.14). Toward the end 
of the 1980s, the need for a profound reorientation of the economy 
became increasingly evident. To this end, the Gran Viraje’s politics, 
instrumented during Carlos Andrés Pérez’ second term, entailed 
strengthening a vast program of privatization, price release, and labor 
flexibilization, which corresponded with the symbolic construction of 
the market as a new center of gravity for economic policy.
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The instrumentalization of neoliberal policies meant a radical 
shift in forms of regulation for the state-society relationship that had 
dominated for the previous 30 years. The 1989 Caracazo as a limit-
event represented a profound break in the “development” imaginary, 
shook the Venezuelan society to its core and “was the first of the social 
fractures that signaled the end of the social pact, foreshadowing the turn 
towards the left” (Beasly-Murray, 2010, pp.260–61). This uncertainty 
configured the political system as an empty place, and formed the 
conflict’s constituent tension. The disruption of an emerging protest 
cycle, promoting social solidarity as counterfactual sociability to the 
representation of individualism, induced political innovation along 
the system’s margins. Sociopolitical conventions instrumented by the 
Pacto de Punto Fijo that had acquired a naturalized character began to 
break down, shaping a plurality of modes of interaction in general, 
and establishing new roads for social and political action. In a way, the 
logic of de-naturalization of the social was pierced by what Jacques 
Rancière called the equality effect.
For the country’s political crisis, the 1990s meant a sharpening of the 
conflictive as the social became more deeply politicized and the split in 
Venezuela’s institutionalized forms of politics deepened further. Front 
and center of a profoundly dislocated and fragmented stage, with a 
popular interpellation discourse that captured the latent anti-oligarchic 
and anti-imperialist feelings of subaltern imaginers, Chávez triumphed 
in the 1998 national elections. The interpenetration between radical 
and historical struggles and a present of renewed hope built new nets of 
political subjectivation in a carnivalized and celebratory environment. 
Simultaneous to the multiform display of popular mobilizations, 
President Hugo Chávez Frías’ figure is built as an evanescent mediator18 
in the sense expounded on by Frederi Jameson. As a negative trope that 
reorganizes our perception, and in a scandalous procedure of negative 
rewriting, Chávez transforms into a catalytic agent. His figure’s semantic 
elaboration as a nodal field condenses, stops, and sets the accumulation 
of floating signifiers, and builds him up to be the only efficient agent 
among the horde of barbarians. The mimesis built between Chávez 
and barbarism, between the horde and popular mobilizations, between 
noise and disorder, settles and naturalizes a nostalgic semantic around a 
Threatened Venezuela, threatened by the imminent chaos, destruction, 
and conflict that Chavismo represents.
This happens in moments where the social and political rallies for or 
against Chávez become intrinsic in the multiple spaces of discussion, 
mobilization, and confrontation of quotidian Venezuelan politics. 
The conflicting imaginaries produced an emotional environment, 
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the vibrations of which were felt in the surface of social and political 
phenomena, in what Appadurai (1996) calls a community of feelings. 
Profound aggressiveness of the political rested against the affective 
contagion of shared feelings, participation in imagining and feeling 
in a joint way, as a social and cultural group. Conflictive and mutual 
incomprehension between manifestations and divergent social 
expressions reflected the tension between antagonistic projects that 
had imaginaries incommensurable among themselves. Either way, in 
the imaginaries’ designation, nodes critical for the understanding of 
transformative cultural processes could be perceived. The knotting 
between the instituted as a reactive force and the instituting as a force 
of transformation for the contemporary topography of Venezuelan 
politics represented a turn that nominated a profound paradox between 
a Hobbesian moment as a place of order and a Machiavellian moment as a 
place of strategic conflict in the field of imaginaries.
The insurgent imaginaries (Chavismo) were contraposed to a 
restoration logic that had a dynamic, and changing, fluctuating, and 
active forms of expression, where public spaces get reevaluated as areas 
of joy, transgression, and revolt. Massive popular events marked the place 
where this new regime of political truth was being disputed: streets, 
public squares and spaces, among others, gained new symbolic meaning, 
allowing the emergence of a popular universalism which achieved a 
symbolic split with the neoliberal regulatory devices. The coup d’état of 
April 2002, the oil sabotage strike in 2002–03, and the recall referendum 
of August 2004 become nodal points of the political mobilization in a 
force field crisscrossed by the confrontations of divergent imaginaries. 
The symbolic density of these events grants new meaning to popular 
mobilizations, intensifying the enthusiasm of insurgent imaginaries and 
clearing new paths of action. Chávez as a symbol of transformation 
became the popular mobilizations’ object, which traced new epochal 
destinies, radicalizing the political-ideological contents of insurgent 
imaginaries. The creative self-alteration process of these movements 
strengthened through their collective action at the same time as they 
reinforced Chávez’ leadership. Toward the end of 2004, framed by the 
end of the First Encounter of Intellectuals and Artists in Defense of 
Humanity celebrated in Caracas, President Hugo Chávez Frías declared 
“we have to retake the study of socialist ideas. Socialism, its authentic 
thesis, its original thesis. Revise mistakes, revise successes, refocus and 
take the path we have to take” (Chávez Frías, 2006, pp.306–07).
In 2006, with the electoral proposal to set Socialismo del Siglo 
XXI in motion, Chávez triumphed in the elections, producing a 
new transformative gestalt, founded in the simultaneous need to 
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build socialism and the communal state as new critical agencies for 
the Bolivarian Revolution. Toward the end of 2006, the process 
of constructing the only socialist party started with a government 
proposal titled “Los Cinco Motores” (The Five Motors), which included 
a constitutional reform. The conjunction of both proposals configured a 
technocratic sign by strengthening the corporative tendencies of popular 
participation that had formed partly due to Chávez’ criticism of the 
previous political system. In this extraordinary context of centralization, 
the appeal to the popular became a supplement of the constituted 
powers as it utilized itself as a rhetorical inscription of the government’s 
action. The constituted power supplanted the constituting one as the 
forces of emergent corporate order traced insurmountable limits of a 
popular subject-turned-object. The government corporatism’s removal 
of the General Intellect of popular movements’ transformational value 
became the most challenging political consequence moving forward. 
The centripetal and congressional process that opened in 1998 started 
to have an inverse centrifugal effect. The autonomy of corporative and 
bureaucratic interests produces distance in regard to utopic energies and 
historical solidarities of popular movements. This distance expands in 
the same measure as the people, as much a source of sovereignty and 
legitimacy, are perceived not as a protagonist subject, but as an object 
susceptible of organization.
In a way, Chavismo, by expanding, deepening, and radicalizing 
the contents of democracy in the region, became a specter that, to 
paraphrase Marx, tormented the liberal groundwork of the colonial-
modern logos. Acquiring a statute of indecibility, “in this sense, 
chavismo reflects the ambivalence of the specter metaphor, sometimes 
working as a companion to democracy, but in occasion also becomes 
its antagonist” (Arditi 2009, p.157). The impulse that had begun on a 
theoretical, programmatic, cultural and political plane began to have 
serious flaws in terms of programs, strategies, and normative horizons. 
President Hugo Chávez Frías’ health became the fundamental political 
event at the end of 2012 and beginning of 2013. His death on March 
5, 2013 triggered a multiplicity of events that turned the interpretation 
of his legacy into an object of political-cultural dispute for the internal 
workings of Chavismo. The triumph of Nicolas Maduro (the chancellor 
in Chávez’ government) in the March 2013 presidential election by a 
small margin meant an intensification of political conflict as it opened 
a space for electoral competition. This event fractured the force field’s 
homogeneity, transforming the stability, order, and the differences that 
had organized the political conflict in Venezuela since the Caracazo. 
The figure of Chávez as a center of gravity that polarized, organized, 
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and unified imaginaries exerted a global magnetism that strained the 
dynamic intersection of conflicting imaginaries.
This vector field’s fracturing pointed toward the exacerbation, 
confrontation and dissemination of political violence in a context of 
intensification of the economic, social and political crisis, configuring 
a nebulous distribution of the imaginaries. The force field’s constitutive 
tension became re-signified in new social and political circumstances, 
where the precarious nature of the links displaced the center of 
gravity between the instituting and the instituted by deepening the 
manifestations of economic crisis. Social and political violence became 
the leitmotif of daily life amid the economic indicators of rising inflation, 
scarcity of essential products19 disseminated as issues into the totality 
of Venezuelan society. At this point, Venezuelan society is confronted 
with the negation of its historical existence when the designation 
of its citizen conflict points toward the parable of the two cities. In 
metaphoric terms, the city possessed by war is opposed to the plural 
city of repetitive time of social practices, a matter that directs us 
toward the constitutive heterogeneity of society. The colonial-modern 
visibility regime negates its constitutional fracture, sensible as it closed 
the cultural and class conflict, appealing to natural law as a mechanism 
for naturalized construction of racialized and hierarchized identities 
(Contreras Natera 2014, p.28).
The sensible order that partially sutured society opened the profound 
wounds of stasis, conducting negation as a dialectic between the same 
and the Other, pointed toward the annihilation of the enemy, following 
the famous Schmittian distinction. Political violence traverses the crisis 
of the political representation modes in its double manifestation: on 
one hand, as an undermining of democracy’s procedural mechanisms 
with the deepening of the State’s deinstitutionalization; and on 
the other, as absence of a shared national project by means of the 
emergence of an extreme confrontation of existential negation. The 
violent confrontation that defines Venezuela’s everyday political 
present is between an imaginary that points toward the reestablishment 
of neoliberal grammar, in all its colonial appellation to the United 
States’ modernity, radically contraposed to an insurgent imaginary that 
becomes inscribed into the recovery of the long memory’s historical 
debt. The instituted and the instituting face off against each other 
in changing, dynamic, and contradictory historical circumstances in 
regard to the political architecture of antagonism, which lays bare the 
difference in the privileges of voice and word. It rigorously distinguishes 
between those who possess the logos (patricians) as those who recognize 
the just, the beautiful, and the good; and the talkative beings (plebeians), 
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who are without qualities, identifying themselves instead with the noise, 
tumultuousness, and transgression (Rancière, 1996, p.31).
Society is then presented as a composite social body; social divisions 
are the disease of this organism against whom we must fight—the enemy 
being Chavismo, a carcinogenic institution that must be exterminated 
to recover the ailing social body’s health. The gestures of separation, 
classification, and cleansing are used to evidence the deterioration 
of health, the dangerous contagion of the political body with an 
unprecedented symbolic load. Only exaggerating the differences of 
the inside and the outside is the appearance of a coming order created. 
Chavismo becomes a doubly evil object, worthy of reproach, first 
for crossing the line, and second for threatening society. The identity 
standing between contamination, purification, and security establishes 
the political propaedeutic of existential confrontation in Venezuela. 
The main issue in the dramatic political debate is the geopolitical, 
strategic, and continental character of its political, social and economic 
consequences, as much as they are inscribed in an antagonism that, in 
their constitutive germ of existential negation, can turn into a breaking 
off from the democratic order.
By way of conclusion
The persistence of political-cultural tensions at the beginning of the 
century, the return to the neoliberal agenda as an anti-crisis program, 
and the absence of alternative programs to the systemic crisis manifested 
strongly in the economic, political and social consequences of the 
mortgage bubble’s explosion of 2008. The semantics of the crisis’ 
return displaces the debate from the political to the economical, 
installing in its central position of political action the contents of global 
technocracy, written in a neoliberal tone. And above all, imposing itself 
as a political-economic diagnostic in that it reinstates the critique of 
the state as a producer of waste, inflation, and inefficiency, comparing 
the logic of the market with its axiology of efficiency, productivity, and 
performance. The state becomes the fundamental interface, as capital 
depends on the legal-institutional framework, the socio-spatial and 
work conditions for the process of accumulation of wealth in its double 
dimension of appropriation: as relative or absolute surplus. Apparent 
de-territorialization linked to financial globalization represents just one 
dimension of the complex socio-spatial process on a global scale. “The 
perpetual change that is produced in capitalist modes of production 
guarantee that the requirements, definitions of qualifications, systems 
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of authority, division of labor, etc., are never stable for long periods 
of time.” (Harvey, 2007, p.127)
The attempts to conjure, domesticate, and normalize the region’s 
processes of change become a subtext for the reaction of neoliberal 
nostalgia. The emergence of deinstitutionalization, the split of regional 
alliances, and the deepening of economic, political, and social crises 
meant a symbolic break with the transformative assumptions of the 
political turn toward the left in the region. Toward the end of the 
century, the regional cartography was characterized by the simultaneous 
nature of the progressive decline of the cepalista industrializing 
paradigm and the emergence of structural adjustment policies 
anchored in the Washington Consensus. Globally, the consolidation 
of deindustrialization and refocusing processes, combined with the 
dependent transformations of commercial, financial, and productive 
international structures, has driven a pattern of accumulation of wealth 
centered on the exporting of commodities and importing of industrial 
goods. This is a return to the structural conditions of the 1950s. The 
profound transformations of historical capitalism that are leading 
toward systemic stochastic confrontations (hegemony, recentering, 
and systemic change), accelerate the processes of economic, political 
and social crisis of a region in a scheme of dependent transformation.
The decadence of US hegemony, with its new perfectionist politics 
(in the Trump era), together with the decisive emergence of China, 
in the restructuring of international commerce points toward systemic 
confrontation, affect the construction of commercial, productive, and 
political alliances in the region. In the words of Elmar Altvater, “the 
economical mechanisms won’t be enough to maintain inequality 
and, in consequence, they must be complemented with political 
or even military coercion. Rich nations are getting prepared for 
that situation with new military strategies and expanded security 
concepts” (2012, p.253). Undoubtedly, the transformations of the 
imaginaries were signified by the dialectic between the instituting as 
a transformational moment, and the instituted as a reactive moment in 
its point of inflection. But also, in their interpolations, negotiations and 
receptions, they indicate the persistence of neoliberal assumptions as 
social ontologies in middle- and lower-class sectors; this demonstrates 
the perseverance of the forms of possessive sociabilities anchored in 
the mercantile representations of neoliberalism. The media-based 
offensive anchored in the expansion “of a way of life, mythical and 
demobilized, for the professional and intellectual middle class, highly 
remunerated, ideologically and politically conservative, of a renewed 
promotional, internationalist and individualist culture” (Contreras 
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Natera, 2015, p.22) has continued to have a fundamental and constant 
presence in the political-cultural debate. Epochal censuring points 
toward the contradiction on a global level with uncertain regional 
consequences and, above all, the restructuring of loyalty, compromises, 
and challenges of popular imaginaries in a context of simultaneous 
political pugnaciousness and systemic destabilization.
Notes
1  Carlos Andrés Pérez’ election in Venezuela, Carlos Menem’s in Argentina, and 
the post-Stronist transition in Paraguay, which allowed for a political liberalization 
process, become inscribed into this phase of destruction of the social fabric and 
the stability of the economic adjustment coded in the neoliberal key. Reforms to 
political systems meant eliminating critical, plural, and democratic parliamentary 
discussion, as well as simultaneously reinforcing executive power.
2  “If the logos (being) is an imperial instrument of colonization, one of the urgent 
tasks which we must achieve is becoming decolonized (getting rid of) the colonial-
modern logos … The affinity between the eurocentral humanist project and the 
imperialist one shows the persistence of the scientific, cultural and spiritual theater 
of operations that began in 1492, and which hasn’t yet ended its effective time of 
action.” (Contreras Natera, 2014, pp.342–3) The colonial-modern logos represents 
the programmatic continuity between colonialism and modernism in forms of 
being, representation, and thought of the elites endogenous to the regions.
3  The Chamber of Commerce’s 1944 speech specifies that Argentina must prepare 
for a third stage. Above all, “to prevent the masses which have obtained necessary 
and logical social justice to go any further in their pretensions, the first remedy is 
the organization of these masses, so that, forming responsible organisms, logical 
and rational, well-run, which won’t produce injustice, because the common sense 
of the organic masses ends up imposing itself over the exaggerated pretensions of 
some men. This would be insurance, the organization of the masses. The State 
would then organize the reinsurance, which is the necessary authority that, when in 
place, no one can step outside it, because the statal entity has an instrument that, if 
necessary, will set things straight and let them run their rightful course if necessary. 
This is the integral solution put forth by the state at this time as a solution to the 
social problems. It’s been said, gentlemen, that I’m an enemy of capital; if you look 
at what I’ve just said, you wouldn’t find a more, let’s say, staunch defender than 
me, because I know that the defense of businessmen, industry, and merchants, is 
the same as the defense of the State.” 
4  Populism is “the synthetic antagonist set of popular interpellations which face off 
against the bloc in power” (Barciela, 2015, p.154). It is the principle of articulation 
in its relational complexity that unifies popular identity in an equivalence chain. 
“Populism is not, therefore, an expression of ideological delay of a previously-
dominated class, but, on the contrary, an expression of the moment in which the 
articulatory power of this class hegemonically imposes itself over the rest of society.” 
(Laclau, 1980, p. 30)
5  “Paraguay, since its birth as a republic at the beginning of the 19th century (1811), 
went through dictatorships, a genocidal war, and a period of oligarchic democracy 
until finally reaching, in the mid-twentieth century, one of the longest and cruelest 
authoritarian regimes in American history: the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner.” 
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(Ortiz, 2014, p.10) Paraguay’s economic uniqueness in the 19th century cemented 
a state model of public expansion and investment, the absence of foreign debt, 
and economic autonomy. Paraguay’s national industry, anchored in fluvial and 
railroad transportation, had the most cutting-edge technology in the region. With 
Bartolome Mitre’s victory in Argentina in 1861, strategies were set in motion to 
produce the military conflict that would eventually destroy Paraguay. The War of 
the Triple Alliance (1864–70) caused the death of 90% of the male population, 
territorial devastation, and dispossession of public lands by the Anglo-Argentinian 
and Anglo-Brazilian elites. “A pattern of plundering and inequality imposed itself 
after the war, the Paraguayan State gave out immense tracts of land at laughable 
prices to English, Argentinian, Brazilian, American, French, and, to a lesser degree, 
Paraguayan businessmen.” (Guereña and Rojas Villagra, 2016, p.11)
6  Popular imaginaries in Paraguay show the persistence of the colonial-modern 
logos as an instituted form of sociability, and simultaneously, it recreates spaces of 
opposition and resistance from critical interstices in an instituting sense, with the 
re-appropriation of the long memory reproducing consuetudinary relationships 
of reciprocity and autonomy in the popular, peasant, and indigenous field.
7  The profound mnemic footprints of these events are, in the traces of subjectivity, 
testimony of a tendency toward repetition, where imaginaries looking to reclaim 
different representations of the past cross. On one hand, official celebratory 
representations that selectively mystify the past, and on the other, the ways of being 
Paraguayan that highlight the static, immutable and hopeless as ontologized. In terms 
developed by Sigmund Freud, through the compulsion toward repetition, the 
subject reproduces sequences, actions, ideas, thoughts, and memories that generated 
suffering, retaining its painful character. “Lacan observes that unconscious repetition 
is never repetition in its usual meaning of identical reproduction: repetition is the 
movement that sustains the search for an object, always located beyond this or that 
particular thing, and therefore, always out of reach.” (Roudinesco and Plon, 1998, 
p.922)
8  In Paraguay, dynamic relationships between Spanish and Guarani, which are 
cemented on a pyramid-like organizational structured anchored on the processes 
of colonization, allow us to understand the random transmission of Guarani, 
supported by the immense vitality of the communities for which it is the mother 
tongue.
9  For an author such as José Carlos Rodríguez, it is unacceptable to call a society in 
which 60% of the population lives in cities and half of the rural population doesn’t 
work in agriculture or livestock farming “agrarian” (Rodríguez, 2015, p.144). This 
facticity implies historicizing the community of feelings shaped since colonial times 
until the present to understand nomological patterns which form the basis of the 
colonial-modern logos in Paraguay. A social structure persists in its recursivity, 
unequal and anchored as it is in the consolidation of colonial-modern relationships, 
favoring the interests of the landowner oligarchy. Social relationships are constructed 
over this original trauma, based on recreating the patronage relationships present 
in the Paraguayan state. During the Stronist dictatorship, great tracts of land were 
spuriously handed out to those logical to the regime, without this transaction being 
revised during the democratic transition to landowner dispossession. “During the 
Stronist regime, mechanisms for popular participation in resolving all the different 
topics which make up the national problematic have, by definition, been absent: 
the dictatorship confiscated the rights of Paraguayan citizens until 1989, the year 
of its fall.” (Ortiz, 2014, p.102) Political resistance to the popular field’s colonial-
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modern logos introduce difficulties into the construction of the democratic demands 
equivalential chains.
10  The Frente Guasu as a political platform includes a variety of left-leaning 
and progressive political parties, such as Tekojoja, Frente Amplio, Partido 
Revolucionario Febrista, and Pais Solidario, among others.
11  None of the six formally renegotiated points were endorsed by the Brazilian 
congress, even though most of its members were supporters of President Lula Da 
Silva.
12  “The Chokokue report (assembled for the Coordination of Human Rights of 
Paraguay, Codehupuy in 2007 and updated in 2014) investigated and certified 115 
cases, proving that in none of them did the Paraguayan State fulfill its obligations of 
investigating and sanctioning those responsible.” (Soto and Carbone, 2015, p.293)
13  This practice implies a radicalization of the ore scheme, which consists of the express 
intentionality of those who “make up part of a system of relationships inside a 
closed circle, of excluding the others and creating favorable conditions only for 
those that are part of the group.” (Juste, 2015, p.98)
14 Commonly known as the Azulgrana Pact.
15  “Today, without a doubt, there is a systematic plan of attack against landless peasants 
which supports soy landowners in their determination to have peasant-less fields. 
Indigenous settlements are also victims of the agro-export, soy monoculture model, 
as their ancestral lands are being deforested.” (Zambrano, 2015, pp.195–6)
16  The naming of Chancellor Eladio Olaizaga (high Stronist bureaucrat) is irrefutable 
proof of the upward direction taken when building bridges by the factions within 
Paraguayan oligarchy.
17 The Pacto de Punto Fijo, agreed on October 31, 1958, constitutes the most 
important agreement between the political, economic, and military elites, as it 
represents the compromise of the main parties at that moment, AD, COPEI and 
URD, to back whoever was elected, and conform around the victor in a coalition 
government. The rules of the game and the basic political agreements of the pact 
crystallized in the Constitution of 1961 (Levine, 2001, p.10).
18  An evanescent mediator is a catalytic agent that allows for the energy exchange 
between two terms that would otherwise be excluded among themselves. In 
any case, it functions as an agent of change and social transformation, only to be 
forgotten once this change has ratified the reality of the institutions involved. This 
concept, of Weberian inspiration (Weber, 2008, p.126), contests that “social change 
is relatively undecidable: it postulates the intervention in a series (social tradition) 
of an event by another series (religious and political) that is completely different, 
in which the resurgence of the charismatic or prophetic figure provokes a mix in 
the traditional situation and allows the formation of a totally new situation in its 
place” (Jameson, 2004, p.187).
19  The explanations for the economic crisis oscillate between economic sabotage, 
used recurrently by the government as causal explanation, and the failure of the 
economic model, emerging from sectors of the political opposition. The debate 
regarding the rentist character of the current economy, along with the discussion 
of the socialist-inspired economic development model becomes one of the political 
agenda’s fundamental themes. The reappearance of neoliberal phraseology such as 
adjustment, privatization, and competitivity emerges as a response to the economic 
crisis, revealed as post-liberalism as it deepens the global crisis of historic capitalism.
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Making Neoliberal Selves: 
Popular Psychology in 
Contemporary Mexico
Daniel Nehring
This chapter looks at narratives of personal development in self-
help books in contemporary Mexico. In so doing, it explores the 
sociocultural significance of the ‘happiness industry’ that has come 
to play an outsized role in contemporary life. Across much of the 
world, from East Asia to the Americas, counseling sessions, personal 
development workshops, newspaper advice columns, self-help books, 
life advice apps for smartphones and a range of other media teach 
individuals how to be happy, how to be successful, how to make 
money, how to be happy, how to find love, how to get married, how 
to get divorced, and so forth (Watters, 2010; Nehring et al, 2016). 
The success of this happiness industry reflects to the extent to which 
psychotherapeutic narratives of the self and interpersonal relationships 
have seeped into everyday life and come to define moral visions of what 
a ‘good life’ might mean. This popularization of therapeutic narratives is 
closely bound up with the success of neoliberal political projects around 
the world, in so far as it tends to reinforce neoliberalism’s emphasis 
on individual autonomy, choice and competition as basic principles of 
social interaction (Rimke, 2000; Gershon, 2011). In Mexico, popular 
psychology has likewise enjoyed considerable success over at least the 
past two decades, and its recipes for personal development have come 
to play a significant role in public life (Nehring, 2009a, 2009b).
This chapter has two objectives. First, it seeks to explore the 
proliferation of popular psychological narratives in contemporary 
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Mexico. Its second aim is to examine the ways in which these 
narratives may reinforce or contest neoliberal discourses of the self 
and social relationships. To address these objectives, the chapter 
focuses on self-help books. Self-help books are didactic texts that 
offer their readers life advice on a range of issues, including work 
and professional development, marriage and family life, health and 
wellbeing, and spiritual concerns. Self-help books have a long history 
across the Western world, including Hispanic societies, which dates 
back at least to the manual of conduct and moral treatises of the 18th 
century (Secord, 2003; Mur Effing, 2009; Nehring et al, 2016). They 
set out, typically at considerable length, a moral grammar of personal 
conduct with regard to a specific reality of everyday life. The term 
moral grammar refers to a particular set of norms, values and beliefs 
about the nature of social life and the relationship between individual 
and society (Nehring and Kerrigan, 2018). The moral grammars of 
self-help books are typically situated within broader cultural narratives. 
Thus, for example, the life advice books of the American pastor Joel 
Osteen (such as Osteen, 2011) draw on the ethical framework of 
certain strands of Evangelical Protestantism in the USA, while the 
treatises of Mexican writer Don Miguel Ruiz (for example, Ruiz, 
2011) purport to recover ancient Toltec wisdom to enhance readers’ 
spiritual wellbeing. In other words, self-help books may be read as 
indicators of dominant and alternative public moral discourses. This 
is, to a large extent, where the sociological significance of these texts 
lies, and this is how this chapter will approach them.
The following analysis of self-help books excludes questions about 
consumption, readership and the ways in which readers may or may 
not use these books to orient their everyday conduct. Rather, it is 
interested in what a very widely circulating form of popular literature 
may reveal about the prevalence of neoliberal public narratives of the 
social in Mexican society today. This chapter looks at self-help books 
from the perspective of public discourse, and not from the perspective 
of individual consumption and interpretation, in line. In this, it follows 
the approach taken in much of the academic literature in this field, 
which tends to separate discursive analysis (Hochschild, 2003; McGee, 
2005) from enquiries into the personal uses of popular psychology 
(Lichterman, 1992; Simonds, 1992).
This chapter builds on fieldwork conducted in Mexico since the mid-
2000s, on popular psychology, self-help narratives and the production, 
marketing and circulation of self-help books. On the one hand, it draws 
on the narrative analysis of more than 100 self-help books, both those 
written and produced in Mexico and those imported from elsewhere 
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to be translated into Spanish and sold to local audiences. Given the 
limited space available in this chapter, typical cases are used to document 
patterns in self-help narratives current in Mexico. While it is not 
possible to showcase the full range of self-help books analyzed for this 
study, engagement with typical cases nonetheless makes it possible to 
highlight important trends in the narrative organization of self-help 
in contemporary Mexico.1 On the other hand, this chapter briefly 
analyses the trajectories of production, circulation and consumption 
of self-help books in Mexico and shows how popular psychology in 
Mexico may be embedded in wider, transnational cultural flows. This 
chapter will thus present statistical data on the production and sales of 
self-help books in Mexico. These publication statistics were provided 
by the National Chamber of the Publishing Industry of Mexico 
(CANIEM). The data analyzed in this chapter do not allow empirical 
generalizations about self-help culture and popular psychology in 
Mexico. However, they allow for significant insights into the range of 
self-help narratives prevalent in Mexico and the relationships of these 
narratives with neoliberal discourse.
This chapter adds in substantial ways to academic debates on 
neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism in Latin America. These debates 
have concentrated, on the one hand, on the political and socioeconomic 
consequences of Latin America’s turn to neoliberalism in the 1980s 
and its post-neoliberal aftermath in the early 21st century (Harris, 
2003; Dello Buono, 2011; Yates and Bakker, 2014; Laurell, 2015; 
Springer, 2015). On the other hand, scholars in Latin American cultural 
studies have engaged with the expression of neoliberal discourses and 
anti-neoliberal resistance in literature, film and the arts (Levinson, 
2001; Masiello, 2001; Blanco-Cano, 2014). However, there has been 
relatively little engagement with the ways in which neoliberalism, 
anti-neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism have re-organized popular 
culture and everyday experiences and practices of social life. The 
‘therapeutic turn’ that has accompanied neoliberalism’s ascent has 
remained widely under-researched in Latin America, a few scattered 
studies notwithstanding (Lakoff, 2005; Nehring et al, 2016). This is 
due, perhaps, to the development of academic sociology in the region 
and the fact that the cultural turn that reshaped the discipline in much 
of Europe and Anglophone North America did not have a similarly 
far-reaching impact in Latin America (Nehring, 2005). Be this as it 
may, scholarly interest in Europe, Anglophone North America, East 
Asia and Oceania in therapeutic culture and its associations with 
neoliberalism has not been matched in Latin America. The following 
analysis of self-help books in Mexico addresses this omission.
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Popular psychology and neoliberalism in 
contemporary Mexico
The history of popular psychology in Mexico has so far not been 
documented through academic research. However, there is some 
scholarship that points to the long history of psychological knowledge 
and its application in clinical psychiatry, dating back to the late 19th 
and the early 20th century (Buffington, 1997; Benassini, 2001; de la 
Fuente and Heinze Martin, 2014). This coincides with the transnational 
diffusion of psychological knowledge and the establishment of 
institutions related to mental health care in other parts of the Americas 
(Lappann Botti, 2006; Illouz, 2008; Brandão Goulart and Durães, 
2010; Ferrari, 2015). The diffusion of psychological knowledge beyond 
academia and clinical practice into popular culture remains poorly 
researched. However, from at least the late 1980s onwards popular 
psychological narratives began to acquire a considerable degree of 
visibility in public life, through advice columns in newspapers and 
magazines, TV talk shows, self-help books, and a range of other media 
(Nehring, 2009a). The extraordinary success of self-help writers such 
as Carlos Cuauhtémoc Sánchez in the same period speaks to the 
growing cultural influence of therapeutic narratives of self and social 
relationships. Sales statistics for the period from 2005 to 2011 speak 
to the continuing popularity of self-help books in Mexico (Table 3.1).
The fact that, in a country of 120 million people, between 3.5 and 
4.3 million new self-help books were sold every year in this period 
Table 3.1: Sales of self-help books in Mexico, 2005–11
Year Number of titles sold Number of copies 
sold
Total sales value, 
Mexican pesos
2005 4,642 4,101,759 241,019,606
2006 5,485 4,536,105 311,824,402
2007 3,529 4,557,996 319,399,314
2008 5,966 3,773,438 270,025,220
2009 6,328 3,599,363 224,512,334
2010 8,578 4,328,206 303,168,849
2011 8,572 4,299,865 350,702,536
Source: National Chamber of the Publishing Industry of Mexico (CANIEM); personal correspondence.
Note: Due to substantial fluctuations in the value of the Mexican Peso in this period, the table does not include 
conversions of sales values into other currencies. For purely illustrative purposes, it may be useful to point out 
that the sales value of self-help books in 2011 is equivalent to more than US$19 million, at 2017 exchange 
rates and following a substantial depreciation of the Peso.
51
illustrates the extraordinary popularity of the genre. Of the titles on 
sale each year, only small and decreasing proportion was produced 
locally in Mexico (Table 3.2).
Most self-help books sold in each year therefore were titles by 
foreign authors and foreign publishing companies imported and sold 
to Mexican readers. This hints at the transnational scale of popular 
psychology, in terms of the cross-border circulation of self-help 
narratives and the media that carry these narratives, and in terms of 
those narratives’ ability to captivate audiences from a range of national 
and cultural backgrounds (Nehring et al, 2016).
The period of extraordinary popularity of self-help books in Mexico 
coincides with the country’s turn to neoliberalism from the mid-1980s 
onwards. Following a profound crisis of the Mexican economy in 1982, 
successive governments embarked on a string of structural adjustment 
programs guided by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank (Alvarez Béjar and Mendoza Pichardo, 1993; Christopherson and 
Hovey, 1996). Until the beginning of the crisis of the 1980s, Mexico 
had experienced several decades of relative prosperity. The pre-crisis 
period had been characterized by expanding public and social welfare 
services, declining income inequality and growing middle classes, in 
the context of Mexico’s pursuit of a development model driven by 
theories of import substitution industrialization (Hirschman, 1968; 
Baer, 1972; Careaga, 1983, 1984). During the crisis, the Mexican 
government abandoned this development, turning instead toward 
direct foreign investment, the generation of employment and revenues 
through export-oriented manufacturing in the burgeoning maquiladora 
industry, and the large-scale privatization of public assets and public 
services (Laurell, 1991; Alvarez Béjar and Mendoza Pichardo, 1993; 
Table 3.2: Local production of self-help books in Mexico, 2005–10
Year Total number of titles Number of locally 
produced titles
Share of locally 
produced titles, %
2005 4,642 1,424 30.7
2006 5,485 1,304 23.8
2007 3,529 898 25.4
2008 5,966 1,109 18.6
2009 6,328 968 15.3
2010 8,578 1,074 12.5
Source: National Chamber of the Publishing Industry of Mexico (CANIEM); personal correspondence.
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Coppinger, 1993; Botz, 1994). As a result, poverty, unemployment 
and precarious employment in the informal sector grew for much 
of the 1980s and 1990s and Mexico’s middle classes collapsed, while 
at the same a small number of individuals and firms profited greatly 
from the privatization of state-owned enterprises (Escobar Latapí and 
González de la Rocha, 1995; Ramirez, 1995; Hogenboom, 2004). The 
years since the crisis of the 1980s and 1990s have been marked by a 
recovery of ambiguous scale. Official data point to a marked decline 
of the poverty ratio since its high point in the mid-1990s (Table 3.3).
However, the validity of official poverty measurements has been 
called into question (Rodríguez Gómez, 2009). At the same time, 
the level of economic inequality in Mexico has remained stubbornly 
high, as indicated by relatively small variations in the Gini index from 
the mid-1980s until the mid-2010s (Table 3.4).
The transformation of the macro-structural framework of Mexican 
society had profound consequences for individuals and families. 
Growing unemployment and declining unsettled established patriarchal 
family structures, built around the model of a male breadwinner 
and household head supported by his wife and mother. Economic 
Table 3.3: Poverty headcount ratio at US$3.10 a day (2011 PPP), Mexico, 
1984–2014 (% of population)
Year % of population Year % of population
1984 21 2000 25
1985 n.a. 2001 n.a.
1986 n.a. 2002 23
1987 n.a. 2003 n.a.
1988 n.a. 2004 13
1989 18 2005 18
1990 n.a. 2006 11
1991 n.a. 2007 n.a.
1992 24 2008 12
1993 n.a. 2009 n.a.
1994 23 2010 12
1995 n.a. 2011 n.a.
1996 31 2012 10
1997 n.a. 2013 n.a.
1998 30 2014 11
1999 n.a.
Source: The World Bank, World Development Indicators (accessed September 2017) 
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readjustment at the household level, through the incorporation of 
multiple, female and male, family members into the labor market, thus 
entailed a crisis and readjustment of gender relations, through women’s 
expanding participation in extra-domestic labor and concomitant 
shifts in domestic power relations (Fernández-Kelly, 1984; Escobar 
Latapí and González de la Rocha, 1995; Fernández-Kelly, 2008). 
In turn, women’s role in Mexico’s labor market often occurred on 
highly exploitative terms, for example through women’s incorporation 
in export-oriented manufacturing in only the most subordinate 
positions (Alarcón González and McKinley, 1999; Wilson, 1999). 
The application of neoliberal political-economic models in Mexico 
was ostensibly to resolve a profound crisis of the state. However, it 
destabilized Mexican society, and the insecurity it produced was, from 
the early 2000s onwards, exacerbated by the escalating confrontation 
between the state and Mexico’s drug cartels (Chabat, 2002; Calderón et 
al, 2015; Shirk and Wallman, 2015). In stark words, Asa Cristina Laurell 
(2015) describes the long-term consequences of Mexico’s neoliberal 
turn as the “destruction of society.” She points to increasing restrictions 
Table 3.4: Gini index for Mexico, 1984–2014
Year Gini index Year Gini index
1984 49 2000 52
1985 n.a. 2001 n.a.
1986 n.a. 2002 50
1987 n.a. 2003 n.a.
1988 n.a. 2004 46
1989 54 2005 51
1990 n.a. 2006 48
1991 n.a. 2007 n.a.
1992 51 2008 48
1993 n.a. 2009 n.a.
1994 54 2010 48
1995 n.a. 2011 n.a.
1996 48 2012 48
1997 n.a. 2013 n.a.
1998 49 2014 48
1999 n.a.
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of basic human, political and social rights, a pervasive climate of fear 
and insecurity and a fundamental decline in social solidarity:
Neoliberal ideology promotes the disqualification of 
representative democracy with the aim of transferring 
crucial decisions to formal or informal undemocratic 
structures. This distortion of politics can take on different 
forms, and the Mexican case is perverse. However, the 
role of widespread fear—whether of terrorism, violence, 
immigrants, the poor, the delinquent, or any unspecified 
“threatening other”—seems to play an important role in 
disciplining the population. This serves to make acceptable 
the restriction of civil, political, and social rights …. The 
Mexican situation is especially dangerous because formal 
state institutions are permeated with organized crime to 
create what some analysts … consider a Narco-State that 
practices state terrorism. The ideology of individualism, 
power, and consumerism has a damaging influence that 
tends to destroy social values such as solidarity, humanism, 
and respect for human life. This ideology turns particularly 
toxic in the absence of the possibility of getting a decent 
job or access to education. The exaltation of power, money, 
consumerism, and violence by mass media seems to play an 
important role in the making of extremely violent criminals 
under conditions of what Valencia Triana … named Gore 
capitalism. (Laurell, 2015, p.260f)
The period of neoliberal privatization and marketization since the 
1980s thus coincides with a profound crisis of Mexican society, in 
political, economic and cultural terms. One of the central issues in this 
book is the question to what extent a post-neoliberal turn has offered 
Latin Americans alternative developmental pathways that may enable 
a recovery of the social (Davies, 2009; Radcliffe, 2012; Elwood et al, 
2016). In contrast to the post-neoliberal turn in Latin American studies 
(Springer, 2015), scholars in Europe and in the US have pointed to 
neoliberalism’s distinctive capacity to retain its political, economic and 
cultural dominance in spite of the ostensible delegitimization of its basic 
assumptions (Crouch, 2011; Mirowski, 2013), following the financial 
crisis of 2008. Likewise, it seems doubtful that a post-neoliberal turn 
has taken place in Mexico at all, given the persistent consequences 
of privatization for Mexican society, in terms of the long-term 
precarization of the lives of a large part of the country’s population 
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and the still escalating spiral of insecurity and violence (Mercille, 2014; 
Paley, 2015; Castillo Fernandez and Arzate Salgado, 2016).
In everyday life, neoliberalism’s resilience is visible in the thriving 
market for popular psychological ideas and products, exemplified by 
the outlined, extraordinary and persistent, success of self-help books 
among Mexican readers. Self-help fills the gaps left behind by the 
decline of social bonds and solidarities, in so far as it is usually premised 
on the assumption that individual solutions to pressing life problems 
are both feasible and desirable (Nehring et al, 2016). Self-help recipes 
for personal development tend to emphasize the association between 
autonomous behavioral modification and improved life chances, in 
terms of the attainment of a range of material and immaterial goals, from 
the achievement of wealth and professional success to the realization 
of happiness and spiritual fulfillment. In this sense, the individualism 
of self-help appears as closely associated with neoliberalism’s emphasis 
on an entrepreneurial ethic of personal development. This ethic is the 
social-psychological corollary of neoliberalism’s political-economic 
program; it sustains this program by translating it into the common-
sense assumptions that define individuals’ everyday experiences and 
practices, and by rendering its basic tenets—market-based competition, 
autonomy, choice, private responsibility—unquestionable. Pierre 
Dardot and Christian Laval characterize neoliberalism’s entrepreneurial 
self along these lines:
Once the subject is fully conscious and in control of his 
choices, he [sic] is also fully responsible for what happens to 
him. The correlate of the ‘irresponsibility’ of a world that 
has become ungovernable by dint of its global character is 
the infinite responsibility of the individual for his own fate, 
for his capacity to success and be happy. Not being weighed 
down by the past, cultivating positive expectations, having 
effective relations with others: the neo-liberal management 
of oneself consists in manufacturing a high-performance 
ego, which always demands more of the self, and whose 
self-esteem paradoxically grows with its dissatisfaction at 
past performance. (Dardot and Laval, 2013, p.274)
The close association between popular self-help narratives and the 
figure of the entrepreneurial self is documented by the narratives of a 
wide range of advice books published over the past three decades. At 
the same time, these books exhibit notable variations on the theme 
of self-directed entrepreneurialism that merit closer consideration.
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Crisis and individual choice
The self-help books analyzed for this study hardly ever portray the crisis 
of Mexican society in socioeconomic terms. This seems to be due to 
two reasons. First, in line with the statistics shown above in Table 3.2, 
most of these books were written by foreign authors, translated into 
Spanish, and imported into Mexico. Second, the narratives of both 
imported and locally authored texts share an important feature, in 
that they tend elide the social context in which individuals’ personal 
development take place. In line with their didactic character, they offer 
detailed recipes for personal improvement, but they typically frame 
such improvement as the outcome of individual choices, irrespective 
of the social-structural arrangements that organize such choices.
A characteristic example of this narrative trend is Carlos Cuauhtémoc 
Sánchez’s Juventud en Extasis (Youth in Sexual Ecstasy) (1994). 
Originally published at the height of Mexico’s economic crisis, the 
book became a bestseller and launched its author’s enduring career 
as self-help entrepreneur known across the Hispanic world (Nehring, 
2009b). Juventud en Extasis addresses young people in their teens and 
twenties and offers them moral guidance on issues of sex and intimate 
relationships. Written as a novel, the book tells the story of Efrén, a 
student with a highly promiscuous way of life. When a former girlfriend 
undergoes an abortion and Efrén contracts a sexually transmitted 
disease, he seeks the guidance of Dr Asaf Marín, a medic who cures 
his illness and turns into Efrén’s mentor and moral guide along the way.
To better illustrate what I would like to tell you, I will 
present the case of two male patients I had recently. Both 
began to have very serious confrontations with their wives, a 
few months after getting married. When he was single, one 
of them belonged to gangs, was an expert seducer, and went 
frequently to bars and cantinas. The other was committed 
to his studies and to sports; in addition, for many years he 
played the guitar with his bohemian friends, and sometimes 
also for the local church. Afterwards, during his fights with 
his wife, both men became so upset that more than once 
they left their homes full of anger. Where do you think 
that the one and the other went? As is obvious, the first 
went to see prostitutes, drowned himself in alcohol, and 
did not return to his wife for several days. In contrast, the 
second paced the streets calming his anger with exercise, 
and sometimes he took refuge in the tranquility of a church 
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to think and recover his calm. These are extreme cases, but 
they are real. … If you have a balanced life before marriage, 
have fun in a decent and measured way, it is difficult for you 
to become corrupted after getting together with a woman. 
On the other hand, if you live unhealthily and without 
control, when marital problems arise, you will have the 
tendency to flee through the wrong door of licentiousness. 
In the developed countries the environment among the 
youth has been degraded so much that it is now very 
difficult to find successful young marriages; young people 
are used to so much depravation that after marriage – as 
seems logical – they do not manage to overcome their 
promiscuous habits. (Cuauhtémoc Sánchez, 1994, p. 37f; 
author’s translation)
This extract is noteworthy on several accounts. First, Cuauhtémoc 
Sánchez depicts the development of an intimate relationship as the 
result of individuals’ moral choices, as evident in the contrast he builds 
between the faithful husband and the man of low moral fiber who 
seeks out prostitutes after fights with his wife. Both in the preceding 
extract and throughout the book at large, Cuauhtémoc Sánchez does 
little to engage with the relational qualities of love, intimacy, marriage, 
and so forth. Rather, he takes an interest in the moral qualities that 
allow individuals to create and sustain intimate bonds that correspond 
to his distinctive Christian vision of human life.
Second, in so far as Cuauhtémoc Sánchez accounts for the social 
context in which individuals’ choices are set, he does so by considering 
the moral influence which society may have on individuals. In 
the preceding extract, his allusions to prostitutes, alcohol and the 
escalating moral degradation of contemporary youth hint at a larger 
theme of his work, namely the corrupting influence of modern life. 
Cuauhtémoc Sánchez’s self-help writing ultimately seems geared 
toward counteracting this moral corruption, and toward promoting 
his version of Christian morality and judging individuals’ choices 
accordingly.
Carlos Cuauhtémoc Sánchez deserves mention here because his 
work ranks among the big self-help bestsellers in Mexico throughout 
the late 1990s and 2000s. However, the emphasis on individual choices 
considered outside their social context pervades is typical of the sample 
of texts analyzed for this study. Consider, for instance, the words of 
another bestselling Mexican self-help author. Don Miguel Ruiz writes 
texts that claim to be inspired by Toltec spiritual traditions. His work 
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belongs to the long-established New Age movement, and it thus stands 
clearly apart from the Christian moralism of Carlos Cuauhtémoc 
Sánchez. In The Four Agreements, a 1990s bestseller that is still found 
frequently in bookshops around the world, Ruiz suggests:
Whatever people do, feel, think, or say, don’t take it personally. 
If they tell you how wonderful you are, they are not saying 
that because of you. You know you are wonderful. It is 
not necessary to believe other people who tell you that 
you are wonderful. Don’t take anything personally. Even if 
someone got a gun and shot you in the head, it was nothing 
personal. Even at that extreme. … Our mind also exists in 
the level of the Gods. Our mind also lives in that reality 
and can perceive that reality. The mind sees with the eyes 
and perceives this waking reality. But the mind also sees and 
perceives without the eyes, although the reason is hardly 
aware of this perception. The mind lives in more than 
one dimension. There may be times when you have ideas 
that don’t originate in your mind, but you are perceiving 
them with your mind. You have the right to believe or not 
believe these voices and the right not to take what they 
say personally. We have a choice whether or not to believe 
the voices we hear within our own minds, just as we have 
a choice of what to believe and agree with in the dream of 
the planet. (Ruiz, 1997, p. 20; author’s translation) 
Ruiz here discusses interpersonal communication in everyday life, in a 
language that is noticeably more abstract than that Carlos Cuauhtémoc 
Sánchez employs. The roots of his writing in New Age thought are 
apparent in his references to “the Gods”, the nature of reality, and so 
forth. However, Ruiz shares with Cuauhtémoc Sánchez an emphasis 
on personal choice. Ruiz’s emphatic claim that we “have a choice 
whether or not to believe the voices we hear within our own minds” 
implies that individuals have the capacity to define their self-image 
on their own and as a result of personal choices, regardless of the 
influence of others.
Here and elsewhere in The Four Agreements, Ruiz makes his case 
for individual choice in an otherworldly language that has nothing 
concrete to say about everyday life in contemporary Mexico. In this 
sense, a significant corollary of Ruiz’s emphasis on choice lies in his 
encouragement of a kind of mental inward turn. Personal truths, 
Ruiz suggests, can be gained through a journey that occurs within 
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individuals’ minds and that removes them, morally, emotionally and 
cognitively, from engagement with other people and the everyday 
world. Ruiz has nothing explicit to say about the crisis of Mexican 
society, but the mental withdrawal he encourages marks an important 
response to an everyday lifeworld that has little to offer by way of 
certainties and security. At least in part, this might explain the lasting 
success of his work.
Autonomy
The works of Carlos Cuauhtémoc Sánchez and Don Miguel Ruiz 
represent another typical feature of the sample of self-help texts analyzed 
for this chapter, in that they rely on a strongly voluntaristic model of 
self-identity. Their contrasting intellectual roots in Christian theology 
and New Age thinking notwithstanding, they both posit a self that 
is separate from the social world, autonomous and therefore able to 
determine its development to a large degree. Both authors’ emphasis 
on the importance of personal choices stems from this assumption of a 
self-enclosed and autonomous self. This assumption is equally apparent 
in other self-help texts on a range of subject matters. For instance, in 
Los Secretos de la Mente Millionaria (The Secrets of the Millionaire Mind), a 
translation of an English-language bestseller, Canadian self-help writer 
T. Harv Eker (2005) argues that accumulating substantial personal 
wealth is, above all, a matter of developing an appropriate mindset:
You surely have read other books, listened to CDs, taken 
part in courses and taken an interest in numerous systems 
to get rich, be it through real estate, stocks or business. But 
what happened? In the case of most people, not much! 
They gain a brief charge of energy, and later they return 
to their prior situation. Finally, we have an answer. It is a 
simple answer, which also is a law that cannot be mocked. 
Everything can be reduced to if your subconscious ‘financial 
pattern’ is not ‘programmed’ for success, nothing you might 
learn, nothing you might know and nothing you might do 
will change things very much. (Eker, 2005, p.12; author’s 
translation) 
Starting with this supposition, Eker goes on to develop a scheme 
for mental reprogramming that, he suggests, will allow his readers to 
develop a set of attitudes that will allow them to achieve great financial 
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Actions lead to results.
(Eker, 2005, p. 33; author’s translation; emphasis in original) 
As this “principle of wealth” illustrates, in Eker’s reasoning, there is 
a clear path from having the right thoughts to achieving the right 
results—wealth. Eker thus sells his audience a “get rich quick” scheme 
in which having the right attitude is all that matters, irrespective of 
social circumstances, such as one’s social class, pre-existing inherited 
wealth, family connections, and all the other factors that social research 
has long tied to individuals’ life chances (Dorling, 2014).
Dealing with a much less facile subject matter, in Autoboicot (Self-
Boycott), the Argentinian pastor and motivational speaker Bernardo 
Stamateas advises his readers on how to overcome negative attitudes 
that prevent them from leading a fulfilling life. In this context, he 
discusses the problem of low self-esteem, and he relates it to frequent 
criticism by others. He suggests:
The self-harming person [el automaltratante] does not move 
by the principle of ‘wanting’, but by ‘having to’ and by 
orders. [...] Because of this it is necessary that you gain 
control of your mind; and I am not talking about mind 
control or New Age, but rather about learning to fill your 
mind with words of recognition, of self-improvement, of 
action. Little by little your thoughts will change. Your worst 
enemy are not others, but your own mind. Your worst 
enemy are not criticisms by others but those you accept, 
those you allow to invade you and to slowly destroy you. 
Criticism and all the actions that are tied to it […] make 
you doubt what your real thoughts are and what thoughts 
others want to impose on you. (Stamateas, 2008, p.37: 
author’s translation) 
Stamateas’s account of mental self-control hinges on his assertion that 
your “worst enemy are not others, but your own mind.” Negative 
thoughts and the negative influence of others can be overcome once 
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individuals realize their power to control their own thoughts. Just like 
T. Harv Eker, Bernardo Stamateas thus relies in his self-help writing 
on the figure of an autonomous self that can be analyzed, understood 
and systematically guided toward ‘better’ thoughts and emotions. The 
voluntarism that is inherent in this notion of an autonomous self is a 
defining feature of the self-help texts analyzed for this study. These texts 
propose that a better life is possible on purely individual terms and as 
the result of individual action. In turn, this highly individualistic version 
of self-improvement hinges on the assumption of an autonomous self 
whose modification can have a far-reaching impact on individual’s life 
changes, regardless of social context.
Responsibility
As self-help books elide social context and the personal consequences 
of large-scale institutional arrangements, they also tend to place a heavy 
burden of responsibility on individuals’ shoulders. As has been noted 
elsewhere (Simonds, 1992; Hochschild, 2003), the advice literature on 
women’s intimate relationships is notable in this regard. A prominent 
example of these texts is Robin Norwood’s Las Mujeres que Aman 
Demasiado (Women Who Love Too Much). Originally published in 
the USA in 1985, the book has since been translated into a range of 
languages and re-published in various international editions. It has also 
spawned several sequels, such as Norwood’s Meditaciones para Mujeres que 
Aman Demasiado (Meditation for Women Who Love Too Much) (2012), and 
spin-offs by other authors, such as the recent Las Mujeres que se Aman 
Demasiado (Women Who Love Themselves Too Much) by Mexican writer 
Gabriela Torres de Moroso Bussetti (2017). At the time of writing, 
Las Mujeres que Aman Demasiado is available in Mexico in various print 
and electronic editions, through booksellers such as Librerás Gandhi. 
All this illustrates the book’s lasting influence, both in Mexico and at 
the international level. One of Norwood’s central points lies in the 
argument that women must take charge of their intimate lives, place 
their wellbeing center-stage, and apply their entrepreneurial energies 
to the management of their relationships with their partners, even if 
this may mean abandoning an unfulfilling or harmful bond:
From the beginning, Jill was willing to accept more 
responsibility than Randy for the beginning of their 
relationship and for keeping it going. Just as in the cases of 
so many other women who love too much, it was obvious 
that Jill was a very responsible person – a great entrepreneur 
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[emprendedora] who had been successful in many areas of 
her life, but who, nonetheless, had very little self-love. The 
accomplishment of her academic and professional objectives 
was not enough to balance the personal failure she had to 
bear in her couple relationships. Each time Randy forgot 
to call her on the phone constituted a heavy blow to the 
fragile image that Jill had of herself – an image that Jill 
afterwards would try heroically to strengthen, in order to 
receive some sign of affection from him. Her willingness 
to accept all the responsibility for a frustrated relationship 
was typical, as was her inability to evaluate the situation 
realistically and to take care of herself by abandoning the 
relationship when the lack of reciprocity became apparent. 
Women who love too much have little consideration for 
their personal integrity in a love relationship. (Norwood, 
1986, p.16f)
The story of Jill and Randy plays a large role in Norwood’s narrative, 
and she uses it to illustrate the harmful consequences of women’s 
inability or unwillingness to take responsibility for their intimate lives. 
This notion features quite clearly, for example, in the final sentence 
of the quoted extract, when Norwood writes that women “who 
love too much have little consideration for their personal integrity 
in a love relationship.” Norwood tells the story of Jill and Randy as a 
series of close personal encounters between two lovers whose intimate 
bond ultimately proves too weak to sustain their relationship. Broader 
considerations, for instance about gender or about the ways in which 
intimate attachment is complicated by the growing burden of work 
(Hochschild, 1997), do not feature explicitly in Norwood’s analysis 
of what went wrong between Jill and Randy. Intimate relationships, 
Norwood’s narrative implies, are a matter of the emotional bonds 
between two individuals, and the management of these bonds is likewise 
a matter of individual responsibility.
Las Mujeres que Aman Demasiado deserves mention here due to its 
considerable and lasting success. However, the emphasis on individual 
responsibility cuts across much of the sample of texts compiled for 
this study. It is central, for instance, to the—in Mexico—equally 
influential writing of Carlos Cuauhtémoc Sánchez. In Juventud en 
Extasis, individual responsibility is a major theme in the narrative of 
Efrén’s misadventures—he finds himself in trouble, with a sexually 
transmitted disease, due to his own carelessness, while his life improves 
dramatically once he realizes his mistakes, accepts Christian sexual 
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morality, and forms a lasting relationship that involves sexual abstention 
before marriage. Just like Norwood, Carlos Cuauhtémoc Sánchez 
does not interrogate the social, cultural and economic implications of 
Efrén’s life and issues such as Christian morality, abortion, and young 
people’s intimate relationships.
The moral grammar of self-help: neoliberalism, self-
identity and the denial of the social
The preceding analysis suggests that self-help writing seeks to empower 
individuals by encouraging them to adopt an ethos of autonomous 
self-making, characterized by self-directed choices and the assumption 
of individual responsibility for major life events. This narrative pattern 
corresponds to central features of the self-help genre and popular 
psychology at large identified elsewhere in the Western world (Rimke, 
2000; Hazleden, 2003, 2012). However, the academic literature also 
points to the capacity of therapeutic discourses to empower individuals 
by facilitating social bonds and collective agency (Wright, 2010). In the 
sample of books analyzed for this study, this capacity did not feature 
in significant ways, even though it comprised a broad range of books, 
both written locally by Mexican authors and imported from abroad.
Central to the moral grammar of these self-help texts is a de-
socialized self thinking, feeling, and acting without clear reference 
to the social processes and institutions in which self-development 
is situated. In a sense, thus, self-help writing contradicts the central 
assumption of the sociological project, namely that individual 
biographical trajectories are in various ways defined by structures 
and processes beyond immediate individual control or understanding 
(Mills, 1959; Durkheim, 2013). Importantly, self-help discourses thus 
underpin the pursuit of neoliberal political and economic projects in 
Mexico, by promoting the competitive, individualistic ethos of the 
marketplace in everyday social relationships and rendering invisible 
the collective ties that sustain these relationships. In turn, when self-
improvement is framed in terms of the purely individual agency of 
autonomous individuals, it becomes difficult to envision it as the result 
of collective political action. The individual empowerment of popular 
psychological self-help may therefore be accompanied by collective 
disempowerment. This collective disempowerment corresponds to 
the fundamental tenets of neoliberalism, which understands society 
in terms of market-based exchanges between private individuals, 
with the market acting as a natural regulator of these exchanges, to 
be warded off from political intervention (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010). 
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The assumptions that neoliberal theorists have articulated in academic 
publications are thus raised by self-help authors to the level of everyday 
common sense.
These far-reaching conclusions seem warranted for two reasons. 
On the one hand, as this chapter has shown, self-help texts are widely 
popular in Mexico. In so far as they are consumed by very large 
audience, they have the capacity to define common-sense assumption 
about the self, individual agency, and social relationships. On the other 
hand, given their popularity, these texts may be read as indicators of 
much broader public discourses that manifest in a variety of narrative 
forms and media—in political rhetoric and policy discourse, in 
news media, in TV talk shows, in online social media, in popular 
psychological texts, and so forth. Read this way, self-help books speak 
to the pervasiveness of neoliberal common sense in contemporary 
Mexican society.
Note
1  For a more comprehensive account of self-help texts in contemporary Mexico, 
see Transnational Popular Psychology and the Global Self-Help Industry (Nehring et al, 
2016).
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From Uribe’s “Democratic 
Security” to Santo’s Peace 
Accords with the FARC:  
Hate, Fear, Hope and other 
Emotions in Contemporary 
Colombian Politics
Fabio López de la Roche
Introduction
This chapter first presents explanatory factors concerning Colombian 
divergence from the recent tendency in several Latin American countries 
toward 21st century models of political socialism or in conjunction with 
post-neoliberal development. It then explores the complex legacy of 
political culture bequeathed by the governments of Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
(2002–06 and 2006–10), which involved an important military effort 
to combat the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC by 
its Spanish acronym) but was not able to defeat them, although their 
debilitation undoubtedly constituted one of the factors that led to 
the negotiations in Havana. Hatred and fear of the FARC, promoted 
by President Uribe’s discourse supported by the mainstream media 
and important journalistic sectors, are then explored as factors in 
conjunction with societal ideological homogenization around the policy 
of “Democratic Security.” The chapter moves onto the redefinitions in 
the political culture and hegemonic communicative regime promoted by 
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President Juan Manuel Santos (2010–14 and 2014–17), which favored 
promoting successful conclusion of the peace process with the FARC 
and initiation of a new, complex and still uncertain phase of national 
reconciliation among Colombians, notwithstanding obstinate Uribistic 
loathing of both the FARC, and President Santos and President Uribe’s 
systematic and ideological delegitimization of the peace process. This 
section also deals with issues concerning the October 2, 2016 plebiscite 
regarding the ratification of the Havana Accords, the triumph of the 
rejectionists, the renegotiation of the Accords with representatives of 
the rejectionists by the government’s negotiating team, the mobilization 
of the citizenry in defense of the Accords, and the ratification of the 
revised Accords by the Congress at the Teatro Colón. The chapter 
concludes by outlining some of the challenges and possible alternatives 
for the country’s political development during the post-Accord era.
Colombian divergence and its causes
Colombia has not had a “pink tide” experience since the beginning 
of the 21st century unlike several other Latin American countries1 
because it has not experienced anything like 21st century socialism 
or an eventual post-neoliberal alignment. Such divergence has a few 
explanations.
Colombian conservatism
During the 20th century Colombia was characterized by conservative 
politico-cultural hegemony. The Constitution of 1886, a normative 
model based on the fear of God and conservative, authoritarian and 
religious Catholic culture, led alternatives in partisan politics and ideas 
to coalesce around political and philosophical liberalism and the Liberal 
Party. Amid that conservative order, the political left, communist as 
well as socialist, seemed an extremist and marginal phenomenon. 
Such conservative hegemony and the religious tenor it imposed on 
culture and politics generated a conservative form of modernization 
that hampered societal dialogue with respect to modern values such 
as freethinking, scientific thought, secularism, separation of church 
and state, philosophical liberalism and socialism (Jaramillo Vélez, 
1994; Melo, 1990; López de la Roche, 1990). The system, in place 
for more than a century (until the Constitution of 1991), promoted 
and maintained an exclusionary, anti-leftist, anti-communist politico-
cultural tradition that stigmatized and obstructed the consolidation of 
the political and social left.
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A proposal for violent revolutionary societal 
transformation
A country that, for more than 50 years, maintained an internal conflict2 
without resolution facilitated stigmatization by the establishment of not 
only violent leftists but also of unarmed leftists and social movements, 
predicated on the false premise that protests were always insurgency 
sponsored. The presence of armed insurgents coupled with the 
seductive quality of revolutionary violence hampered development 
of a legal, civil, and democratic leftist political project (López de la 
Roche, 1994).
Sectarianism and concealed truths within the world of 
the left
Starting in the 1920s, leftist organizations and political parties played 
an important role in social justice and in the organization of laborers, 
campesinos (rural crofters) and other urban and rural worker sectors. 
Influenced by the Cuban revolution during the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s, such organizations and political parties in Colombia and 
Latin America became critics of the peripheral capitalist order and 
of its related exclusions and inequities. Despite contributions to the 
development of an emancipatory spirit, the study of national realities, 
and criticism and denunciation of repression, leftist political culture 
was not exempt from problems involving authoritarianism, dogmatism, 
and the absence of a democratic inclination for resolving differences or 
relational recognition of political, social, and cultural diversity.
The sectarianism of most of the legal left’s gradations—the Colombian 
Communist Party (with a pro-Soviet orientation), the Marxist-Leninist 
Colombian Communist Party (with a pro-China orientation), the 
Independent and Revolutionary Workers’ Movement (MOIR by its 
Spanish acronym, a pro-China oriented critic of armed struggle), and 
many Maoist, Stalinist and Trotskyist parties and groups—constituted 
an additional factor in the left’s struggle to unite and consolidate into 
a unitary and truly alternative project. Ideological intolerance was 
often the predominant tone among such leftist gradations during 
the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s: self-assumed political churches, each 
with their respective closed and incontrovertible truths. Such truth 
regimes expressed in a sectarian manner are still present among leftist 
organizations.
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The degradation of war and deterioration of the 
armed left’s ethics
Outside the purview of the legal left, responding to the leftist insurgent 
presence (and its use of extortion, kidnapping and association with 
drug trafficking to finance its growth) right-wing paramilitary groups 
entered the Colombian conflict during the 1990s and beginnings of 
the 21st century, degrading it with massacre and terror-based strategies 
of their own. The armed left’s reaction had unfortunate consequences 
involving deterioration of its ethics and revolutionary ideals. Too often 
it resulted in relationships with the illicit drug industry, human rights 
abuses, and a lack of respect for the lives and physical integrity of the 
civilian population. Resulting excesses, although characteristic of 
prolonged and crude military confrontations such as that experienced 
in Colombia, earned the insurgents strong animosity from broad sectors 
of Colombian society. Those sectors also, albeit indirectly, discredited 
the legal left because the mass media and anti-subversive government 
propaganda did not always make the necessary distinctions between 
armed leftists and the legal and civilian left.
Military containment of the FARC and societal drift 
toward the right (2002-2010)3 
Evaluations of democracies deal with how presidents think and how 
they manage governmental communications and the communicative 
rights of opposition parties and groups; and, by virtue of their 
presidential investiture, how they deal with their relationships as 
governments (and consequently as rulers) imbued with great rhetorical 
power with respect to the media and journalism. The communicative 
modalities used by leaders permit evaluation of their perspectives with 
regard to power, democracy, and political and cultural pluralism, and 
of their view of the opposition. It is posited that such elements are as 
important for evaluation of the democratic quality of political systems 
and governments as judicial and congressional independence from the 
executive and even the existence of truly free and competitive elections.
President Uribe, an extraordinary and skillful political communicator, 
made “propaganda” the dominant genre of his governmental 
communication, favoring mass media and audiences such as television 
and radio, to the detriment of the press and more reflexive and thought-
provoking discourse and audiences. Propaganda, which generally 
functions as a type of unilateral communication and rhetorical device, 
geared to persuasion, was created during his rule by the repeated 
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production of an insistent message to the effect that “the country 
is getting better every day,” “the war against the insurgency is being 
won,” and, as for the FARC, the idea that “the end of the end” of that 
organization was here and now.
So-called “community councils”, community meetings, and 
meetings with regional and local institutions—to discuss their needs 
and exigencies and to make decisions with regard to investments in 
works and projects—played a central role in Uribe Vélez’s governmental 
communications. Such “community” or “communal” councils became 
personalized and populist areas of communication. The president 
would take his ministers to account to the populace for their ministries’ 
performance, publicly interview them with respect to details of their 
administration and related supporting data, and might also reprimand 
them in such a hierarchical display of authority that it was popularly 
said “Uribe had vice-ministers rather than ministers.” President Uribe 
was the star of such weekly council performances, televised publicly 
for eight to twelve hours on Saturdays and which made it appear that 
he was responsible for all investment indulgences and regional progress. 
Through such publicly staged discourses, Uribe Vélez was portrayed 
as a moral leader and an exemplary fighter against political chicanery 
and corruption. One could thus allude to the communicative regimen 
(Brunner, 1988) characteristic of the Uribe government as “monologic” 
or “monoglossic” (single voiced) contrasted with “heteroglossic”, one 
inclusive of differing voices (Bajtín, 1993); or perhaps as an “oracular” 
regime where oracles would equate to paternalistic, vertical, and 
unilateral forms of communication where others do not count, their 
voices being faint or simply conceived of as servants or subjects (Evans, 
2008).
Government discourse and television news played a central role in 
Uribe’s monologist communication regimen. During his eight-year 
administration, Uribe’s discourse (supported by private television 
channels’ reports) homogenized and effectively reoriented public 
opinion through generation of a singularly “anti-FARC (antifariano4) 
nationalism” through discursive definition of the FARC as Colombian’s 
public enemy number one (López de la Roche, 2014). Such anti-
FARC nationalism catalyzed, multiplied and politically exploited 
the feelings of hate and rejection shared by millions of Colombians 
because of the FARC’s systemic kidnapping and extortion practices 
and because of such insurgency’s militaristic arrogance during the 
Pastrana government’s frustrated peace initiative in the Caguan region 
from 1998 through 2002.
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From a communicative perspective, such “anti-FARC nationalism,” 
which transformed the FARC into the “Colombian society’s primary 
culprit,” developed an inequitable victim visibility structure that 
prioritized FARC victims over others and reflected the FARC as 
more responsible than other victimizers. Right-wing paramilitary 
groups were never persistently criticized by Uribe Vélez despite the 
probability that they were much crueler and more heartless, with 
massacres and terror being central to their politico-military strategy. 
This strategy was designed to provoke the flight of affected campesinos 
and the abandonment of their lands, permitting paramilitaries to 
appropriate the lands while presenting themselves as guarantors of 
security. Paramilitaries were not subjected to systemic media and 
journalistic campaigns denouncing and confronting them in a manner 
that might have stemmed the bloodshed they occasioned, as was done 
with respect to the FARC.
Official propaganda, as well as the hegemonic media system’s 
anti-FARC propaganda, was perverted by a systemic “pedagogy of 
hate” directed against the organization, directly promoted through 
presidential discourse.5 In order to understand this phenomenon 
in all of its complexity it must be added that President Uribe not 
only managed to unify part of the country against the FARC but he 
also automatically categorized opposition politicians, intellectuals, 
journalists and other government opponents as FARC sympathizers 
or as “complicit in terror.” Such a nationalist construct produced a 
Manichean (but politically profitable) polarization of public opinion.
From another analytical angle, Uribe Vélez’s military policy in 
combating the FARC was, unequivocally, very successful. It resulted 
in the FARC’s expulsion from the Department of Cundinamarca, as 
well as from areas near the national capital, severely impairing their 
offensive capabilities. It also allowed government penetration into the 
jungles of the Colombian Orinoquia and Amazonia, where insurgent 
encampments and positions had been considered unassailable. With 
foreign aid,6 incorporation of advanced technology permitted improved 
coordination between intelligence and telecommunication functions 
as well as making location of insurgent encampments and areas of 
concentration much easier to find.
Given this, President Uribe’s anti-FARC military policy must 
be credited with helping to rebuild foreign investor confidence in 
Colombia as well as the confidence of Colombians themselves who, 
after many years of insecurity and fear of possible kidnapping by 
insurgents, were once again able to travel on principle highways. The 
“Democratic Security” policy also helped overcome the designation 
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of Colombia as a “failed state”—a state that lacked viability due to the 
inability to control its own territory. Nonetheless, while “Democratic 
Security” solved the problem of security on major highways and 
seriously degraded the FARC, it was unable to defeat them and, 
beginning in 2008, the FARC were able to restructure their military 
strategy.
As to right-wing paramilitaries, between 2004 and 2008, Uribe 
Vélez sponsored political negotiations with leaders and members 
of paramilitary groups who chose to avail themselves of a “Law of 
Justice and Peace” promulgated at his urging and thereby temporarily 
deactivating an important aspect of the armed conflict. However, 
many mid-level paramilitary commanders and lower ranking troops 
were subsequently recycled into new paramilitary groups or criminal 
gangs denominated “Bacrim” (an abbreviation for criminal gang). 
Senior paramilitary leaders (Salvatore Mancuso, “Jorge 40,” “Don 
Berna,” Hernan Giraldo, and ten others), rather than facing Colombian 
justice, were extradited to the US during May 2008 by President 
Uribe, making unfavorable information relating to their crimes, 
human rights violations, and complicity with politicians, businessmen, 
military personnel, and senior state officials unavailable to Colombian 
authorities.
Returning to the theme of government rhetoric with respect 
to “anti-FARC nationalism”, during the eight years of the Uribe 
government confrontational daily polarizing discourse directed at those 
who thought differently or had a different perception with respect 
to the country, the conflict, security or peace, produced a profound 
deterioration of confidence among diverse sectors of the population. 
Whole families, friends and coworkers became estranged; political 
conversation became shunned either tacitly or explicitly both at home 
and at work, all because of the official discourse of “good versus bad” 
and of “friends versus enemies” that permeated all of Colombian 
society.
Using a linguistic policy aimed at establishing an official ideological 
version of reality, Uribe Vélez prohibited reference in government 
documents to the existence of an armed conflict in Colombia; in its 
place they had to refer to a “terrorist threat,” consequently rendering 
victims of the conflict invisible.7 In order to complete such linguistic 
standardization, President Uribe sent the communications media a 
“Style Manual,” through which he sought to intrude into media and 
journalistic ideological orientations (Secretaría de Prensa, Presidencia 
de la República, 2009). President Uribe, having reaped widespread 
popularity among Colombians by virtue of his decisive and effective 
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struggle against the FARC, made perverse use of the authority he had 
acquired by subverting public discourse in a manner bordering not 
only on the unwarranted but also on the criminal. He did so in order 
to repeatedly stigmatize his critics and opponents, to illegally intercept 
the telephone conversations of the journalists, judges, intellectuals, 
and politicians he considered enemies or unreliable, and to organize 
smear campaigns against justices of the Supreme Court investigating 
collaborative relations and complicity between ultra-right-wing 
paramilitary leaders and Congressional leaders.
Such actions eventually miscarried, resulting in legal proceedings 
that led to imprisonment of more than 50 legislators. One of the most 
serious cases involved the Administrative Department for Security 
(DAS by its Spanish acronym) which, under the direction of Jorge 
Noguera (appointed directly by the President), provided paramilitary 
leaders in the departments of the Atlantic Coast with lists of trade 
unionists and leftist leaders to be intimidated or killed. An egregious 
example involved Professor Alfredo Correa de Andreis, a renowned 
sociologist and social researcher, and an exonerated victim of a judicial 
process fabricated to make him appear a member of the FARC, was 
shot and killed in Barranquilla in 2004 by hired assassins linked to 
paramilitaries. María del Pilar Hurtado, DAS director after Noguera, 
was also tried and sentenced by the Supreme Court, in her case 
for illegal telephone interceptions involving judges, journalists, and 
opposition politicians. Another of the Uribe government’s notorious 
cases of corruption involved the Agro Ingreso Seguro A.I.S. program, 
supervised by Agriculture Minister Andrés Felipe Arias. Arias illegally 
granted millionaire subsidies to affluent families on the Atlantic Coast 
in exchange for electoral support. Arias, under investigation by the 
Colombian attorney general’s office, is currently a fugitive seeking 
asylum in the US. It bears noting that, in conjunction with similar 
but less serious crimes by members of his administration involving the 
Watergate affair, US President Richard Nixon felt compelled to resign.
A further instance of impropriety involved Uribe’s efforts to secure 
constitutionally prohibited re-election in 2004 where, in order to obtain 
Congressional approval for a required Constitutional amendment, 
his government bought the votes of congressmen Yidis Medina and 
Teodolindo Avendaño. A case relating to such acts was adjudicated by 
the Supreme Court, resulting in the imprisonment of then ministers 
Sabas Pretelt and Diego Palacios for offering bribes and notarial posts8 
to the Congressmen in exchange for their votes.
In summary, not only can the corrupt nature of the Uribe 
government be affirmed but also the right-wing, authoritarian and 
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antiliberal nature of Uribe’s politico-communicative regimen and 
the consistency during its eight-year administration of a markedly 
anti-leftist discourse directed against defenders of human rights and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—in a country where, in 
the midst of symbolic exclusion and violent physical annihilation, the 
consolidation of a legal left has proven a tortuous process.
The delegitimization of liberal opposition and the legal left was 
compounded by the stigmatization of other voices critical of the 
government, especially those of intellectuals in favor of political 
solutions to the armed conflict through negotiation. President Uribe 
publicly referred to the latter (such as members of “Colombians for 
Peace”) as “the FARC’s intellectual bloc” (El Tiempo, 2009). Such 
stigmatization of intellectuals, journalists, and opposition politicians 
constituted a potential death sentence in a country where in many 
regions and marginal urban areas the state was unable to preserve its 
legitimate monopoly over the use of violence (effective authority being 
held by rightwing military groups). A number of those publicly accused 
via the then president’s obdurate discourse of being “accomplices 
of terrorism,” such as opposition journalist Hollman Morris, were 
forced to experience a veritable “calvary” of intimidations and threats 
(Morris, 2010). Between 2002 and 2010 the Uribe Vélez phenomenon 
reflected an experience similar to that of Fujimori in Peru—the abuse 
of authority attained as a result of a successful military containment 
policy against an insurgency in support of a complex of antidemocratic 
and criminal objectives.
Another rhetorically discursive track unfurled by President Uribe 
during his administration in public speeches, event inaugurations, 
and declarations to the mass media involved historical revisionism 
keyed to antiterrorism. In his version of history, he was portrayed as 
fighting “against 50 years of terrorism,” incorporating not only the 
paramilitaries and drug related car bombings of the 1980s and 1990s 
but also all historical insurgencies, notwithstanding the absence of any 
careful assessment regarding timing or concrete historical circumstances. 
Within that same mixed terrorist bag he included: human rights 
NGOs; the indigenous movement in El Cauca (which had dared to 
confronted him directly, questioning his authoritarian communication 
model and propaganda); the Marxist left; M-19 nationalists; critical 
journalists like Hollman Morris and Jorge Enrique Botero (whom 
he called “accomplices of terrorism”); and opposition politicians and 
intellectuals like Gustavo Petro and León Valencia, former insurgents 
who had resumed civilian life as part of the legal left to whom the 
president systematically referred as “guerrillas in civilian clothing.”
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Finally, Uribism’s legacy in terms of political culture generated 
a strong coterie comprised of millions of Colombians, a legion of 
unconditional believers in the former president, many voting for 
whatever candidates Uribe Vélez selects.9 Because they consider their 
leader not only a great political leader but also a great moral leader, 
many of them fail to acknowledge the crimes and abuses here analyzed 
and take as their own, without the tiniest criticism, the arguments 
posited by Uribe Vélez and his legislators in his Centro Democrático 
(the political party founded by Uribe after he left the presidency) to 
the effect that his ex-ministers and senior officials found guilty and 
imprisoned are victims of political persecution by a “politicized” justice 
system, biased against the former president and his party.
The governments of Juan Manuel Santos (2010–14 
and 2014–17) and its reconsideration of “Democratic 
Security”
Juan Manuel Santos won the 2010 election with the support of 
President Uribe and his political base on the expectation that he 
would continue the “Democratic Security” policy of his predecessor. 
However, to the surprise of those who expected continuity with the 
Uribe administration in which Santos had served as Defense Minister 
and as a promoter of the “Democratic Security” policy, the election 
resulted in important reconsideration of Uribist policies and discourse.
To begin with, Santos transformed the conflictive relationship 
and permanent tensions with Venezuela and Ecuador, neighboring 
countries ascribed to 21st century socialism—an anathema to Uribe. 
He advocated for Colombia’s integration into organizations of Latin 
American states such as the Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR, by its Spanish acronym), de-ideologized relations with 
Venezuela, and promoted a pragmatic coexistent relationship with 
regimes of differing political orientations. With a touch of irony, the 
media and journalists began to refer to President Santos’s relationship 
with Hugo Chavez as that among “new best friends.”
As for internal politics, promoting consensus, Santos surprised critics 
of doctrinaire Uribism by affirming in his speech in celebration of 
his electoral triumph on June 20, 2010 that “I am and I will be the 
president of national unity … Let us turn the page from hatred … No 
more pointless confrontation, no more divisions.” Toward that end, 
President Santos symbolically crossed clear and progressive boundaries 
with respect to the worst facets of Uribe Vélez’s politics. On August 7, 
2010, in one of his first post inauguration acts, he met with the justices 
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of the Supreme Court in an effort to normalize the conflictive relations 
that had characterized the Uribe era, clearly expressing his desire for 
a harmonious and respectful relationship with the courts. Another 
of his decisions involved support for the “Law of Victims,”10 a very 
important symbolic differentiation with respect to Uribism, which had 
consistently torpedoed such an initiative in Congress. A symbolically 
strategic demarcation was the recognition of the existence of internal 
armed conflict that his predecessor had systematically denied, arguing 
that it was a “terrorist threat.”
Santos promoted a “Land Law” to accelerate restitution of rural 
properties appropriated through paramilitary expansion during the 
1990s and the beginning of the 21st century. That decision generated 
resistance among regional economic, political, and military elements 
who had thrived due to paramilitary plundering of poor campesinos, 
and small and medium rural landowners. In some regions, the new 
government’s policies were challenged by purported “anti-restitution 
armies,” criminal bands comprised of recycled demobilized former 
paramilitaries known as BACRIM. While some restitution process 
leaders were able to remain on their land with government protection, 
others were displaced as a results of threats or assassinated.
With respect to communications, Juan Manuel Santos, the scion of an 
elite, cosmopolitan, capitalist family with an important background in 
the newspaper industry, replaced former President Uribe’s personalist, 
monologic, rural-plantation driven and confrontational communicative 
regime.11 Importantly buoyed by the presidential decisions described 
above, a liberal, democratic, pluralistic, less ideological and less dogmatic 
tone less linked to a traditional, rural and religious view of authority 
was adopted in the president’s public discourse and in the political life 
of the country.
Such repositioning of “Democratic Security” policies and discourse 
by President Santos earned him the animosity of former President 
Uribe, who was accustomed to the unconditional obedience of his 
officials and partisans. It also earned him the animosity of thousands 
of Uribist militants who began to brand the new president a “traitor” 
and to delegitimize his political decisions.
The Havana peace process between 2012 and 2016
The peace process with the FARC was made public at the end of 2012 
after a year of secret conversations between insurgent commanders and 
Santos government emissaries, which had concluded in the signing of 
a minimalist agenda permitting the initiation of a public phase to such 
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conversations. The peace process has been well conducted to date by 
President Juan Manuel Santos, who has proven a skilled strategist in 
the quest for peace. The support of the international community has 
been key to its success: Cuba as host of the talks and, together with 
Norway, guarantor of the agreements, with Venezuela and Chile as 
support countries. Experiences involving the quest for peace in South 
Africa, Guatemala, Salvador, Ireland, and other countries were studied 
in order to advance the dialogue and highly competent national and 
international advisers, expert in conflict negotiation, international 
humanitarian law, transitional justice, and rural land reform, were 
consulted.
The UN’s involvement was key for participation by social leaders 
from different regions of the country12 in the discussion of each of the 
Havana negotiation agenda items. This enabled placing of the agenda 
items before such different social groups in different regions and 
gathering related societal input and proposals. This work was carried 
out by the UN and the Centro de Pensamiento y Seguimiento al 
Diálogo de Paz (Center for Thought and Follow-up on Peace) of the 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia, which also organized working 
meetings with a view to preparing proposals for the dialogue table 
in Havana among representatives of a wide variety of victims of the 
armed conflict from different regions.13
One of the most important aspects of the Havana peace negotiations 
was the attention paid to victims’ reparations demands. Given the 
complexity of the Colombian conflict and the tensions arising from 
political polarization between Uribism and Santism not all groups of 
victims felt represented at the negotiating table; however, the UN, the 
Catholic Church, and the Universidad Nacional de Colombia made 
significant efforts to assure pluralistic and equitable representation of 
the different categories of victims. The inclusion through a liaison 
committee of active duty armed forces personnel and national police 
generals and senior officers in the Havana dialogues was also key to the 
negotiations’ progress on issues involving terms for ending the conflict 
(disarmament, security and reincorporation of the insurgents into 
civilian life). Such officers also having participated in the redesign of 
their respective institutions in order to adjust to the new, post-accord 
context.
Because for the main part negotiations took place in the midst of 
armed confrontation between the parties, they experienced several 
precarious moments, including: the FARC capturing (deemed a 
kidnapping by the government) General Alzate during November 2014 
(Semana, 2014); the death of 14 soldiers in Buenos Aires, Cauca, in 
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an attack by the FARC during April 2015 (Semana, 2015a); and the 
systematic attacks by the FARC during June 2015 against electrical and 
oil infrastructure in Buenaventura, Tumaco, and Putumayo (Semana, 
2015b). These episodes seriously threatened continuation of the peace 
talks.
The 2014 presidential election (May and June14) posed an additional 
challenge to the peace process because the Uribist radical opposition 
had, during the seven years of the Santos administration, generated not 
only visceral hatred against the FARC and Manuel Santos, but also, 
in parallel fashion, spawned significant fear with respect to the peace 
process and the transition of the FARC from a military insurgency 
into a political party. While Uribe’s designated candidate, Oscar Ivan 
Zuluaga, won the most votes in the first round, Santos managed to 
win the second round thanks to supporters of the democratic left, 
Clara López’ Alternative Democratic Pole Party and Gustavo Petro’s 
Progressives Party, key allies in supporting political negotiation to end 
the war.
The Havana Peace Accords as agreements for 
democratization and social modernization
The agenda for discussions on termination of the armed conflict 
included six agreed upon items: comprehensive rural reform; political 
participation; end of the conflict; solution to the problem of illicit 
drugs; victims’ rights (including the transitional justice component); 
and ratification and implementation of the items agreed upon.
With respect to political participation, the objective involved 
conversion of the FARC into a political party so that, upon 
abandonment of its weapons, verbal arguments rather than bullets and 
bombs would be used to defend and promote their ideals. The topic 
of rural reform involved recovering a countryside totally neglected by 
ruling groups during the past half century. Modernization includes 
recording ownership to the 50% of rural property that neither has 
titles of record nor pays taxes, the granting of land to those displaced 
by the armed conflict, the construction of tertiary roads, and the 
implementation of improvements in rural healthcare and education. 
A key component of the accords deals with creation of the institutions 
required for implementation of transitional justice: the Special 
Jurisdiction of Peace (JEP in its Spanish acronym), the Commission 
for Clarification of the Truth (CV in its Spanish acronym), and the 
Unit for Search of Disappeared Persons (60,000 estimated). Those 
eminently democratic and modernizing tasks that have nothing to 
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do with socialism are currently major sources of tension among the 
Uribist right.
Reasons why the NO triumphed in the October 2, 
2016 plebiscite
Although unnecessary from a legal perspective, President Santos 
decided to submit the peace accords with the FARC to a public 
plebiscite as a means of strengthening the political legitimacy of the 
peace negotiations with the insurgency.  Colombians would vote yea 
or nay to express either their support for or opposition to the peace 
accords. 
Despite being well designed and despite its success, the peace process 
was very poorly executed from the perspective of public opinion. Not 
only were there no public-to-state-to-government communication 
policies in place with respect to the Havana Accords but President 
Santos himself was communicatively ineffective, failing to express 
positive emotions such as “hope,” “enthusiasm for peace,” or “a 
collective sense for the future.” In addition, the excessively confident 
tone of the official promotional campaign during the final weeks 
preceding the plebiscite generated a false sense of security (and of 
governmental arrogance) when public opinion surveys indicated that 
the YES vote was likely to win with 70% of the vote. An additional 
factor involved the systematic failure of the Santos government to 
comply with agreements with social movements such as Dignidades 
Campesinas de Boyacá, truckers and educators, which led thousands of 
Colombians to vote NO, not so much because of their opinion with 
respect to the peace process but as a de facto plebiscite on the overall 
performance of the government.
The FARC’s poor communication, its delayed apology to victims 
(on September 26, 2016, only a few days after signing of the Peace 
Accord), as well as the contrast between its last-minute agreement to 
return land to victims compared with its initial assertion that “[w]e have 
neither the money nor the property to make reparations” obviously 
also failed to favorably impact the YES vote.
The mass media played a somewhat negative part in the process 
as the two major news providers on private television channels 
(essential sources of information for Colombians) made very limited 
supplemental information publicly available. Since the beginning of 
2015, one network, RCN,15 has been actively opposed to the peace 
process and through four daily programs on RCN News, its news 
channel and an important forum for peace process opponents, echoes 
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and expounds on the positions of former President Uribe and the 
Centro Democrático party’s Congressional delegation (López de la 
Roche, 2018b).
Moreover, former President Uribe and the Uribist right’s policy 
of “lying and myth building – falsehood and fear” (and slogans like 
“takeover of the country by Castro-Chavism”, “Santos will deliver 
the country to Cuba”; we are headed toward a model like Maduro’s 
Venezuela) played their part in the NO vote’s success. A dirty 
propaganda campaign in traditional media and social networks by the 
Centro Democrático against the YES vote (unveiled with a mixture 
of cynicism, arrogance and ingenuity by its director, Juan Carlos 
Vélez, in a La República interview (2016)) implemented a deception-
based strategy designed to generate indignation against the Havana 
Accords. Less well-off citizens were provoked with allegations that the 
Santos government would pay insurgents two million pesos monthly 
while better off citizens were incited by criticism of alleged insurgent 
impunity, eligibility for public office and resulting increased taxation 
(La Republica, 2016).
“Salvation” of the Peace Accords
The NO vote triumphed by a little over 50,000 votes, a precarious 
triumph stained by illegitimacy given the surprising revelations of 
Juan Carlos Vélez on October 5 with respect to NO vote promoters’ 
strategies for emotional manipulations of the voters. Reflecting the 
fact that the difference in voting between proponents and opponents of 
the Peace Accords had been negligible (in spite of having lost, almost 
half the country had voted YES) and that many of the NO voters 
had been manipulated through the Centro Democrático’s admittedly 
dirty campaign, a broad student and citizen mobilization in defense of 
the Havana Accords was organized between Monday October 3 (the 
day after the plebiscite) and Wednesday October 5. On October 5, a 
huge concentration of university students filled the Plaza de Bolivar 
in Bogotá clamoring for peace under the slogans “No more war!” 
and “Agreements now!” and for a swift new agreement between the 
Santos government and spokespersons for NO voters in order to break 
the impasse generated by the victory by opponents of the YES vote. 
Concurrently, similar mobilizations took place in numerous cities in 
support of the Peace Accords and of their renegotiation with partisans 
of the NO vote (López de la Roche, 2018a).
Despite the need to seek consensus among YES and NO voters, 
the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Juan Manuel Santos 
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on Friday, October 7, 2016, constituted a formidable political and 
symbolic endorsement by the international community of the manner 
in which the quest for peace had been managed and of the manner 
in which victims’ interests were to be dealt with. Additionally, on 
October 12, indigenous movements and numerous regional and local 
associations throughout the country joined the students in backing the 
peace process with another massive march to the Plaza de Bolivar. The 
resulting mobilization by the citizenry, animated by genuine feelings 
of hope and the conviction that war had to be overcome generated a 
complex new scenario (Semana, 2016).
Discussions between government negotiators with representatives 
of the different sectors who had led the campaign for the NO vote16 
permitted the presentation of their objections, many of which were 
deemed acceptable. However, notwithstanding the concessions made by 
government negotiators and FARC spokesmen, the obtuse opposition 
of former President Uribe was unrelenting. The opposition was partly 
predicated on Uribe’s intransigence with respect to transitional justice, 
the absence of prison as punishment for insurgent leaders, opposition 
to comprehensive rural reform and to political participation by former 
FARC commanders). It also involved his personal rivalry with Santos 
for his “betrayal” of “Democratic Security” and calculations concerning 
the electoral benefits of radical opposition to the accords in the looming 
2018 presidential election, the latter probably carrying more weight 
than judicious assessment of the points renegotiated17.
Given such circumstances, the Santos government played its only 
remaining card by signing a new accord with the FARC incorporating 
the points agreed to with opponents other than former President 
Uribe. The new accords between Santos and the FARC were signed 
on Thursday, November 24, 2016, at the Teatro Colón in a much more 
modest and lackluster ceremony than the one prior to the October 2, 
2016 plebiscite. Rather than a second plebiscite, the new version of 
the accords were ratified by the Congress subject to approval by the 
Constitutional Court, making it possible to salvage the peace process 
and the agreements with the FARC but at the cost of a partial loss of 
legitimacy due to the electoral victory of the NO vote and because 
of the inability to secure the support of Uribe and his partisans: 




At stake today in Colombia is not a transition to 21st century socialism 
or to a post-neoliberal economic-political model. What is deeply 
revolutionary in the contemporary Colombian experience is the 
severance of the exercise of politics from its relationship to violence, 
a development which now applies not only to the left but also to the 
right and the extreme right. They too must now exercise politics, 
especially in remote regions, dissociating themselves from paramilitary 
groups engaged in the murder of social and leftist leaders. Overcoming 
the internal armed conflict and displacing it from its privileged place 
on the political, electoral, and media agenda is likely to allow social 
agenda issues (health, education, improvement of rural life, employment 
and equity) to come to the fore in its place.
Contrary to Uribe’s negative discourse and to that of his political and 
media spokesmen, as FARC insurgents were incorporated into rural 
settlement transition zones during the first half of 2017, the former 
fighters validated their strong desire for peace and for reincorporation 
into civil life to the population and the media. The delivery of 7,132 
of their weapons to UN representatives at the different transition 
zones on Tuesday, June 27, 2017 reaffirmed such determination to 
national and international public opinion. The reauthorization of a 
second UN mission to verify implementation of the Teatro Colón 
agreements on July 10, 2017 signified renewed backing for the peace 
process on the part of international society. The peace process is 
highlighting profound changes in the former FARC insurgents’ political 
culture. They now accept democratic institutions (the decisions of 
the Constitutional Court and Special Peace Jurisdiction, for example) 
and have reconsidered not only ideological ties to orthodox Marxism 
but also militaristic and authoritarian gambits typical of any politico-
military insurgent organization.
Transformation and mental broadening in the political culture of 
important sectors of the military, the national police and liberal and 
conservative political classes are also being witnessed, notwithstanding 
the strong still existent national polarization concerning peace with 
the FARC and the implementation of the accords. However, and 
as part of the current situation’s complexity foreshadowing a strong 
politico-ideological conflict during the post-accord period, significant 
opposition still exists among the sector of the right embodied in 
Uribism, several sectors of conservatism, a strong Protestant and 
Catholic moralistic right-wing, and social sectors victimized by the 
FARC, all of which maintain ideological, exclusionary, and revanchist 
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postures, still resisting or not yet prepared for reconciliation and 
forgiveness.
Sectors of the right, encouraged by Uribe Vélez’s intransigent 
discourse and his rejection of everything in the Peace Accords that 
provides former insurgents with the right to participate in politics 
or that creates an equitable transitional justice system, seek a return 
to power in 2018 using the same discourse of fear and hate that has 
characterized them politically during the past 15 years of the nation’s 
history. 
Opposition to such sectors will need to be based on democratic 
strategies emphasizing peace-building and compliance with the accords, 
reconstruction of trust and hope among Colombians, progress in 
attaining social justice, and in the construction of modern institutions 
in rural and marginal urban areas, and minimization of widespread 
corruption among almost all political forces. As John Paul Lederach 
(2016) has emphasized, periods of armed conflict tend to dehumanize 
mutual perceptions among enemies while peace processes favor the 
re-humanization of social relations.
It is probable that this process of re-humanization of relations between 
Colombians which seeks the generation of hope and confidence 
in reconciliation and the attainment of collective purposes is only 
just beginning, and that between 30 to 50 years will be required to 
consolidate it. But the truth is that with the current peace process, the 
first steps in that direction have already been taken.
Notes
1  Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina and briefly Paraguay during the 
Lugo government.
2  The FARC were born during 1964 and only started reincorporation into civil 
society in July 2017.
3  For more detailed information concerning the analytical elements with respect to 
Uribe’s political culture heritage, see López de la Roche (2014).
4  A term coined by the author, López de la Roche (2014).
5  The FARC facilitated their transformation by Uribe into Colombian society’s 
“worst monster” through their absurd justification for kidnapping as a purported 
“social tax.”
6  Primarily involving US sponsored Plan Colombia. Assistance under Plan Colombia 
reallocated from the War on Drugs to counterinsurgency operations during the 
administration of President Pastrana (1998–2002) had permitted retooling of the 
Colombian armed forces which had suffered crippling blows during the 1990s at 
the hands of the FARC, including the loss of government garrisons and dozens 
of soldiers taken prisoner, especially during the administration of Ernesto Samper 
(1994–98).
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7  At the conclusion of the Uribe administration, its government shelved a 
Congressional proposal for a “Law of Victims,” with one of its ideologues, José 
Obdulio Gaviria, daring to affirm that “no displaced persons existed in Colombia 
but rather, only internal migrants” (Revista Cambio, 2008).
8  Notaries are much more important, prestigious and lucrative than in the US, more 
akin to quasi-judiciary county clerkships.
9  They do so for various reasons, including: because they were victims of extortion 
or kidnapping by the FARC; for their ideological affinity with President Uribe’s 
“hard hand” discourse and actions against the insurgents; or because of fanatical 
and uncritical assimilation of the “democratic security” discourse.
10  The proposal sponsored by progressive sectors of the Liberal Party involved 
providing reparations for the consequences of past and recent political violence to 
a broad group of victims.
11  For more complete information concerning the communicative regimes of 
the Uribe Vélez and Santos administrations and with respect to hegemonic 
characteristics of other “communicative regimes” in Colombia, see López de la 
Roche (2013).
12  Indigenous peoples, campesinos, Afro-Colombians, settlers, small and medium 
range entrepreneurs, and so on.
13  The author participated with social leaders and victims as a member of the Centro 
de Pensamiento y Seguimiento al Diálogo de Paz of the Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia during each of its combined working sessions, serving as the moderator 
of a 30-person dialogue working group.
14  Colombia requires an absolute majority of the popular vote for a first round electoral 
victory and a second round was required in the 2014 election.
15  Radio Cadena Nacional, S.A. (the National Radio Network) a provider of mass 
radio and television programming with a presence in 50 countries.
16  For example, Protestant pastors, ultraconservative former attorney general Alejandro 
Ordóñez, the Conservative Party sector led by Martha Lucía Ramírez, Francisco 
Santos and former President Uribe of the Centro Democrático.
17  The first round of presidential elections was held in Colombia on 27 May 2018. As 
no candidate received a majority of the vote, a second round was held on 17 June. 
In this round Ivan Duque, candidate of right-wing party Centro Democrático, 
was elected.
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Cine Bajo Tierra: Ecuador’s 
Booming Underground 
Cinema in the Aftermath of the 
Neoliberal Era
Rafael Ponce-Cordero
I film, therefore I am.
Nelson Palacios, Ecuadorian filmmaker
When I am not around anymore, I want to be remembered 
as a woman who was important. I want to make something 
real, so when people ask “Who was Irma Herrera?” they 
will remember me … as the pioneer of cinema in [my 
hometown of] El Triunfo.
Irma Herrera, Ecuadorian filmmaker
Film or die!
Fernando Cedeño, Ecuadorian filmmaker 1
There is a cinematic boom going on in Ecuador. Long gone are 
the days when Ecuadorian films were few and far between, when 
there could be prolonged periods of time—sometimes several years 
in a row—without a single movie release, when every new motion 
picture felt like the first. In fact, when La tigra (The tigress), a film 
based on a short story by José de la Cuadra and directed by Camilo 
Luzuriaga, premiered in 1990, renowned Ecuadorian poet and cineaste 
Ulises Estrella sardonically criticized its promoters’ apparent inaugural 
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pretensions (De la Vega, 2016, pp. 20–21). La tigra was not the first 
feature-length fictional film ever made in the South American country, 
of course,2 but it quickly became—and, today, it still is—the biggest 
box office hit in the history of Ecuadorian cinema.3
La tigra’s success notwithstanding, the 1990s saw the release of only 
three additional Ecuadorian movies, one of them also directed by 
Luzuriaga, and the other two by various members of just one single 
family. Sensaciones (Sensations), by siblings Juan Esteban Cordero and 
Viviana Cordero, premiered in 1991; Entre Marx y una mujer desnuda 
(Between Marx and a naked woman), by Luzuriaga, in 1996; and Ratas, 
ratones, rateros (Rats, mice, petty thieves), by Juan Esteban and Viviana’s 
younger brother, Sebastián Cordero, in 1999. The latter film, arguably 
the first one made in the South American nation with international 
production values, marks a definite watershed in the history of 
Ecuadorian cinema, to such an extent that it is usually heralded as 
the cornerstone of today’s so-called boom. Cordero would go on to 
become the most recognizable Ecuadorian filmmaker of all time both 
inside and outside his country, and to helm projects backed by global 
capital, such as 2004’s Crónicas (Chronicles), a Mexico/Ecuador co-
production shot in Ecuador with American, Mexican, Spanish, and 
Ecuadorian actors; 2009’s Rabia (Rage), a Mexico/Spain/Colombia 
collaboration filmed in Spain with Colombian, Mexican, and Spanish 
performers; and 2013’s Europa Report, an American movie made in 
the US with an international cast featuring American, Romanian, 
Swedish, Polish, and South African talent.
After Ratas…, there seemed to be an awakening of filmmaking 
enthusiasm in Cordero’s home country. While the 1990s gave us 
a meager four feature-length movies, for an average of one release 
every two and a half years, the following decade would see the pace 
of production increase to an average of three releases per year. Some of 
the works produced in the wake of Cordero’s opera prima are Alegría 
de una vez (My one time joy), directed by Mateo Herrera, and Sueños 
en la mitad del mundo (Dreams in the middle of the world), by Carlos 
Naranjo, in 2001; Un titán en el ring (A titan in the ring), by Viviana 
Cordero, and Fuera de juego (Offside), by Víctor Arregui, in 2002; Cara 
o cruz (Heads or tails), by Camilo Luzuriaga, and Tiempo de ilusiones 
(Time for illusions), by Germán Aguilar and Margarita Reyes, in 2003; 
1808–1810: mientras llega el día (1808–1810: until that day comes), by 
Camilo Luzuriaga, and the already mentioned Crónicas, in 2004; Jaque 
(Check), by Mateo Herrera, in 2005; and Qué tan lejos (How much 
further), by Tania Hermida, in 2006. The latter film is to this day the 
second largest box office hit in the history of Ecuadorian cinema, the 
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only one other than La tigra to sell over 220,000 tickets, and with 24 
weeks in movie houses it had one of the longest theatrical runs on 
record for a domestic production. It was around this time—the mid 
to late 2000s—when some people started talking about an Ecuadorian 
cinematic boom.
This was not unreasonable. Some of these movies were good, some 
were selected to participate and even won awards at prestigious film 
festivals from around the world, and some were commercially successful 
or at least viable. And, while an average of three releases per year 
may look like nothing to write home about, it was progress. Yet the 
best was still to come: in the late 2000s and early 2010s, production 
climbed again, at such a pace that 2012 saw the theatrical release of six 
Ecuadorian motion pictures, thirteen more premiered during 2013, 
and 2014 brought a record sixteen.4
State support has been decisive in the development of this still modest 
cinematic boom, especially in the last decade or so—in other words, 
since Rafael Correa’s rise to power in 2007. Charismatic leader of what 
he called a citizens’ revolution, sympathizer of the new socialism of 
the 21st century, and self-proclaimed anti-neoliberal, Correa did not 
hide his conviction that the state can—and should—intervene in the 
most diverse facets of national life, including the cultural field. He also 
believed that those diverse facets, and in particular the cultural field, 
must serve a common good defined as the advancement of the key 
values of the citizens’ revolution. Ecuador’s Ley de Cine (Film Law), 
which was promulgated in 2006 and thus predated Correa’s presidency 
by about a year (Maldonado, 2014), as well as the subsequent creation 
of the Consejo Nacional de Cinematografía (National Council of 
Cinematography) or CNCine, recently renamed and reconfigured 
as the Instituto de Cine y Creación Audiovisual (Institute of Cinema 
and Audiovisual Creation) or ICCA, have been instrumental in the 
formation and consolidation of an embryonic Ecuadorian film industry 
mainly through the distribution of subsidies to the tune of $1 million 
per year on average.5 Between 2007 and 2015, CNCine financed 
almost 400 projects (Criollo, 2016).
Some motion pictures made in Ecuador over the past ten years—
many of them with state funding—include Cuando me toque a mí (When 
my turn comes, released in English as My Time Will Come), directed by 
Víctor Arregui, and Esas no son penas (Those are not sorrows, released 
as Anytime Soon), by Anahí Hoeneisen and Daniel Andrade, in 2007; 
Retazos de vida (Offcuts from real life), by Viviana Cordero, in 2008; 
Impulso (Impulse), by Mateo Herrera, Los canallas (The scoundrels, 
released as Riff Raff), by Ana Cristina Franco, and Blak Mama [sic], by 
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Miguel Alvear and Patricio Andrade, in 2009; A tus espaldas (Behind 
you), by Tito Jara, and Prometeo deportado (Deporting Prometheus), 
by Fernando Mieles, in 2010; En el nombre de la hija (In the name of 
the daughter, released as In the Name of the Girl), by Tania Hermida, 
and Pescador (Fisherman), by Sebastián Cordero, in 2011; Sin otoño, sin 
primavera (No autumn, no spring), by Iván Mora Manzano, and Mejor no 
hablar (de ciertas cosas) (Better not to talk (about certain things), released 
as The Porcelain Horse), by Javier Andrade, in 2012; No robarás (a menos 
que sea necesario) (Thou shalt not steal (unless it is necessary)), by Viviana 
Cordero, Mono con gallinas (Monkey with chickens, released as Open 
Wound), by Alfredo León, Distante cercanía (Distant proximity), by Alex 
Schlenker and Diego Coral, El facilitador (The facilitator), by Víctor 
Arregui, Tinta sangre (Blood ink), by Mateo Herrera, La llamada (The 
call, released as On the Line), by David Nieto Wenzell, and Silencio en 
la tierra de los sueños (Silence in the land of dreams, released as Silence 
in Dreamland), by Tito Molina, in 2013; Quito 2023, by César Izurieta 
and Juan Fernando Moscoso, Saudade (Melancholy), by Juan Carlos 
Donoso, Sexy Montañita, by Alberto Pablo Rivera, Feriado (Holiday), 
by Diego Araujo, and A estas alturas de la vida (At this point in life), by 
Manuel Calisto and Alex Cisneros, in 2014; Adolescentes (Teenagers), 
by Rogelio Gordon, Sed (Thirst), by Joe Houlberg, La descorrupción 
(The de-corruption), by María Emilia García, and Ochentaisiete (Eighty-
seven), by Anahí Hoeneisen and Daniel Andrade, in 2015; Alba, by 
Ana Cristina Barragán, Entre sombras: Averno (Between shadows: Hell), 
by Xavier Bustamante Ruiz, UIO: sácame a pasear (UIO: take me for 
a ride),6 by Micaela Rueda, Tan distintos (So different, released as An 
Ocean Between Us), by Pablo Arturo Suárez, Translúcido (Translucent), 
by Leonard Zelig, and Sin muertos no hay carnaval (There is no carnival 
without dead people, released as Such is Life in the Tropics), by Sebastián 
Cordero, in 2016; Tal vez mañana (Perhaps tomorrow), by Dwight 
Gregorich, Sólo es una más (It is just one more), by Viviana Cordero, 
and Quijotes negros (Black Quixotes), by Sandino Burbano, in 2017; 
Oscuridad (Darkness), by Jaime Rosero, Cenizas (Ashes), by Juan 
Sebastián Jácome, and Agujero negro (Black hole), by Diego Araujo, in 
2018. Also worth mentioning are feature-length documentaries such 
as Descartes (Scraps), directed by Fernando Mieles (2009); Abuelos 
(Grandparents), by Carla Valencia (2010); Con mi corazón en Yambo 
(With my heart in Yambo), by María Fernanda Restrepo (2011); 
La bisabuela tiene Alzheimer (My great-grandmother has Alzheimer’s 
disease), by Iván Mora Manzano (2012); La muerte de Jaime Roldós (The 
death of Jaime Roldós),7 by Manolo Sarmiento and Lisandra Rivera 
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(2013); Alfaro Vive Carajo,8 by Mauricio Samaniego (2015); and Si yo 
muero primero (If I die first), by Rodolfo Muñoz (2017).
A boom indeed, especially for a country such as Ecuador, a tiny 
peripheral fragment of a Latin American film industry that is itself 
already peripheral in the context of global capitalism. Important 
though it may be, however, this is not the Ecuadorian cinematic boom 
that this chapter wants to examine. For there is a different, unofficial, 
subterranean cinematic boom also going on in the South American 
nation.
The ‘other’ boom
“It turns out there is another cinema in Ecuador,” Quito-based visual 
artist and filmmaker Miguel Alvear wrote in 2009. “It is such a different 
cinema that the word another should be capitalized,” he added. Yet 
which one of these distinct expressions of the Ecuadorian cinematic 
imagination deserves to be defined by its alleged otherness was then, 
and remains, a debatable issue. Alvear went on to characterize this 
alternative Ecuadorian cinema in terms of its relationship with the 
marketplace and the audience:
You will not find these movies on the screens of any theater 
in the country. Their place, where they thrive and feel like 
home, is the pirate DVD market, where anything goes, 
where everything can be sold and bought, where hierarchies 
such as artistic-commercial, good-bad, Gringo-European-
Latino have been obliterated forever. And, believe it or not, 
in contrast to the other Ecuadorian cinema—the semi-
subsidized one that wins prizes at international festivals—
this cinema sells like hotcakes. (Alvear, 2009a, p.28)
Together with film critic and academic Christian León, Alvear 
conducted an investigation that resulted in the 2009 book Ecuador 
bajo tierra: videografías en circulación paralela (Underground Ecuador: 
videographies in parallel circulation), still today the best source of 
information about this movement. After considering other options 
such as amateur, exploitation, trash, and low-budget cinema, they 
concluded that the most fitting adjective to describe the phenomenon 
that they had just “unearthed” was underground (León, 2009, pp.12–13), 
and thus labeled it “Ecuador bajo tierra” (EBT). A marveled quality is 
palpable throughout their writing after the realization that
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there was a complex system of production, distribution, 
and commercialization that did not go through the 
quality standards, the film schools, the filmmakers guild, 
the audiovisual production structures, the commercial or 
alternative movie theaters, the Internal Revenue Service, 
the Ley de Cine regulations, or the jurisdiction of cultural 
authorities. We discovered that there was a massive 
audiovisual universe running parallel to the institutionalized 
realm of cinema, the lettered culture, the middle class, and 
the formal market. (León 2009, p.11)
Another voice that contributed to the task of making these subterranean 
movies visible was writer and academic Gabriela Alemán, who also 
in 2009 published an essay on the pirate DVD market in Ecuador 
included in the edited volume Latsploitation, Exploitation Cinemas, and 
Latin America. That same year, Alvear joined forces with Ochoymedio, 
a cultural organization led by film producer Mariana Andrade, to 
put together the EBT film festival. This event, which has had three 
additional iterations since then, marked the first encounter between 
these underground creators and mainstream audiences in Quito and 
Guayaquil. In 2010, Alvear would revisit the EBT movement, this 
time in a docu-fiction titled Más allá del mall (Beyond the mall). 
Using his own experience as a commercially unsuccessful filmmaker, 
a fictionalized Alvear played by actor Andrés Crespo sets out to 
understand where the ‘real’ Ecuadorian cinema is, distressed by the 
revelation that most domestic productions do not turn a profit—his 
Blak Mama, for instance, ends up $247,267 in the red and is seen in 
theaters by only 1,922 moviegoers. The protagonist then ‘discovers’ 
the elusive EBT filmography, travels around the country interviewing 
these popular filmmakers, and winds up deciding to bring Blak Mama 
to the pirate DVD distributors and let them copy it—he just wants 
his work to reach an audience. Throughout Más allá…, as throughout 
most of the texts and media dealing with the EBT phenomenon, the 
comparison between the two sides of Ecuadorian cinema is inevitable, 
awkward, and instructive.
The films that belong to the post-Ratas… and especially post-Qué 
tan… explosion of ‘mainstream’ filmmaking creativity in Ecuador 
described above have a number of things in common. Their participants 
see themselves as auteurs, regard what they make as art, usually come 
from Quito or Guayaquil or live in those cities, have attended film 
school in Ecuador or abroad, are members of the upper middle class 
and tell their stories from that specific perspective—even if they depict 
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poverty or include lower class characters—and their productions have 
an average budget of $370,000 (García Velásquez, 2017, p.91) that 
would be unthinkable without state subventions, among other reasons 
because very few people go to the theater to watch these expensive 
movies.
Until the late 2000s, each new Ecuadorian production—being a 
relatively isolated novelty—was able to attract an average of 100,000 
moviegoers (García Velásquez, 2017, p.84). Beginning in the early 
2010s, box office figures started to decline rather sharply. As the number 
of movies per year drastically rose, the response from the public grew 
colder: 2013’s thirteen releases had to share 235,000 viewers, 2014’s 
record sixteen films attracted a paltry 85,000 moviegoers, and 2015’s 
five productions sold an embarrassing combined total of under 5,000 
tickets. Indeed,
Trying to explain the mismatch between this exponential 
growth in the production of national cinema (300%) and 
the extremely low levels of ticket sales has been a constant in 
the analyses on the topic. However, these analyses leave out 
the demand for that ‘other cinema’, absent from commercial 
theaters, that is produced not only in tune with, but even 
at the express request of, the public. (Montalvo, 2016, p.6)
The underground films that belong to this ‘alternative’ explosion 
of filmmaking creativity do not sell tickets in commercial theaters 
either, because in fact they are not even shown there. Yet despite their 
shoestring budgets they have an audience of hundreds of thousands, 
sometimes even millions, thanks to their considerable success in the 
informal market of pirate DVDs completely outside the conventional 
channels of cultural distribution—and, more recently, their free 
circulation on the internet via video-sharing websites such as YouTube 
or peer-to-peer file-sharing protocols such as BitTorrent. They are part 
of “globalization from below,” that is, globalization “as experienced by 
most of the world’s people” or “the transnational flow of people and 
goods involving relatively small amounts of capital and informal, often 
semi-legal or illegal transactions, often associated with ‘the developing 
world’ but in fact apparent across the globe” (Mathews and Alba Vega, 
2012, p.1).
In most cases, the creators involved in this parallel cinematic boom 
are not from Quito or Guayaquil, nor do they live in those cities. They 
are from rural areas of the country, mainly in the coast.9 The regional 
divide between the mainstream cinematic boom and its subterranean 
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counterpart cannot be overstated in a nation so intensely affected by 
regionalism10. In the words of La Tigra’s director, “Ecuadorian cinema 
is perceived as cinema from Quito; it is not perceived as national” 
(Luzuriaga, 2014). Suffice it to say that, according to CNCine, every 
year about 80% of the state monies dedicated to the promotion of the 
national film industry are awarded to Quito-based projects.
It is obvious, and often painfully so, that EBT filmmakers have 
not studied filmmaking at all, in Ecuador or abroad, and they are far 
from being members of the upper middle class, something that their 
movies make quite clear. While the first boom’s creators favor non-
linear narratives and other techniques typical of “great cinema,” their 
underground counterparts choose clarity over cleverness every time. 
While the first boom’s directors show, in general, white-mestizo city 
dwellers who belong to the middle or upper classes, except when they 
want to portray the dangers of a supposedly pervasive urban criminality, 
the other ones make Ecuador’s enormous racial diversity visible and 
let the viewers peek into a world that is eminently rural, lower class, 
even marginal.
Crucially, and in stark contrast to their mainstream counterparts, 
EBT creators do not receive state funding at all, making this alternative 
boom a truly independent phenomenon that responds exclusively to a 
massive consumption by the subaltern classes of Ecuadorian society11.
Underground movies, subaltern voices
The EBT phenomenon has multiple foci throughout the country, 
particularly in the littoral region, and a growing number of participants 
from diverse backgrounds. However, its epicenter is arguably Chone, 
a small city in the province of Manabí, so much so that the term 
Chonewood is now commonly used—albeit often in a tongue-in-
cheek way—by the media, in academia, and by Choneños themselves 
(see for example Alvear, 2009a; Neumane, 2013; Araya, 2016; Cedeño, 
2016; Coryat and Zweig, 2017).
The story of underground filmmaking in Chone is a tale of 
two pioneers, Nixon Chalacamá and Fernando Cedeño, with an 
indefatigable desire to “be in the movies”12 and express themselves 
through cinematic means. As they have reminisced in numerous 
interviews, most notably for Alvear’s Más allá…, in their youth both 
men were part of a bunch of friends in love with martial arts and 
motorcycles. At some point in the early 1990s, one of their pals got a 
hold of a VHS camcorder, so the group started taping their fights and 
races. One day, Chalacamá suggested they make a movie akin to the 
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Bruce Lee, Jean-Claude Van Damme, or Arnold Schwarzenegger-led 
action flicks they liked. Cedeño thought he was crazy, but went along 
with the idea, as did the rest of the crew. The result was 1994’s En busca 
del tesoro perdido (In search of the lost treasure), followed by Potencia 
blanca (White energy) one year later. Today, both works are sadly lost, 
but they were shown for several days at the now defunct movie theater 
Oriflama,13 where they attracted big crowds of locals despite being such 
rudimentary productions that their camera movements—shot without 
tripods or Steadicams—left many in the audience dizzy from motion 
sickness (Alvear, 2009a, p.33).
Chalacamá has directed or co-directed five feature-length films and 
several shorts since then. El destructor invisible (The invisible destroyer), 
from 1996, has in Alvear’s words the privilege of being “the first 
postmodern Ecuadorian movie” (quoted by actor Andrés Crespo 
during the Pinchagua Voladora (Flying Herring) award ceremony at 
the second EBT film festival in 2013). To make it, Chalacamá mixed 
and matched scenes originally recorded for his previous productions, 
splicing them together, redubbing them, and ultimately managing to 
create a somewhat coherent story against all odds. Chalacamá’s most 
interesting film may be 2012’s Los raidistas (The raiders), co-directed 
with Ignacio Solórzano. First, because it is a historical drama based 
on the real-life adventure of five Choneños who in 1939 traveled 
cross-country to Quito in a Chevrolet convertible to demonstrate 
the viability of the itinerary and force the government to fund the 
construction of the first road connecting Chone to the capital. Second, 
because it features Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, leader of the coup d’état 
that deposed Jamil Mahuad in 2000 and then democratically elected 
president of Ecuador from 2003 to 2005, in the role of 1930s dictator 
General Alberto Enríquez Gallo. Chalacamá’s latest movie, 2017’s 
Un minuto de vida (A minute to live), tackles the difficult topic of 
human trafficking for sexual exploitation purposes with a heavy dose 
of Chonewood’s trademark cinematic action and violence. Made for 
around $20,000 (Ramos Monteiro, 2016, p.48), Chalacamá’s biggest 
budget to date by a large margin, it was among the first Ecuadorian 
motion pictures to use a drone for aerial filming and shows a remarkable 
progress for the director in terms of production values and narrative 
technique when compared to his earlier efforts.
A reluctant participant at first, Cedeño is now considered one of 
the de facto leaders of the EBT movement, for which he prefers 
the term “guerrilla cinema.”14 His first movie as a director, Avaricia 
(Avarice), was released in 1999. Still made in close collaboration 
with Chalacamá—they parted ways, amicably, in the early 2000s—it 
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featured a motorcycle chase that later became a cult sequence among 
some professional filmmakers in Quito (Alvear, 2009a, p.34). His 
second work, 2004’s Sicarios manabitas (Hitmen from Manabí), may 
well be the most commercially successful Ecuadorian film of all time: 
it is said to have sold over a million copies in the pirate DVD market 
(Alvear, 2009a, p.35). A tale of love, violence, and revenge, this western 
continues to be the undisputed flagship of the EBT phenomenon 
to this day. Cedeño took a long time to complete his third motion 
picture, El ángel de los sicarios (The hitmen’s angel), released in 2012 to 
great acclaim. It tells the story of Ángel, a young man who becomes 
a vigilante after witnessing the murder of his parents, devoting his life 
to the seemingly unachievable mission of killing each and every hired 
gun in a Manabí full of them. As with Chalacamá’s latest project, El 
ángel… exhibits unusually high production values, to such an extent 
that—despite a frugal budget of just $4,000—it is perhaps the only EBT 
creation virtually indistinguishable, in terms of ‘look’, from many of 
the movies produced by professional Ecuadorian filmmakers at almost 
100 times the cost.
Manabí is not, of course, the only place with an intense EBT activity. 
To the south, also on the coastal region, the Guayas province—where 
Guayaquil, the most populous city in the country, is located—has a 
lot to offer in terms of underground cinema. To start with, it is the 
home province of Nelson Palacios, without a doubt the most prolific 
Ecuadorian filmmaker of all time. Born in the city of Milagro and a 
resident of Durán, a commuter town just outside Guayaquil, Palacios 
averages a whopping 4.5 movies per year: he had directed 12 by the 
end of 2009 (Alvear, 2009b, p.57), 26 by early 2012 (Matamoros, 
2012), 36 by mid-2014 (Martillo Monserrate, 2014), and almost 50 
by the end of 2016 (Alvear, 2016, p.2). Some of his films are also 
exceptionally popular: Pedro, el amante de mamá (Pedro, mom’s lover), 
from 2014, has over 11 million views on YouTube as of November 
2018, which probably makes it the most watched movie in the history 
of Ecuadorian cinema.
Palacios started producing his substantial body of work in 2006 with 
a small video camera and the help of his family, friends, and neighbors. 
His oeuvre includes Chonewood-style westerns full of gun violence, 
such as 2007’s Sicarios malditos (Damned hitmen) and 2008’s El llanero 
vengador (The avenging cowboy) as well as its sequel El regreso del llanero 
vengador (The return of the avenging cowboy) from the following year, 
but Palacios seems to be a creator with a wider range of interests. He 
has explored the horror genre in films such as 2010’s No te burles de los 
muertos (Do not make fun of the dead) and 2015’s Cansado de esperar 
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sentí a la muerte llegar (Tired of waiting I felt death coming), religious 
cinema in 2011’s El pastor, el ateo y el ciego (The pastor, the atheist, 
and the blind man) and 2012’s El pastor y el siervo del mal (The pastor 
and the servant of evil), and even the animal movie genre in 2012’s 
Sentimientos de Jashy (Jashy’s feelings), which features the director’s own 
dog in the title role.
The main obsessions for Palacios as a storyteller, in any case, seem to 
be abandonment and poverty. These two themes, which are reportedly 
autobiographical, combine to produce a certain kind of “masculine 
melodrama” (León, 2009, p.125) that informs much of his output. 
Examples include movies such as La niña abandonada (The abandoned 
girl) and Buscando a mamá (Looking for mum), from 2007; El dolor de 
ser pobre (The pain of being poor), from 2008; No me dejes, mamá (Do 
not leave me, mum), from 2009; Recordando a mamá (Remembering 
mum) and Cuando nos toca llorar (When it is our turn to cry), from 2011; 
La hija no deseada (The unwanted daughter), from 2012; Espérame en el 
cielo, mamá (Wait for me in heaven, mum), from 2014; and Te perdono, 
papá (I forgive you, dad), from 2016.
There is room for feminine melodrama, too, within the EBT 
movement. Also in Guayas, two female directors have made a point of 
presenting their perspective in underground movies. Bárbara Morán, 
an actress since she was 12, is a playwright who has written over 40 
theater plays (Martillo Monserrate, 2012). One day, she decided to tape 
some of them with the help of her family and an amateur crew, and thus 
2007’s Lágrimas de una madre (A mother’s tears), 2008’s Sueño de morir 
(The dream of dying), 2009’s Cuando los hijos se van (When children 
leave), 2010’s El gran varón (The great man), and 2011’s Emigrantes 
latinos (Latino emigrants) were born. The latter film is undoubtedly her 
most interesting one, because it deals with the collapse of the national 
economy and its dollarization in the early 2000s, the massive migration 
of suddenly impoverished Ecuadorians to Spain, and the racism that 
many of them suffered there. Meanwhile, Irma Herrera has made 
three feature-length movies, each of them in a different genre, during 
the last decade. Inspired by Nelson Palacios, who in 2008 visited her 
hometown of El Triunfo in search of locations for his next production, 
she premiered Fantasías de Rita (Rita’s fantasies), a fairy tale aimed at 
children made with a budget of less than $1,000, before an audience of 
800 people. Her second film, Odisea de un sueño (Odyssey of a dream), 
tackled the drama of immigration and violence in the US–Mexico 
border. It cost almost $20,000 and debuted in front of 2,000 spectators 
(Franco, 2016, p.7). For her third movie, Herrera chose to tell the 
CINE BAJO TIERRA
104
A POST-NEOLIBERAL ERA IN LATIN AMERICA?
story of her hometown’s name change in the 2016 documentary De 
Boca de los Sapos a El Triunfo (From Boca de los Sapos to El Triunfo).
Indigenous people, in this case from the highlands, are another 
prominent demographic in the EBT movement. In fact, the films of the 
Sinchi Samay collective directed by William León, such as Ch’uchipak 
Navidadtapash a.k.a. La Navidad de Pollito (Pollito’s Christmas), from 
2004, and its sequel Ch’uchi Tigramuytapash a.k.a. Pollito 2, from 2007, 
both in Kichwa15 and both incredibly popular, were among the first 
‘discoveries’ that launched the original EBT research project (León, 
2009, p.11). More recently, in 2014, Sinchi Samay and William León 
premiered a horror movie titled Pillallaw that narrates the legend of 
the titular monster. Given the current surge in indigenous filmmaking, 
as well as the special situation of native Ecuadorians in a country that 
defines itself as pluricultural,16 CNCine created a specific category for 
this kind of endeavor—first conceptualized as ‘community cinema’ 
and then subsumed under the broader umbrella of ‘intercultural 
content’—in order to provide an avenue for state funding. This 
makes indigenous film the only portion of Ecuadorian underground 
audiovisual production with access to institutional support (Coryat 
and Zweig, 2017, pp.276–8).
Other regions where EBT activity is conspicuous are Santo Domingo 
de los Tsáchilas, a province created in 2007 that used to belong to 
Pichincha (where Quito is located), and Esmeraldas, the northernmost 
coastal province. In the former, Manabí-born Cristóbal Zambrano 
has been able to complete three films, including one where he plays a 
feral child in the Tarzan tradition (Espinosa, 2015). In the latter, Elías 
Cabrera has written and directed over 15 movies, several of them—such 
as 2010’s La Tunda17 and 2011’s Mitos afro (Afro myths) along with their 
respective sequels—re-telling old legends taken from Afro-Ecuadorian 
folklore. He is also behind the 2015 urban actioner El taxista verdugo 
(The killing taxi driver) (Bonilla, 2015). From Esmeraldas as well, but 
working out of Isla Trinitaria—an extremely impoverished area of 
Guayaquil with a large, and growing, Afro-Ecuadorian population—
Jackson Jickson directed Trinity Island: dime hasta cuándo (Trinity Island: 
when will it stop) in 2014 and starred in José Daniel Cuesta’s Una noche 
sin sueño (A sleepless night) the following year (Holguín, 2017). In a 
similar vein, Félix Caicedo has depicted how truly bare ‘bare life’ can 
be in Bastión Popular, another of Guayaquil’s slums, in his 2016–17 
pentalogy Un día en Bastión (A day in Bastión).
Granted, these films are all of variable and often questionable quality, 
and plenty of them are simply dreadful. Copies of copies of copies, 
their creators draw inspiration from Hollywood action blockbusters, 
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from Hong Kong martial arts movies, from the narco-narratives 
produced in Mexico and Colombia and other countries devastated by 
the consequences of the illegal drug trade and the ‘legal’ fight against 
it, from popular music, and so forth:
Popular videographies advance readings of appropriation 
that take the codes of hegemonic cinema to rework, 
relocate, and exacerbate them in a questioning process 
emanated from the imitation of an impossible model. 
Indeed, among EBT films we find westerns, melodramas, 
comedies, and zombie movies that, perhaps without 
intention, parody Hollywood narratives from a local 
perspective. (León, 2009, p.22)
They employ these sources liberally, with more boldness than ability, 
and with very little faithfulness. Their plots are formulaic, their 
characters stereotypical, their actors amateurish, and, in the ultimate 
affront to the lettered city, their credits often contain typos or even 
gross grammatical errors. It seems obvious, though, that the importance 
of cultural artifacts such as these EBT films—however ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
one considers them to be as works of art or entertainment—cannot 
be overstated at a time when “Latin American national majorities are 
accessing modernity not through books but rather through audiovisual 
technologies and formats” (Martín-Barbero, 1992, p.14). Furthermore, 
“there is nothing that is not social and historical—indeed, … everything 
is ‘in the last analysis’ political” (Jameson, 2002, p.5). Even lowbrow 
entertainment, even bad movies, and even clichéd tales of hired assassins, 
abandoned daughters, and ancestral indigenous monsters. Dismissing 
the most popular films in today’s Ecuador does very little to advance 
the study of Ecuadorian cinema and Ecuadorian popular culture. The 
sensibilities these movies channel are clearly popular, in the sense of 
“stemming from the common people,” although the concomitant senses 
of “adapted to the ordinary taste” and “commercially successful” are 
not foreign to them—Sicarios manabitas alone is proof of that.
Beyond the exaggeration and glamorization, understandable given 
their sources of inspiration, EBT’s crude and generalized violence is 
far from gratuitous: it responds to a violent reality. Specifically, to the 
nefarious consequences of the application of neoliberal policies in 
Ecuador since the 1980s (Eguren, 2017, p.108). In a post-modern, 
post-revolutionary, post-ideological, in fact virtually post-everything, 
and—this is critical—allegedly post-national world, the spectacle of 
“every man for himself ” seems hardly baffling. Neither should it be 
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surprising, in these times, to find popular narratives that treat the 
cruelest violence as habitual and omnipresent. EBT movies “portray, 
display, and create the social memory of a marginal, violent, neglected, 
and forgotten city for those who inhabit it from other points of view” 
(Henríquez Mendoza, 2017, p.97). They make visible previously 
silenced “memories without archive” regarding true violence and 
thus constitute the “irruption of the other” in Ecuador’s audiovisual 
landscape (Pinto, 2017, pp.130–31).
That said, it is perhaps worth inquiring why this boom of a kind of 
cinema that is at once hyper-violent and hyper-popular—and/or offers 
a heightened, almost hysterical melodrama that stems from the most 
abject destitution—occurs precisely under an openly anti-neoliberal 
government whose achievements include a pronounced decrease in 
poverty as well as an apparently sincere effort to redistribute wealth at 
a level never before seen in Ecuador.
A post-neoliberal era in Ecuador?
In part, of course, the answer lies in the fact that it is impossible to undo 
in just a few years a reality of social and economic exclusion shaped 
by a history of decades, if not centuries. In part, too, a redistribution 
of wealth “at a level never before seen” in a country such as Ecuador 
still leaves us with shocking inequality, because the previous levels have 
always been negligible. Yet it seems clear that, also in part, the crux 
of the matter lies in the way Correa’s anti-neoliberalism has at times 
been only timidly anti-neoliberal.
A good approach to measuring how truly post-neoliberal the current 
situation of Ecuador is may be to compare it to neighboring nations 
not involved in leftist rhetoric and politics for the past decade. A recent 
study did so and found that
beyond alignment with ‘twenty-first century socialism’ or 
‘neo-liberalism’, the differences in terms of how property 
concentration is treated are not major, even though the 
governments of Colombia and Peru are more enthusiastic 
supporters of investment in large-scale farming for export 
than are the governments in Ecuador and Bolivia. (Eguren, 
2017, p.121)
While it is true that “In office, Correa has implemented policies that 
shifted resources to poor and marginalized sectors of society. Many 
of his moves against the conservative oligarchy have earned him 
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broad popular acclaim” (Becker, 2013, p.47), it is also undeniable that 
“Coupled with Correa’s technocratic leadership style, his government 
did not organize the subaltern beyond elections, and has not promoted 
mechanisms of participatory democracy at the local and community 
level” (De la Torre, 2013, p.28), as well as that, in Correa’s usage, 
socialism “meant state investment and spending in the pursuit of 
national development that essentially left intact existing class relations” 
(Riofrancos, 2017, p.42).
Correa has had more than his fair share of disapproval, opposition, and 
outright enmity from right-wing, neoliberal, or oligarchic types, but 
it is the criticism from the left, and specifically from social-movement 
activists, that matters more here. Their problem with Correa “is not 
that he is too radical but that he is too conciliatory toward imperial 
forces, has refused to make a clean break from Ecuador’s neoliberal past, 
and has failed to open up participatory spaces” (Becker, 2013, p.53).
In fact, while he was brought to power by a coalition of social 
movements, particularly indigenous and ecologist ones, as well as a 
broad spectrum of leftist forces, Correa’s relationship with most of these 
groups grew sour almost from the very beginning of his presidency. In 
a then-unstable country where “Three previous presidents—Abdalá 
Bucaram in 1997, Jamil Mahuad in 2000, and Lucio Gutiérrez in 
2005—had been forced out of office early due in part to Quito-
based street mobilizations in which a variety of social groups and 
media outlets had taken part,” it seems clear that “taking actions to 
undermine the power of groups, especially those with a track record 
of anti-government rabble-rousing, made perfect sense” (Conaghan, 
2015, p.10). Yet such a display of rational political strategy does not 
make Correa’s stance any less disappointing, or more palatable, from 
a left-wing perspective.
Correa was unwilling, or unable, to fulfill the promise of the new 
socialism of the 21st century and move the nation beyond extractivism, 
economic dependency, and neoliberalism. Indeed,
It seems that the wheel has come full circle. The Pink Tide 
has receded, and the promise of a Latin America in control 
of its own resources appears to have been abandoned. Today 
the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela are 
once again under the thumb of the global market, delivering 
their minerals, oil, and gas to big capital, whether US, 
Canadian, Chinese, or Russian. (Gonzalez, 2017, p.113)
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In structural terms, Correa’s purported revolution did little to push 
Ecuadorian society toward an economically more egalitarian, politically 
less oppressive system. In part, this was so because he simply did not 
need to:
The achievements of the Pink Tide were made possible 
by a particular moment in the world economy—a boom 
in commodity prices generated by the growth of China. 
The resulting primary export growth provided rents to 
fund social programs. This meant the Pink Tide could 
assist the poor, but without need for the type of structural 
transformation that would compromise the rich by 
fundamentally changing the balance of power in society. 
The favorable economic climate covered up the persistence 
of structural inequalities, and also left the social gains of 
the project vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market. 
(Sankey, 2017, pp.33–4)
Inevitably, due to the cyclical nature of capitalism, after years of bonanza 
“The collapse in oil prices triggered a decline in resource rents, which 
then forced the government to make massive cuts to social spending 
and state pensions,” so while “The benefits that Correa’s government 
delivered to the poor were real” they will “always be in jeopardy under 
the present development model, where the web of class relations is left 
virtually untouched” (Riofrancos, 2017, p.42)18.
In the realm of culture, cultural promotion, and more specifically 
film subsidies, this new economic crisis caused a drastic reduction 
in available state funding. This, of course, has not affected EBT 
filmmakers, since they did not have access to those monies anyway. 
But it is interesting to note how, whether in good or lean times, and 
despite their revolutionary rhetoric, Ecuador’s cultural authorities have 
maintained a two-pronged approach to national cinema that perfectly 
mirrors that “virtually untouched” class structure. As should become 
obvious by examining its notion of culture itself and its discriminatory 
practices when determining the allocation of cultural promotion 
funds discussed above, Correa’s movement—not unlike other political 
projects in Latin America deemed more or less populist, more or less 
well-intentioned, more or less revolutionary—is after all an entity 
designed in, by, and for the lettered city. At best, the citizens’ revolution 
aspires to bring the rest of Ecuador’s social reality inside this beautiful 
city’s tall, lettered walls. It does not seem to understand or even see 
what lies beyond those limits.
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There is an additional explanation for the persistence of a neoliberal 
ethos in Ecuadorian underground cinema, this time from below, which 
is to say from the standpoint of the producers and consumers of this 
audiovisual violence themselves. Filmmakers such as Palacios, Cedeño, 
and Chalacamá see and present themselves as entrepreneurs, as veritable 
self-made men, and as profit seekers who cite money as one of their 
main motivations. Of course, they also talk about their vital need to 
express themselves through cinematic means and tell the stories they 
have inside. In Chalacamá’s words, “We are totally underfunded. But 
we do these kinds of artisanal things for art’s sake, for the culture, 
because we love cinema” (Neumane, 2013). Yet they know and fully 
admit that what they make is commercial entertainment, not art house 
film, and they dream big:
We have not reached the movie theaters, but we are sure 
that our future productions will do so, because we have 
been sowing the seeds and the audience is ready to watch 
our films. The fight will not be easy, but we will win. 
(Cedeño, 2016, p.75)
As usual, “the agents of globalization from below are not really aiming at 
constructing another world from that of globalization from above; they 
aim at becoming rich and powerful, just like those who consider them 
illegal smugglers or pirates” (Lins Ribeiro, 2012, p.230). Neoliberalism 
comes “from above,” imposed by corporations, governments, the IMF, 
and so forth, yet also operates “from below,” once it takes root in popular 
subjectivities and becomes part of the collection of tools people use 
to participate in and adapt to—but also resist—the system. In fact,
thinking of neoliberalism as a mutation in the “art of 
government,” as Michel Foucault … proposes with the term 
governmentality, supposes understanding neoliberalism as 
a set of skills, technologies, and practices, deploying a new 
type of rationality that cannot be thought of only from 
above. Moreover, this rationality is not purely abstract nor 
macropolitical but rather arises from the encounter with 
forces at work and is embodied in various ways by the 
subjectivities and tactics of everyday life, as a variety of 
ways of doing, being, and thinking that organize the social 
machinery’s calculations and affects. Here neoliberalism 
functions immanently: it unfolds on the territorial level, 
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modulates subjectivities, and is provoked, without needing 
a transcendent and exterior structure. (Gago, 2017, p.2)
In this sense, though their fictions contain traces of the representation 
of a certain reality and even of social criticism, they also seem to carry 
within them the possibility of the reproduction of the very ideology—
neoliberalism—that has allowed and incentivized this perpetual state of 
economic crisis and savage competition, this generalized anomie, this 
political and social morass filled with symbolic and physical violence. 
A violence suffered, but also practiced, by the subaltern classes in a 
counterproductive struggle with and against themselves that in the end 
makes power more powerful.
Popular culture is always a complex, contradictory, dialectical 
phenomenon. On the one hand, it is formed with elements and 
languages owned by the ruling classes, so it has no choice but to 
reproduce, at least partially, the logic of power. On the other hand, 
and in a more promising way, it is in the realm of the popular where 
its meanings are ultimately created and re-created, often against and 
despite the ruling classes’ desires. It is, after all, popular use and affection 
that determines its success and its permanence: nothing can be popular 
if the public is not willing to accept it. Ecuadorian elites seem happy 
promoting films that Ecuadorian popular subjects reject not because 
they are not interested in audiovisual narratives, but because they 
prefer their own. They want to see themselves—or what they think 
of themselves—in these hyper-violent, hyper-melodramatic, hyper-
popular movies that tell stories “as real as life itself.” They do not need 
the prestige of international film festivals or the complexities of great 
cinema. They want “cine bajo tierra.”
Frequent Chalacamá collaborator Elías Zambrano summarized it 
best in an interview for the 2013 documentary Luces, cámara, ¡Chone!, 
produced and directed by Ana María Neumane:
We have the best audience right here on the streets: the 
gentleman who sells coconut water, the one who sells lottery, 
the one from the store, the one from the butcher shop. 
That is our public. Our cinema is popular because people 
identify with it. We do not aspire to be like Hollywood. 
… We are going to be much better. Because Hollywood 
may have the equipment, the money, the technique, but we 
have the desire, the will, and that character that identifies 




1  Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Spanish are my own.
2  Such honor belongs to El tesoro de Atahualpa (Atahualpa’s treasure), directed by 
Augusto San Miguel and released in 1924 (León, 2010, p.68).
3  La tigra sold over 250,000 tickets during its theatrical run. It is sometimes claimed 
that an older movie, a comedy titled Dos para el camino (Two for the road) directed 
by Jaime Cuesta, was able to bring half a million people to the theaters in 1980. 
However, there is no tangible proof of this, so most experts prefer to quote La 
tigra’s confirmed figures and treat Dos para el camino’s record as the stuff of legend.
4 The number of films per year has decreased more recently but is still higher than 
it was in the pre-boom era.
5  Ecuador abandoned its old currency, the sucre, and adopted the US dollar in 2000.
6  UIO is the International Air Transport Association (IATA) code for Quito’s Mariscal 
Sucre International Airport.
7  Jaime Roldós Aguilera was Ecuador’s president from 1979 until his untimely death 
in an airplane crash in 1981.
8  ¡Alfaro Vive, Carajo!, literally ‘Alfaro lives, dammit!’, was an Ecuadorian terrorist 
group active in the 1980s.
9  Ecuador’s territory is customarily divided into four very distinct geographical 
regions: La Sierra, or the highlands, where Quito is located; La Costa, or the coast, 
where Guayaquil is located; El Oriente, literally ‘the orient’, which comprises the 
portion of the Amazon that belongs to Ecuador; and the Galápagos Islands.
10  The rivalry between Quito and Guayaquil, and more generally between the 
highlands and the coast, predates the formation of Ecuador as an independent 
country and manifests itself in every aspect of national life, from the economy to 
the arts, from soccer to electoral politics. 
11  The author does not want to insinuate that state-backed filmmaking is easy: in 
Ecuador, as elsewhere, filmmaking is always a complex, expensive, and time-
consuming endeavor. Furthermore, in most cases government funding covers 
only about a third of the final budget. That said, it is evident that the state has a 
clear-cut hierarchy when it comes to deciding which productions are worthy of 
its support, and it goes without saying that unsubsidized filmmaking will always 
be more difficult than its subsidized counterpart. 
12  “I wanted to be on Chone’s movie billboards—and I did it,” Chalacamá told BBC 
Mundo (Zibell, 2013).
13  Indeed, Chone—where so many films have been produced over the past two 
decades—does not have a movie theater and has not had one since the Oriflama 
closed its doors at the dawn of the 2000s.
14  The director makes a point of explaining that the term does not necessarily imply 
violence: “When we say guerrilla cinema, it can be a comedy, a drama, a horror 
movie, etc. It is not only a cinema about guns, but an insurgent, ideological one.” 
(Cedeño, 2016: 75) Yet he also calls his collaborators ‘soldiers’ and is proud of the 
fact that his movies used to feature real guns firing real bullets until this practice 
was expressly forbidden by law (Zibell, 2013; Araya, 2016, p.57).
15  Kichwa is a Quechuan language that encompasses all the dialects of Quechua 
spoken in Ecuador and Colombia.
16  The first article of the current Ecuadorian Constitution, promulgated in 2008, 
characterizes the South American nation as “sovereign, unitary, independent, 
democratic, pluricultural, and multiethnic.”
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17  La Tunda is a myth of the Pacific coastal region of Ecuador and Colombia, 
particularly popular among the Afro-descendant community, about a shapeshifting 
monster resembling a woman that lures people into the forests to suck their blood 
and sometimes devour them.
18  Since the end of Correa’s presidency in mid-2017, the austerity measures have 
worsened under his successor, Lenín Moreno (Correa’s own vice president). 
Moreno has been accused by many critics—including Correa himself—of betraying 
the citizens’ revolution, steering Ecuador rightward, and either allowing or pushing 
the return to neoliberalism.
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Culture and Popular 
Participation in the Case of the 




provides us a very pleasant sight.
It sells everything in the world.
The Caruaru Market.
(“A Feira de Caruaru” [The Market of Caruaru] by the 
composer Onildo Almeida)
Neoliberalism is not merely one of the main theoretical strands of 
contemporary thought. It also transcends the economic model that 
has given new breath to laissez-faire. Neoliberalism manifests itself 
dynamically through the everyday forms of subjects’ thoughts and 
actions, in the constant reconstruction of public and private spaces, 
in the daily choices that modulate levels of equality and social justice, 
in the urbanization of cities, in the distribution of goods and power 
struggles, which often take place without an explicit and direct 
connection with the abstract concepts of theory. Neoliberalism shapes 
society itself and only makes sense as an effective set of political actions 
and contexts. Real subjects live and practice neoliberalism! This 
“everyday application of the theory” is often not perceived as neoliberal 
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values (individualism, freedom, minimal state interference, defense of 
capitalism) are unconsciously practiced by the agents themselves (from 
ordinary people to politicians). This can be partly explained by the 
force of the neoliberal rhetoric of progress and economic prosperity 
itself: neoliberalism presents itself as the natural and most favorable 
proposal for any person. Any discourse against freedom in the market, 
or against any other issues (environment, education, security) where 
the freedom of individuals is at stake, automatically becomes a discourse 
against justice. The pragmatic naturalism of this fallacy seems to be 
so advantageous to the individual that it excuses neoliberalism from 
announcing itself explicitly on the stage of social life, as if the ethics 
of such a model was self-evident. For many, to propose alternatives to 
this model would be illogically equivalent to acting against oneself and 
against others. That is why neoliberalism is more than a normative ideal 
and a transition to an alternative post-neoliberal model requires more 
than a mere theoretical impulse, but rather a strong reaction against 
this production of subjectivity. It is important to recognize, therefore, 
that neoliberalism not only shapes society by theoretical arguments, but 
also that its principles are countered or sustained by the way the web of 
power relationships is configured, horizontally and vertically, between 
social actors and institutions. Analyzing neoliberalism, using the social 
world and the experience of individuals as a point of reference, allows 
us to adopt an approach (others are possible) linked to the empirical 
stance that minimizes the risks of myopic theorization or blind activism. 
Viewing neoliberalism in the context of its own movement allows us 
to analyze the possibilities of moving beyond it, especially in Latin 
American contexts, where studies and post-neoliberal experiences 
have flourished more strongly. Based on this perception, we propose to 
study the reality of the Street Market of Caruaru (or Caruaru Market), 
located in the interior of the state of Pernambuco, in northeastern 
Brazil. The case we study in this work, involving the local government’s 
attempt to change the location of the market, was the trigger for an 
intense discussion among traders, other social groups, business people, 
and institutions, regarding the advantages and difficulties of such a 
project. However, both the government and most traders, from different 
perspectives, defend positions that are targeted toward protectionism 
and economic growth to the detriment of culture. This shows that the 
preservation of the local and regional culture, symbolized strongly by 
the Caruaru Market, has been contradictorily discarded in the face of 
the possibility of economic ascension of the individuals and an increase 
in municipal power in the region. Thus, the main objective of this 
research is to understand the relationship between the subjectivity 
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model driven by neoliberal capitalism and the loss of tradition and 
the cultural values that make the Caruaru Market one of the most 
renowned at an international level. The data collected enables us to 
question whether popular participation in decision-making processes 
always acts as a mechanism of resistance against the centrality of 
the market in social life. The case of the Caruaru Market seems to 
demonstrate that the dialogue between government and society, widely 
proclaimed as a tool for emancipation, may function, in some cases, 
as a reinforcement of neoliberal values.
The socioeconomic development of the Caruaru 
Market
The history of the Caruaru Market, as with other renowned markets 
that have stood the test of time (the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul, Jemaa el 
Fnaa in Morocco or the Rialto in Venice), is mixed up with the past of 
the city in which it is situated. Caruaru is in the semi-arid region of the 
state of Pernambuco, in the Ipojuca valley, about 130km from Recife, 
one of the main capitals of the Brazilian northeast. It owes its name to 
the fact that the region was inhabited in the period of colonization by 
the Cariri Indians, who named the region Caruru or Caruaru, which 
means “main place/field.” At the end of the 17th century the banks 
of the Ipojuca river were occupied and used for rearing livestock and 
subsistence culture, and a large farm was established, which became a 
point of support for travelers crossing the state to carry out their trade. 
Gradually, there was an increase in the quantity of products offered 
and in the circulation of people. To supply the demand, at the end of 
the 18th century, the market became a weekly event, consolidating 
Caruaru as the trade center of the region. At that time, the Caruaru 
Market was characterized by the fact that it was established by the 
“Brazilian bourgeois,” the new class of oligarchic merchant proprietors, 
but also by the traders and craftsmen and a few slaves (Medeiros, F.M.). 
On May 18, 1857, provincial law no. 416 sanctioned that Caruru 
be classified as the “City of Caruaru.” Due to its importance in the 
region, Caruaru is known today as the “Capital of the Dry Climate 
Region,” the “Capital of Forró” and even as the “Little Princess of the 
Dry Climate.” After almost 200 years, the market was relocated to the 
Avenida Rui Barbosa in 1966, returning to its former location in 1969, 
near the Church of the Conception (see Figure 6.1). In 1992, it was 
relocated to the 18 May Park.
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As Albuquerque Júnior (2013, p.39) explains, the identity of the 
northeastern region of Brazil was predominantly shaped by the 
influence of the dry climate and the rustic landscape. From a cultural 
point of view, it would be characterized by the preservation of popular 
forms of expression, social rituals, legends, tales, poetry, dances, 
religious manifestations, festivals, superstitions, and oral literature. 
The Caruaru Market emerged within this symbolic universe. Walmiré 
Dimeron, historian and former director of Documentation and 
Cultural Heritage of the Caruaru Culture Foundation, quoted by Sá 
(2011, p.32) in his book Traders: Who They Are and How They Manage 
Their Business, states:
Caruaru’s cultural trichotomy consists of the market, ‘forró’ (local 
square dancing) and clay. The market, however, stands out as the 
mother cell not only of this formation, but also of the identity of 
our people. Everything that we are today – our way of speaking, of 
expressing ourselves, of our daily relationships – is impregnated with 
this inheritance, present since the beginning of the colonization of 
these lands.
It is because of this cultural richness that the city’s main composer 
Onildo Almeida, who composed A Feira de Caruaru (The Market of 
Caruaru) in 1957 pays homage to it. The well-known song uses the 
goods of the market to portray its tradition and was immortalized in 
the singer Luiz Gonzaga’s recording of it. The market is also known 
worldwide for the clay dolls crafted by Master Vitalino. The Caruaru 
Market has grown abundantly and is currently formed of a cluster of 
Figure 6.1: Photo from the “Memories of Caruaru” postcard series
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smaller fairs, including the Cattle Market, Handicraft Market, Free 
Market and Sulanca Market, Meat and Flour Market, which turn over 
between R$20 and R$70 million per week. Depending on the time of 
year, the market is visited by more than 100,000 people from various 
states in a single day. Currently, about 30,000 families are sustained by 
the products they sell at the markets. In 2017, the Caruaru Market was 
designated as a site of Brazilian Cultural Heritage by IPHAN (National 
Institute of Historical and Artistic Heritage), recognizing its economic 
dimension, but mainly focusing on its sociocultural importance.







Figure 6.2: Clay figures for sale in the Caruaru Market
Source: IPHAN, http://portal.iphan.gov.br/pagina/detalhes/61 
Figure 6.3: One of the busy avenues in the Caruaru Market
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It is important to emphasize, however, that the market’s popular 
culture is threatened by the pressure to adapt the cities to the needs of 
capitalism. In the text “Cities and the Geographies of Actually Existing 
Neoliberalism,” Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (2002) discuss the role 
of urban spaces in “actually existing neoliberalism,” arguing that cities 
have become crucial arenas where neoliberal strategies are articulated. 
It is the case that, driven by the economy, urban spatiality has often 
been transformed to the point of weakening or wiping out the values 
inherent within markets, defiling their mosaic of social experiences.
Nowadays the market receives the same pejorative treatment 
its commercial opponents were classified one hundred and 
one years ago. Anachronistic, backward and inadequate are 
some of the adjectives that are now appropriate. The market 
did not keep up with the hectic pace of modernization, 
and it was almost like a crystallized drop in the course of 
progress. Losing space to the supermarkets that became 
bigger and bigger, more assorted, safer, hygienic and 
comfortable, an arrangement that is the perfect fit for the 
hurried rhythm of today’s individual. (Mascarenhas and 
Dolzani, 2008, p.83)
Harvey’s diagnosis in his book Ciudades Rebeldes (Rebellious Cities) is 
bleak: “The traditional city has died, murdered by rampant capitalist 
development, victim of its insatiable need to have accumulated capital, 
avid to invest in unlimited urban growth, regardless of the possible 
social, environmental and political consequences.” (Harvey, 2014, p.13) 
In this sense, the growth of the Caruaru Market, despite being the 
main economic engine of the city, has brought a series of problems 
to the population.
1. Due to its growth in the city center, the traffic has become awful.
2. The market has become a public safety problem: the location is 
considered safe only during the day and in the periods in which 
the market is open.
3. The extensive circulation of people who are not concerned about 
the environment (in addition to the absence of public policies) 
have made the Ipojuca river, the cradle of the city, the second most 
polluted river in the country.
The Caruaru Market has ended up conforming to the almost 
insuperable advances of the modern capitalist world. Even with all 
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these problems, the Caruaru Market is still an oasis where elements 
of popular tradition can still be found. It is still a prime location for 
the reproduction of everyday life, not only in the material sense, but 
especially in preserving the local identity and, recently, in exercising 
rights. However, its cultural existence is threatened. As such, we cannot 
dismiss the market as an important agonistic space of legitimation or 
resistance to neoliberalism. As we will explain later, the Caruaru Market 
is currently the midpoint of a controversial debate involving culture, 
urbanization, politics, and the economy.
The change in the site of the Caruaru Market as result 
of neoliberal psychopolitics
The Caruaru Market is formed of more than 10,000 wooden stands, 
arranged outdoors, on a rustic floor. Walking through the market’s 
alleys is a unique experience, even for those who are local. This 
environment, by itself, provides a characteristic experience of the 
markets and its stalls, immersed in its smells, tastes and ways. But what 
about turning this traditional space into a large, covered commercial 
gallery with aseptic spaces, arranged according to standards that would 
be akin to that of a shopping center? Using an analogy: have you ever 
wondered what it would be like if the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul had its 
traditional place of business transformed in a shopping center? This is 
what will probably happen with the Caruaru Market. The project of 
its relocation from its traditional place of operation was proposed by 
the mayor José Queiroz (2012—16) and its main characteristic is the 
relocation of the Sulanca Market. City councilmen visited the market 
and compiled a report which was later presented to the city hall. The 
mayor, in turn, discussed the issue with the Commercial and Business 
Association of Caruaru—ACIC. Votes and meetings also took place 
between the municipal powers and the representatives of the market 
traders, so that there was a public consultation about the proposal, even 
though several traders have said that the project was not sufficiently 
discussed. On the day of the vote in the City Council a protest was 
held by some representatives of the market traders.
A very positive point is that the market traders, for the first time, 
although in an incipient way and despite the clashes and different 
opinions about the relocation of the market, stepped up and were seen 
as a collective with sufficient power to face the public one, participating 
in the creation of a policy that would seriously affect them. According 
to Butler (2017, p.159):
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… the gathering already speaks before uttering any words, 
which by the mere fact of joining, this multitude of people 
already represents a popular will; and that this representation 
has a very different meaning from that which is transmitted 
by one subject to another when he expresses his will 
through a verbal affirmation.
But, as we will observe later, popular participation, although democratic 
and effective, is conditioned by the values and limits of the subjects 
who practice it.
The project was approved by the City Council of Caruaru on July 
31, 2015. The casting vote of the councilman “Nino do Rap” was 
decisive. The congressman, who was against the relocation of the 
market, changed his position unbelievably “to prove that he was not 
afraid of the threat he would have suffered related to the approval of 
the law.” Despite the approval by the City Council the relocation has 
not yet taken place due to a series of judicial obstacles that remain in 
process. The new address is on the margins of the BR-104 highway, 
moving the market from the center of the city to the periphery. There 
is 60 hectares of land and the capacity for 5,946 vehicles and 380 buses. 
It would feature a food court and restrooms.1 The implementation 
of the project would cost the public coffers around R$300 million, 
with most of the money spent initially by the state government of 
Pernambuco. The new market would be managed by an association of 
the market traders, that is, by the private sector. Such a change, which 
could take place under the management of the current mayor Raquel 
Lyra, would significantly alter the movement of goods and people in 
the Brazilian northeast, in particular, the sale of typical products and 
the clothing trade, which currently corresponds to the market’s most 
prolific sector. The case of the Caruaru Market’s relocation drew our 
attention because of its neoliberal aspects, in such a way that it can 
assist us to think about post-neoliberalism. Our research combines the 
contributions of theory with data collected in empirical reality. In this 
sense, Boltanski’s observation, regarding studies that seek to redeem the 
critique of neoliberalism by analyzing the local and global advances of 
capitalism and the ways in which the state operates, is salient:
… this requires that researchers and analysts keen to follow 
critical projects do their work in a modest way, that is 
to say, that they abandon the fascinated contemplation 
of their televisions, where the “misery of the world” 
finds a deformed reflection, instead they go to the things 
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themselves. Let them undertake to continue the empirical 
study, not only of the condition that is the most needed 
today, but, and above all, of the new devices of power … 
(Boltanski and Nancy, 2016, pp.87–8)
According to this perspective and aiming to understanding the 
reality of the Caruaru Market, 50 traders were interviewed, and 100 
questionnaires were completed over a period of two weeks in June 
2017.2 The application of the research instruments was random, in 
relation to those who agreed to participate, and occurred in the various 
sub-sections of the Caruaru Market (18 May Park), with 50% of the 
data collected specifically at the Sulanca Market. Participants were 
kept anonymous and all procedures were carried out to ensure their 
safeguarding and to uphold research ethics. The comments and data 
collected are revealing. Some of the characteristics of neoliberalism 
function strongly in maintaining the very system that underpins it. 
From the case we analyze, I would like to highlight four possible 
obstacles to post-neoliberalism: a) neoliberalization of subjectivity; b) 
privatization of public space; c) minimum market regulation; and d) 
globalization of localisms.
Neoliberalization of subjectivity
Perhaps the greatest fundamental flaw of neoliberal 
discourse lies in an illegitimate reductionism of social 
reality, making the functioning of the Market appear in an 
artificial vacuum. As if the companies and other economic 
agents were not situated within a natural, social and political 
framework that shapes them and that condition their action 
and its possibilities. (Calcagno and Calcagno, 2015, p.135)
Neoliberalizing subjectivity is the starting point for neoliberalism. 
It is to make the individual lose himself by focusing his existence 
within the market. As we already know, the clash between neoliberal 
ideology and the left, being reformed in the tension between north 
and south (as expressed in the cartography of Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos), reveals distinct equations regarding the relationship between 
individual and society. Without entering into the discussion about the 
existence of collectives as “society,” we may ask ourselves: who is this 
individual that neoliberalism speaks of? It is an individual (Individuus, 
which means “indivisible,” “which cannot be divided”) in the sense of 
being cast into a way of being in the world without openness to other 
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possibilities. Therefore, we must understand neoliberalism essentially as 
a civilizational model, which promotes a specific ethos. Hence the left’s 
focus (with all the practical problems and disastrous experiences that 
have occurred throughout recent history, especially in Latin America) 
on emancipation and a social justice that derives directly from the self-
consciousness and liberation of the individual. Neoliberal power acts 
quietly, subliminally, imprisoning the individuals within themselves, 
preventing them from constructing what Hannah Arendt (1998) calls 
the “common world.”
Byung-Chul Han (2016, p.14), based on Foucault’s thought, explains 
that this power treats the population as a mass of production and 
reproduction that it must meticulously control. It subjects the subject 
to a code of norms, precepts and prohibitions, as well as eliminating 
violations and anomalies. According to the Korean author, the 
neoliberal modeling creates a subject that seems close to the one we 
describe when we analyze the Caruaru Market trader:
Neoliberalism, as a mutation of capitalism, converts 
the worker into an entrepreneur. Neoliberalism, not 
Communist revolution, eliminates the working class that is 
subject to outside exploitation. Today each person exploits 
himself in his own company. Each one is master and slave, 
in the same person. The class struggle becomes an internal 
struggle with myself. (Han, 2017, pp.36–7)
Power in this context operates in a secretive and diffused way:
Power as coercion manifests in imposing one’s own 
decisions against the will of the other. A reduced degree of 
mediation is demonstrated. The self and the other behave 
in an antagonistic way. The self is not welcomed into the 
soul of the other. On the contrary, more mediation restrains 
that other power that does not operate against the project of 
action of the other, but rather through it. (Han, 2017, p.38)
In this sense, neoliberalism is not only a free-market project, it is, 
above all, an adjustment of the subject to a way of being in the world. 
Neoliberal psychopolitics is a powerful weapon for the reinforcement 
of domination through psychological programming. The case of the 
Caruaru Market traders is emblematic in this sense. As Colombani 
(2008, p.169) explains: 
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“Work is the political technology par excellence to achieve 
the desired subjectivation process, as a productive device of 
docile, yet productive, subjects, active while conducive to 
the flow of capital, but controllable in their unproductive, 
and therefore undesirable aspects.” From the political-
existential perspective of the philosopher Hannah Arendt, 
we can affirm that these people only survive, because their 
whole existence is orientated toward the maintenance of 
life, as they remain imprisoned in the world of necessity 
and end up not affirming themselves as properly human.
Privatization of the public space
Although neoliberalism proposes, among other things, the minimization 
of state interference, this does not mean that the neoliberalization 
process is impeded in its action as a disciplining power that manipulates 
the forms of life. One of the most important consequences of the 
modus operandi of this power is the absence of political participation: 
“The neoliberal system has, therefore, an important and necessary by-
product – a depoliticized citizenship, marked by apathy and cynicism.” 
(Chomsky, 2002, p.4) In the context of the Caruaru Market, this is 
mainly because the traders,3 as well as other individuals working under 
similar conditions, experience the drama of not being fully suited to the 
requirements that would make them employable in the conventional 
business structure. Therefore, they remain on their sidelines, fighting a 
daily struggle for subsistence and economic success (Helal et al, 2013, 
p.107). Hannah Arendt’s diagnosis of the human condition provides 
an explanation of this worldview. A trader answered when was asked if 
they had been engaged in the debate about the relocation of the market:
We live to work. From Sunday to Sunday wondering if there 
will be people coming to buy the next week. There is no 
time to go to the meeting or to argue. Everyone has their 
opinion. It will not help at all. They have already decided. 
The only question is whether it will be to our advantage.
When asked in a questionnaire about their participation in the 
proceedings of the market relocation, 93% of the marketers answered 
that they are not interested in discussing the subject because they are 
very busy trying to guarantee their survival. According to Arendt, 
in the modern age, labor (activity directed to immediate subsistence 
needs) would have been placed above of work (activity of production 
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of durable goods) and action (political activity, which gives human 
meaning to the people), because the homo faber4 was replaced by the 
animal laborans. These transformations would be related to the changes 
in the spaces destined to these activities. The distinction between public 
and private space, so fundamental to the Greeks and the Romans, would 
have become almost obsolete, allowing the emergence of a hybrid 
sphere, which Arendt called “society,” a kind of extended domestic 
space that would span entire nations. It would be the form in which 
the fact of mutual dependence for subsistence would have acquired 
public importance, and in which activities which concern mere survival 
would be admitted into the public space. The market, returning to 
the case in question, the public space par excellence (remember the 
dialogues of Socrates in the dialogues of Plato), becomes the space 
of the private, the “social.” The speech of another trader denounces 
what he considers to be the loss of this shared space represented by 
the current market: “They are wanting to privatize the market! They 
want to make the market into something it is not.” The trader does 
not realize, unfortunately, that the market has already been privatized, 
in the Arendt sense. According to the mayor of Caruaru’s proposal, 
the current traders would be required to pay about R$27,000 to 
continue with their stand at the new market. This reveals one of the 
most striking features of neoliberalism: the market is not for everyone. 
The current Caruaru Market reflects the diversity of the social world, 
a place of differences, with all its hierarchies both formal (which are 
sold from a stall) and informal (for example, the person that sells their 
products on the floor, on a towel). Neoliberalism reduces complexity 
and homogenizes social relations, privileging a standard individual 
who has purchasing power. We must not forget that the market is not 
only a place of money, but of symbolic reproduction and local identity. 
Caruaru is not known by the economy of its market, but by the culture 
and tradition that survived there.
Minimum regulation of the market
The new market would be regulated by the government simply in 
terms of feasibility and control of the use of the new location, the 
obligation to maintain security and tax collection. This reminds us of 
the famous book Law, Legislation, and Liberty, where Hayek uses the 
term “catallaxy” to describe “the order brought about by the mutual 
adjustment of many individual economies in a market.” Hayek believed 
that the term “economy” was insufficient, as it meant “domestic 
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management,” indicating that economic agents would have shared 
goals. As the economist explains:
As the term ‘Catallactics’ has long been suggested to define 
the science that deals with market order and, more recently, 
resurrected, it seems appropriate to use the corresponding 
term for the market order itself. The term ‘catallactic’ was 
derived from the Greek ‘kattalletein’ (katallassein), which 
means, not only ‘to exchange’ but also ‘to admit into the 
community’ and ‘to convert from enemy to friend’. (Hayek, 
1973, p.57)
The ex-mayor José Queiroz, interviewed on local television, aptly 
expresses the catallactic nature of the proposal to relocate the market:
The Treasury Department inspectors went to each of the 
traders and explained that it is necessary to be registered 
and, in fulfillment of their obligations, to pay taxes. If 
someone ‘stumbles’ and does not fulfill their obligations, 
they are not a normal trader. All those who are registered 
will have their rights and even those who are not, will be 
regulated. We have established, by law, that we will only 
be opening space to third parties—as there are many who 
have already asked me and would like to participate—after 
all the traders are attended to. Now, if the trader gives up 
and opens the space, it will be filled by a third party who 
is looking for one.5
That is, those who do not conform or do not agree with the new 
market cannot be considered “normal.” They are system anomalies 
and must be replaced by people who agree to submit themselves. 
They would probably be part of the reserve army of labor, namely 
unemployed or informal workers.
The utilitarian belief in a market that is capable of accounting for 
the wellbeing of individuals falls to the ground when we consider that 
there are other dimensions of the human to be considered and that 
cannot be subjected to the “invisible hand of the market,” since its 
existence is only maintained to the extent that they are advantageous 
for the reinforcement of the system. The spontaneity of the market 
described by Hayek particularly favors the economic aspect. According 
to the data collected, 44% of traders believe that the market’s culture 
is being preserved in the current location. But 72% believe that the 
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traditional culture of the market will be lost if the move to the new 
location occurs. It is interesting to note that the traders themselves 
agree with this phenomenon, since 85% of the traders responded that 
they would agree to the market relocation if it would bring more 
money, even if it meant losing the market’s cultural identity. This 
is the contradictory dialectic of the disposable. Not only are people 
disposable in a neoliberal market, but humanity is too. Localisms work 
in some cases as mini-globalizations seeking to consolidate hegemony.
Globalization of localisms
One of the comments made by the traders is that the municipal 
government has not made any investments in the current market, which 
led to a disadvantage when facing competition from other markets in 
the region (from the cities of Toritama and Santa Cruz do Capibaribe):
If we do not have security, when it rains it fills with mud, 
the lighting is not good... why should we resist the mayor’s 
proposal? I believe the right thing would be to improve 
the market that we have today. But how can I be against 
the relocation of the market if they are offering what we 
do not have?
It is certain that the degradation of its infrastructure (intentionally or 
not) leverages the rhetorical power of the relocation of the market, 
anchored in the urgent needs of the merchants. This is compounded 
by the competition of the markets of the neighboring cities, which 
have already been transformed into large commercial galleries. Several 
interviewees spoke of a phenomenon they called “Chinese invasion.” 
According to the traders, the addition of oriental products in the market 
has been damaging. One of the interviewees explained:
It’s difficult to compete with the Chinese products. They 
sell at a low price and are produced in large quantities. Now, 
the factories of the region are closing and beginning to sell 
these Chinese products. It is much better.
It is interesting to note that the market pressure resulting from 
globalization is reproduced at a local level. This is what I call the 
“globalization of localisms.” In the case of Caruaru, there is intense 
pressure on the municipal government not to lose space to the two 
neighboring cities, Toritama and Santa Cruz do Capibaribe. Indeed, 
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buyers are increasingly abandoning shopping at the Caruaru Market 
because these competing cities have created gigantic shopping centers 
that seem more attractive from their point of view. If, on the one hand, 
these two cities have already suffered the “Chinese invasion,” and have 
embraced the import and export market, on the other, Caruaru is 
seen by the traders and the population as a city that was left behind. 
According to the tradesmen we consulted, the Chinese invasion is 
inevitable, and it is necessary to follow the same model as that of the 
cities that have already “modernized.” According to this view, the ideal 
market is precisely the one that abandons whatever it needs to (culture, 
tradition, values) and commits itself to maximizing profit. The “real” 
place is not ours, but the neighbors’.
According to neoliberalized individuals, the only way to make 
the market subsist is to globalize it, which indicates high power of 
reproduction and adaptation of the neoliberal “virus.” Furthermore, 
globalizing is not simply practicing foreign trade, it is adopting the 
market forms of those next to you if there is evidence that their model 
is more advantageous. According to our research, 92% of the market 
participants who answered the questionnaire believe that Caruaru 
should adopt the Santa Cruz do Capibaribe market model. Localisms 
work in some cases as mini-globalizations seeking to consolidate 
hegemony.
I am not against changing the location of the market. Regardless of 
whether the market is in the same place or if there is a change, what 
cannot happen is that its value and rich culture be cast aside, otherwise 
the city of Caruaru will lose its own identity. I believe that resisting 
neoliberalism will be feasible when spatial development is seriously 
rethought in the face of urbanization and the market, which, in turn, is 
permanently and dynamically situated between the local and the global.
Conclusion
Not all regulative public policy that substantially alters the life of the 
market and the population is anti-neoliberal. Each case deserves to 
be analyzed from the point of view of the rhetoric involved, since a 
strengthening of the state can be, under the guise of promoting citizens’ 
rights, a way of increasing capital gains. As we have seen in the case 
of the attempt to change the location of the Caruaru Market, the 
implementation of a control over the traders and their activities seems 
to be more than a concession to the business sector of the region, but 
rather the application of the neoliberal mechanism of psychopolitics. 
The local government itself submits to this device. If it does not meet 
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market pressures, the Caruaru Market will probably be devoured by 
the markets of the surrounding cities (turned into gigantic galleries that 
offer several advantages of shopping malls). If the market is relocated 
according to the approved project, it turns it into a set of shops that 
bears vague resemblance to what the market once was. The market 
would be no longer a market.
On the other hand, immersed in an existential environment where 
the “society” (in the Arendt sense) prevails, the traders themselves are 
largely incapable of overcoming the unconsciousness of their apolitical 
condition, placing subsistence needs above everything else. Selling 
more and more is the only thing that really matters and culture can 
be cast aside. The most direct consequence of the social is that culture 
deserves to be preserved for only as long as it serves to guarantee the 
reproduction of this system. The foundational value, which makes 
the Caruaru Market immaterial heritage of Brazilian culture, is lost.
It is illusory to believe that citizen participation in debates, councils 
and public consultations, through democratic mechanisms, is a lasting 
antidote against neoliberal subjectivity. The field research has shown 
that, in the context studied, independent of popular participation, the 
economy is prioritized to the detriment of culture, insofar as that which 
is sold (but also the Caruaru Market itself) has become a product of 
the cultural industry. This is when the “globalization of indifference” 
reaches the local level. Surprisingly, we observe that the market has 
become a space for the diffusion of neoliberal psychopolitics. And in 
case of the relocation of the market in the manner proposed, the death 
of its cultural spirit would instantly occur, leaving the propaganda of 
a past that no longer belongs to it, which would instrumentalize its 
traditional values in favor of his market survival.
I agree with Han (2017, p.117) when he says that the openness 
to the “Event,” a liberating experience of the submissive subject, is 
essential for a de-psychologization that releases the subject. A crisis 
of neoliberalism has as a pre-condition the potential for a crisis of 
the model of subjectivity that it promotes. The transition to one 
(or several) “posts” will occur when succumb to the “Other” that 
liberalism shelters. According to Del Percio (2015), we should not, 
therefore, naturalize politics, but rather view it as a set of possibilities 
which includes conflict as an important tool for balancing expectations 
and interests. Chantal Mouffe (2014, p.131), in turn, says that the 
current state of globalization would be not “natural” but the result 
of a neoliberal hegemony, and is structured through specific power 
relations. But this state can be challenged and transformed because 
there are alternatives available. It would always be possible to change 
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things politically because one can always intervene in power relations 
with the aim of transforming them.
The case of the Caruaru Market shows us that we must consider the 
peculiarities of localisms and that for post-neoliberalism to exist it is 
not enough to merely have effective popular participation in the public 
sphere, it is necessary to first develop an anti-neoliberal ‘conscience’. 
Ironically, in the case studied, the market should not be the core of the 
market, at risk of losing its democratic and multicultural profile; it is the 
socially enriching informality, symbolism, and tradition that makes it 
culturally strong. In other situations, places, and countries, it may not 
be the culture that is damaged by this world view. The environment, 
human dignity, the bonds of solidarity, and other dimensions of the 
human are lost in detriment of the economic. “Self-care” is necessary. 
Deleuze (2005) explains that this concept means that a person (of this 
era) unconsciously holds his consciousness in things other than himself. 
He finds himself “forgetting his forgetfulness,” as Heidegger puts it. In 
my opinion, to return to oneself would enable the subject to return 
and transfigure the world, denaturalizing the market as the center of 
human life. In the case of the Caruaru Market, the relationship between 
neoliberalism, culture, and popular participation reveals something 
very simple: a post-model only makes sense if people are post-market! 
Even if one speaks of the need for a counter-hegemonic “consensus” 
(Sader, 2009), a third middle way (Giddens, 2001), or the redeeming 
of a general willing, the greatest challenge of post-neoliberalism is to 
break with this kind of subjectivity inaugurated by the moderns and 
deepened in contemporaneity.
Notes
1  A summary of the project can be found at http://feiradecaruaru.com/portal/
conheca-o-projeto-da-nova-feira-de-caruaru/
2  In a subsequent survey, we intend to increase the number of participating subjects, 
including city councilors, the head of municipal government, entrepreneurs, 
business leaders, civil society organizations, and public prosecutors. For the initial 
purposes of our research we chose to collect data only from traders.
3  According to research conducted in 2011, the traders are mostly children of farmers 
who were born in the countryside and studied for an average of only three years. 
Most of them are between 35 and 54 years old (64.5%). Six out of ten traders did 
not complete basic education and only 13.3% of them had some formal employment 
before working at the market. (Helal et al, 2013, p.107)
4  Arendt explains that the Latin word Faber, which is probably related to facere (to do 
something in the sense of production) originally applied to the manufacturer and 
artist who worked with hard materials such as stone or wood and was also the word 
used as a translation from Greek Tekton, which would have the same connotation. 
The word Fabri, referred specifically to the construction workers and carpenters. 
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As for the term homo faber, which certainly has modern and post-medieval origins, 
she says she could not determine where and when the expression first appeared 
(Arendt, 1998, p.136).
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The Contribution of the 
Catholic Magazine Espacio Laical 
and the Constitution to the 
Cuban Public Sphere
Alexei Padilla Herrera and Armando Chaguaceda Noriega
In contemporary political, cultural and communicational debates, 
the idea of the public sphere has a notable presence. According to the 
classical Habermasian perspective, the public sphere is the realm of 
social life in which public opinion can be shaped by principles such 
as free access for all citizens, inclusion, reciprocity, reflection, equality, 
and the rational justification of arguments. In this domain, people act 
as public when they discuss topics of general interest in conditions 
of equality and without coercion. These conditions guarantee, in 
normative terms, that the citizens can meet freely to express their 
opinions and points of view (Habermas, 1989). Nancy Fraser defends 
the influence of public discussions on decision making and believes that 
the formation of public opinion can be a counterweight to discourses in 
formal deliberative arenas. She adds that sometimes the arguments put 
forward by civil society actors succeed in influencing the decisions of 
executive and legislative powers (Fraser, 1992). Reinforcing that idea, 
Avritzer and Costa (2004) argue that issues, positions, and arguments 
defended by the new social actors must infiltrate the state through 
institutional mechanisms, and thus democratize and put it under the 
control of citizens.
However, not all real public spheres are democratic, since cultural 
and material inequalities determine the differentiation between 
publics and their capacities, especially in spaces characterized by 
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dependency relations and state interference (Chaguaceda, 2011). It has 
been pointed out that a merely conversational public sphere will not 
succeed in subverting power relations or guaranteeing the pursuit of 
the common good. The Habermasian model has also been criticized 
because it is confined to the analysis of the bourgeois public sphere and 
ignores that, together with the formation of the dominant bourgeois 
public, the publics were composed of peasants, workers, women, 
and nationalists, who constituted competing public spheres (Fraser, 
1992) and complement each other. Therefore, one should not speak 
of sphere (singular) but of public (plural) spheres that together form 
the public space.
In later texts, Habermas admits the coexistence of various public 
spheres and the need to observe the dynamics of the communicative 
processes that occur outside the dominant spaces of discussion. Now the 
public sphere is defined as a complex network of a diversity of forums 
for public discussion—both in formal institutions and outside these, 
articulated through communicative activity, when different publics 
come together in organized networks to debate topics of common 
interest, contrasting points of view, and assuming or reaffirming 
positions (Marques, 2008).1
Whatever position one takes within that debate, the notion of the 
public sphere reveals its value not only for critical social theory and 
democratic practice, but also for understanding the limits of democracy 
within existing capitalism and for the construction of alternative 
democratic projects (Fraser, 1992), both to the present neoliberal order 
and to socialist experiences of Soviet court. However, the Habermasian 
theory did not propose a universal law applicable to any context: it is a 
normative model to which existing societies relate or not. As has been 
stated (Chaguaceda, 2011), the concept must be anchored in specific 
contexts and subjects, given that the analysis of the public sphere in 
concrete spaces shows its normative limits. Limits appear when one 
analyzes countries that are not governed by the principles of liberal 
democracy, such as Cuba.
The peculiarities of the social system established in Cuba in the early 
1970s make it necessary to consult some of the sources that discuss 
the emergence, structure and functioning of the public spheres in the 
Soviet Union and the rest of the countries that made up the former 
socialist camp. Most of the empirical research done on the public 
sphere in socialist regimes has a historical-descriptive character and 
was carried out after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union. In general, these investigations analyzed the 
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emergence of public spheres integrated by dissidents and intellectual 
criticizers. Some scholars (Bathrick, 1995; Lauristin, 1998; Rittersporn 
et al, 2003; Silberman, 1997; Voronkov, 2003) state that the process 
of de-Stalinisation in the communist countries of Europe and the 
USSR, in particular, made possible the emergence of multiple spaces 
of organization, debate, and exchange of ideas that can be seen as 
prototypes of the public sphere operating without legal guarantees and 
under precarious conditions.
Bathrick (1995) proposed a mapping to illustrate the growing 
differentiation of public space in East Germany from the 1970s until 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The author defines three 
major interconnected spheres: the official public sphere, controlled by 
the Communist Party (unique); the unofficial or counterpublic sphere; 
and the media based in West Germany. Other studies recognize how 
in the official public sphere the leaders sought to legitimize the regime 
through educational and cultural institutions, trade unions, subordinate 
Party organizations, state media, study centers, and institutionalized 
public spaces for debate. They point out how, despite the need for 
criticism, and that sometimes the leaders recognized certain errors, the 
state apparatus was unlikely to be criticized, as the state could close 
the spaces of discussion before any tension arose. In practice it was 
a fabricated, controlled, uncritical, and restricted sphere. One of the 
objectives of this official structure was to make the population believe 
that public opinion was participatory and that the voice of citizens 
was heard amid decision making. However, attempts were also made 
to create a public space to neutralize the image of a rigid bureaucracy 
and a partisan state apparatus that had drifted apart from the masses. 
The objective was to create a public opinion that would align with 
the elite’s discourse. Through letters with criticisms, petitions, and 
complaints published in the official press, most of the population was 
drawn into the practice of public criticism (Rittersporn et al, 2003).
In addition to this diversity of official public spheres, there were 
others considered as alternatives. Alternative public spheres took shelter 
in limited spaces and developed different ways of communication. In 
practice, these were divided into small groups with little influence 
on everyday life (Killingsworth, 2012). The peripheral position of 
these critical public environments reinforced fragmentation as the 
major feature of public spheres in Soviet-type societies (Rittersporn 
et al, 2003). These alternative spheres existed with the consent of 
the Party-State and both their level of activity and their expansion 
showed dramatic fluctuations (Killingsworth, 2012). Periods of 
apparent openness and expansion of public debate were followed by the 
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restraint and repression of critical dissidents and intellectuals. Religious 
organizations were a bastion of resistance to the official ideology of 
socialist states. Rittersporn et al (2003) point out that, in the German 
Democratic Republic (DGR) and in Poland, the meeting spaces 
sponsored by the churches constituted a very influential public sphere. 
These institutions had infrastructures and networks of communication 
perhaps more developed than those of the partisan authorities in the 
early years of the socialist regimes. Linz and Stepan (1967) claim that 
the Polish Catholic Church maintained a relatively autonomous sphere 
of government, which generated a complex pattern of reciprocal 
recognition and negotiations between the high clergy and the state. 
In contrast, Motly (1978) points out that in the Soviet Union various 
religious groups (Roman and Greek Catholics, Orthodox, Protestants 
and Buddhists) in opposed the regime.
As we noted earlier, the media played a key role in the functioning 
of the public sphere. Party control over the state media and the book 
industry, the instrumental nature attributed to the press,2 and the 
absence of laws recognizing the rights of access to information of 
public interest have been essential features of the systems of public 
communication in socialist countries. The process of de-Stalinisation 
of Soviet society and the dissatisfaction of dissidents and intellectuals 
with the monopoly of symbolic production favored the emergence 
of typed publications circulated clandestinely. The main function of 
samizdat, as it was known, was to show the realities ignored by the 
official press. These publications concentrated a diversity of opinions 
and a wide range of information—a threat to the ruling elite—as well 
as acting as a link between people and as a means of communication 
that could overcome the atomization of society (Motly, 1978).
Motly (1978) pointed out that some of the religious denominations 
mentioned earlier distributed their publications covertly. One of them 
was Exodus, edited by the Hebrew community, and the magazine 
Lithuanian Chronicle, which provided information on the activities 
of Catholics and dissidents in Lithuania. British investigator Brian 
McNair, however, asserts that samizdat never threatened party control 
on the flow of information in Soviet society and that its circulation was 
restricted to small groups of political and religious dissidents. Although 
it played an important informative role within these groups, most of 
the population ignored it or did not care (Mcnair, 2006). Nonetheless, 
these publications were the main example of the alternative press in 
the USSR (Motly, 1978) and the countries of the socialist bloc.
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The search for theoretical references and empirical studies on the 
public sphere in socialist regimes has been a complex and unfinished 
task. Almost all the consulted authors who investigate the spaces of 
debate in the countries of the former socialist camp (Bathrick, 1995; 
Rittersporn et al, 2003; Killingsworth, 2012) adapted the Habermasian 
notion to particular contexts, without ignoring its normative limits. 
Hence it is difficult to find an original model of socialist public 
sphere. According to Valdés Paz (2015, interview), the scarcity of 
autochthonous theoretical proposals about the public sphere in 
socialism can be explained by the non-incorporation of the concept 
in the socialist political culture, and its absence in the official ideology 
has resulted in the dogmatisms that reject any term or idea of liberal 
origin.3 Guanche (2009) also refers to the lack of theoretical proposals 
on the public sphere of socialism by linking the poverty of existing 
theories on that subject to the precariousness of its development, as was 
shown in the previous section. In the past decade and a half, Cuban 
researchers (Guanche, 2013; Navarro, 2002; Leyva and Somohano, 
2007, 2008; Valdés Paz, 2009) have contributed to the theoretical 
discussion on the public sphere in socialism.
In line with Fraser (1992) and Valdés Paz (2009), Leyva and 
Somohano affirm that the public sphere in Cuba should not be limited 
to opinion formation, but act as a place of confrontation between 
social actors with possibilities of transforming politics. Confrontation 
“can promote the active participation of citizens to delimit, solve and 
evaluate the surrounding problems” (Leyva and Somohano, 2008, 
p.45). The public sphere must be reconfigured, since the reproduction 
of socialist hegemony necessitates the formation of that sphere of 
citizen confrontation. The debate, criticism, and confrontation 
between diverse interests and different worldviews are necessary for 
the construction of an active consensus (Leyva and Somohano, 2007).
Julio César Guanche, jurist and researcher, defends the constitution 
of a public sphere where “a social space opens to the intervention of 
its multiple actors, which denounces and corrects the asymmetries 
and inequalities that make this public sphere a private enclave of the 
powerful” (Guanche, 2013, p.3). He adds that it is essential to develop 
democratic policies that empower the popular sectors to establish 
egalitarian interactions in a truly public sphere.
Nevertheless, we consider that the most complete normative 
definition made on the island has been a result of the reflections of 
the sociologist Juan Valdés Paz. He argues that, in socialism, the public 
sphere is not the liberal image of a “communicative sphere” nor the 
neoliberal vision that conceives it as a non-state space. The socialist 
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public sphere would be “a space intersected by all social systems, 
to which all are taxed” and where “the public good is defined and 
performed.” Although “it is an area limited by the current legal order, 
its powers are determined by popular sovereignty and culture” (Valdés 
Paz, 2009, p.212).
Valdés Paz’ concept is based on the legacy of critical Marxism 
and particularly on the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg, who defined the 
proletarian public sphere as the key space for building the hegemony 
of socialism. The absence of a public sphere or the limitations that 
impede its normal functioning would preclude socialist democratic 
construction. For the author of El Espacio y el Límite, the political 
participation of citizens demands the establishment and expansion of 
the public sphere in Cuba (Valdés Paz, 2009). Such a commitment 
implies some prerequisites: a legal framework, an institutional space, 
political will that supports participation, and the formation of a culture 
of participation (Guanche, 2009).
In each country, the structuring of the public sphere is a prolonged 
phenomenon historically conditioned by cultural, political, economic, 
and other mediations. One of the shortcomings of the classical studies 
consulted is that they do not refer to the public sphere that existed prior 
to the adoption of one-party socialist regimes. This is an important 
question because, at least in Cuba, there was a diversity of spaces for 
political debate and publications available for different forms of thought, 
as well as a legal framework guaranteeing freedom of association, word, 
and press without any restrictions other than the respect of public 
morality. During the republican period (1902–58), the public sphere 
was one of the sources that fed the citizenship of the generation that 
made the 1959 revolution possible, based on principles of social justice, 
democracy, and national sovereignty (Chaguaceda, 2010).
During the first years of the Cuban Revolution, Cuban public space 
experienced great dynamism. The media environment was the main 
arena of debate between supporters and detractors of measures such as 
Agrarian Reform, as well as the concerns of the Catholic Church about 
the growing ideological proximity of the revolutionary government 
to the Soviet Union. Between 1959 and 1962 the universe of private 
Cuban media was nationalized, and the opposition lost its main space of 
expression (Valdés Paz, 2009). The Catholic Church had to be content 
with sending its messages through bulletins and flyers (Trujillo, 2011).
The unity of organizations and sectors related to the revolutionary 
government would require the necessary means and for all to work 
together. “The Party’s Revolutionary Orientation Commission 
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(which led to the current Party Ideological Department) took control 
of the media and the press. The restructuring of the press imposed 
partisan discipline and partisan agenda in the newsrooms and on the 
reporters,” but failed to produce a better journalism than previously 
(García Luis, 2013, p.81). Although organic to the government, the 
media mirrored the limited (but real) heterodoxy of thought existing 
within the revolutionary ranks. An indicator of the level reached by 
public debate in that period was the controversy about the role of art 
and culture in the education of the population in 1963 prompted by 
veteran communist leader Blas Roca and ICAIC’s director Alfredo 
Guevara in the newspaper Noticias de Hoy (Leyva and Somohano, 
2007). According to Fernández Retamar (2004), Che Guevara created 
a magazine in the Ministry of Industries to argue that if the right to 
dissent was denied to the revolutionaries, the conditions for the most 
steadfast dogmatism would be created. Thus, Cancio Isla (2002, p.57) 
concludes that the 1960s press “is truly attuned to the will to open 
society, and its contents will still be very distant from the ritualization 
and advertising enthroned at the end of the sixties prevailing in the 
following decades.”
The entrance of Cuba to the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) in 1972 was based on the establishment 
of a social, political, and economic order similar to that of the 
USSR and its European satellites. After the First National Congress 
of Education and Culture, in 1971, the subordination of culture to 
the state and to the designs of the Party was established. The theses 
and resolutions on mass media approved at the First Congress of the 
Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), in 1975, guided the adoption of 
the Soviet press model. The media, defined as organs of the Party, 
the state, and the organizations related to both, became instruments 
of ideological and political struggle (García Luis, 2013; Valdés Paz, 
2009). The media monopoly had to show the political, economic, and 
social achievements in Cuba and in other socialist countries. While 
a bureaucratic mechanism was established to regulate the critics on 
specific economic and administrative questions, the analysis of political 
and ideological questions depended on the guidelines of the Party 
leadership (PCC, 1975).
The Socialist Constitution promulgated in 1976 (inspired by its 
Soviet counterpart of 1936) recognized speech and press freedom but 
subordinated them to the achievement of the construction of socialism, 
and it established state and social ownership of the mass media. It 
prohibited the existence of private media, which, in theory, would 
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guarantee the use of the media to the “exclusive service of working 
people and social interest” (Constitution, 1976, Article 52).
The constitutional text does not make it clear whether “rights of 
assembly, demonstration and association” can be exercised outside 
“social and mass organizations” and that “they have all the facilities 
for the development of such activities” (Article 53). One of the 
consequences of the Sovietization of the Cuban state and society was the 
closing of critical publications and a reduction in spaces for discussion 
(Leyva and Somohano, 2008), encouraged by the intellectual vanguard 
of that time. The ideological parametrization (or the imposition of 
ideological parameters) and the impoverishment of the culture of debate 
was, perhaps, the legacy of that period (Alonso, 2006). In those years, 
there was no alternative field for the advancement of Marxist positions 
different from the Soviet one (Martínez Heredia, 2001).
The influences of the Soviet model encouraged the distrust of 
Cuban politicians in relation to the cultural sphere that was seen as 
a potential opposition force. In this scenario, public interventions by 
intellectuals should address cultural and artistic issues. Social and/or 
political criticism should be carried out by professional political cadres, 
experts, or specialists. The transgression of the tolerated limits could 
mean the exclusion of the intellectual from the public sphere (Navarro, 
2002). The disarticulation of cultural policies that responded to the 
political and aesthetic postulates of socialist realism encouraged the 
reappearance of social and political criticism in the plastic arts, theater, 
literature, cinema, and essays.
To contain the influence of the Soviet perestroika and glasnost, a new 
offensive of the state against the interventions of intellectuals in the 
public sphere was unleashed in 1988 (Navarro, 2002). With the growing 
criticism and freedom of the publications of the Soviet press, in August 
of that year the distribution of magazines Sputnik and Moscow News 
was suspended (Rojas, 2008).
The break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 led to an 
economic crisis in Cuba—not yet overcome—worsened by the 
strengthening of the US embargo. The crisis itself and the adjustments 
adopted to guarantee the country’s survival significantly altered the 
Cuban social fabric. The opening to foreign capital, the development 
of international tourism, the free circulation of foreign exchange, the 
reception of remittances, and the resurgence of small private businesses 
consolidated the role of the market in the economy and created a gap 
of inequality among Cubans with access to the foreign currency and 
those who depended on wages and state assistance. The concept of 
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“working people” did not account for the diversity of identities, projects 
of life, or the plurality of forms of thought that, since the previous 
decade, had begun to emerge from the various sectors of society. In 
the margins of the political system were the actors who defended the 
status quo, those who advocated a regime change that would put Cuba 
back on the tracks of liberal democracy and economy, as well as those 
who called for democratization without abandoning socialism. The 
latter constituted an alternative to neoliberalism in Latin America as 
well as to the continuity of a model of socialism that restricted freedoms 
and rights.
When the most critical stage of the crisis was over, some publications 
in the cultural sphere changed into spaces of debate about controversial 
topics, including civil society, civic participation, political culture, 
religion, and migration. Magazines such as Temas, La Gaceta de Cuba, 
Criterios, and the Catholic ones Vitral and Palabra Nueva contributed 
to the shaping of broader and plural discourses (Leyva and Somohano, 
2008). There are essays from this period about the concepts of civil 
society, developed both by Marxist scholars linked to the Centro de 
Estudios de América (CEA), an institution subordinate to the PCC, 
and by Catholic intellectuals such as Dagoberto Valdés and Enrique 
Estrella (1994). However, this spring of tolerance did not have stable 
development and duration. The publication of these discussions led 
to another moment of tolerance that did not last long. The most 
emblematic case was the repression against CEA researchers (Hoffman, 
2003). In March 1996, the CEA was abolished by order of the Party 
Political Bureau, after the state press questioned the relevance of a 
discussion (Castro, 1996) and labeled the participants as members of a 
fifth column (Valdés Vivó, 1996). The Communist Party’s monopoly 
was reaffirmed in the debate and promotion of issues with high political 
sensitivity, in addition to preventing the consolidation of an alternative 
current within its ranks. This stance remained mainly throughout the 
next decade and was characterized by the personalization of power 
and the greater ideologization of public debate and communication.
On July 31, 2006 Fidel Castro suffered intestinal bleeding and his 
brother Raúl assumed the leadership of the state and the Communist 
Party. In 2007, the Party encouraged popular consultations and 
urged citizens to openly express their views on the various internal 
problems affecting the economy and society. The consultations 
lasted until 2010, and some of the opinions and suggestions of the 
participants were included in the guidelines about the economic and 
social policy of the Party and the Revolution, a guiding document for 
updating or reforming the Cuban economic model. In evaluating the 
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results of the first popular consultation, the president reinforced the 
importance of public debate and the participation of the population 
in the economic and social transformations that the country had to 
initiate. He also acknowledged that the best solutions emerged from the 
exchange of divergent opinions and added that there was no need to 
fear discrepancies in a society where there were no antagonistic social 
classes (Castro, 2008). However, the results of this controlled debate 
revealed the limitations of information, articulation, political culture, 
and incidence of Cuban citizenship (Chaguaceda and Azor, 2011).
Although in his pronouncements Raúl Castro appeals to deepen 
democracy and dialogue, the political practice of the partisan elite 
legitimating any proposals remained.
These proposals could be modified or removed during the consultation 
with leaders and other members of social mass organizations. These 
consultations seek to rearticulate the social pact between a Party-State—
whose ideology has not undergone significant changes—and a more 
diverse and plural society. Twenty-five years after the end of the Soviet 
Union, the political regime prevailing on the Caribbean island retains 
characteristics like those of the Eastern European regimes (single party, 
state ideology, political and police control) in the functioning of public 
everyday life. At the same time, after almost three decades of crisis 
and reforms within the system, certain features of social, cultural, and 
economic pluralism have been observed as a result of economic reforms, 
political liberalization, and openness to the outside world. While the 
monopolistic power of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) continues, 
leadership based on charisma4 is being replaced by institutionalization, 
and compulsory mobilization is being replaced by new patterns of 
political acquiescence. It is also more common to implement pragmatic 
political solutions that do not break with official ideologies and there 
is still selective repression against those who oppose the system. The 
convergence of the described features describes a political regime in 
transition toward early post-totalitarianism.
The adaptation of the mapping proposed by Bathrick (1995) for the 
observation of Cuban public space allows us to identify four main areas: 
a) official public sphere; b) intellectual cultural sphere; c) oppositionist 
public sphere; and d) critical tolerated public sphere (1995). The official 
public sphere would be integrated by formal deliberative arenas: the 
vital organs of the Party, the parliament, ministers and state councils, 
municipal and provincial popular people assemblies, social mass 
organizations’ forums, academies, state means of communication, and 
cultural and educational institutions. The intellectual public sphere has 
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a semiofficial character here because most of its members maintain links 
with state cultural or academic institutions with access to the internet 
and email, technologies that allow the establishment of national and 
international information exchange networks. In addition to literature, 
and social and cultural research, this sphere includes artistic expressions 
such as cinema, plastic arts, theater, and music. Not infrequently it has 
generated pockets of tension with the authorities.
The opposition sphere is made up by organizations and individuals 
that advocate the transformation of the Cuban political system in a 
peaceful way. Banned from the public space and the state media to 
publicize their actions, ideas and proposals, Cuban opponents go to the 
international press or use virtual platforms. In the past few years, estado 
SATS,5 a space of debate coordinated by Antonio Rodiles, has stood 
out. Another significant vehicle is the 14 y Medio,6 an independent 
virtual newspaper, founded and directed by the renowned activist 
Yoani Sánchez, who is also author of the Generación Y blog. Finally, it 
is the critical tolerated public sphere formed by debate and publishing 
spaces that gather intellectuals with a critical position in relation to 
the government that propose the democratization of the real political 
system while recognizing the legitimacy of the Cuban authorities. 
Many of these voices manifest through personal blogs or websites such 
as Havana Times,7 Observatorio Crítico8 and Cuba Posible.9
Despite this diversity, the Cuban public space has not yet overcome its 
plight and fragmentation. The plight is given by the very constitution 
of spheres, their argumentative basis, the material conditions, since 
most of the spaces are indoor, some private, where few people enter. 
The fragmentation itself is evident in the disconnection between 
the different fields and discussion vehicles since some people who 
cannot attend certain spaces and are not allowed entry in others. 
It is often a fragmentation created by the official policy that actors 
reproduce to stay “inside the game”; as the evidence of events—in 
particular some outside the country, such as Latin American Studies 
Association (LASA)—and the very nature of the ideas espoused by 
them have repeatedly indicated the possibility of respectful dialogue/
debate and even the existence of common grounds, which are then 
blurred/repressed as the official pattern is adopted. In general, these 
spaces resemble the French 18th-century model of the public sphere, 
where an autocratic regime coexisted with spaces of debate open but 
restricted in access, disconnected from each other, and with relatively 
little impact on current policies.
The state media monopoly aggravates the fragmentation of the public 
sphere by ignoring discussions on issues of public interest, including 
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those organized in semiofficial spaces such as Último Jueves (Last 
month’s Thursday).10 Without access to the internet and other sources 
of information, most citizens do not know the existence of arenas of 
public debate outside those coordinated by the Party and traditional 
organizations, and lose the opportunity to participate in the formation 
of public opinion. Some of the mediations affecting the conformation 
of the public sphere in Cuba are: the limits of the structures to foment 
and channel the debate; the absence of a means to engage in a critical 
discourse that dialogs with power; and the presence of mentalities that 
reject exchange between subjects with diverse and contradictory ideas 
(Leyva and Somohano, 2007).
According to Habermas, in authoritarian regimes communicative 
exchanges through the internet can challenge the censorship that 
tries to control or repress the public opinion (White, 2008). While 
the fragmentation of the public face-to-face remains, the virtual 
environment is consolidated as a space of tensions, where important 
debates and disputes take place between actors from different sectors of 
civil society. The gradual widening of access to email and the internet, 
the promotion of distribution networks and consumption of alternative 
cultural products, popular consultations convened by the Party, the 
emergence of physical and virtual discussion spaces, and the appearance 
of dozens of digital publications are examples of the dynamism that 
the Cuban public sphere has gained since Raúl Castro took power. At 
the same time, the appropriation of information and communication 
technologies (ICT) threatens the control of the Cuban government over 
the production and distribution of information. For Rafael Hernández 
(2014), internet access made the traditional media lose its monopoly of 
information and it would be a “political illusion” to think that issues 
not addressed by the official press will remain silent. The diversity, the 
political plurality, or the realities that the official press ignores emerge 
through blogs, digital platforms, and publications in social networks. 
Díaz (2013) and Geoffray (2013) affirm that since many critical voices 
began to use ICT to overcome isolation, they have contributed to the 
configuration of a more branched and integrated virtual public sphere.
Since the 1980s, religious entities have used their magazines, 
newsletters, and flyers to introduce alternative voices to the official 
discourse, including criticisms of state policies and programs (Crahan, 
2013). In 1991 the entry of religious people to the Communist Party 
was approved, and 1992 constitutional reform eliminated references to 
scientific atheism in the charter, restoring the secular character of the 
state. The consolidation of the Catholic press took place during the 
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economic crisis of the 1990s, with an increase in religious practices in 
Cuban society and an improvement in Church–state relations. Palabra 
Nueva and Vitral were the two most public Catholic magazines and 
their critical headlines rekindled tensions between the Party and the 
hierarchy of the Church. With the support of ecclesiastical authorities, 
the laity of the Church has turned religious publications into vehicles 
for the dissemination of political subjects and ideas that are deprecated 
by the official media. In October 2010, the Church had dozens of 
parish publications, 46 newsletters and magazines, 12 websites and 
seven electronic bulletins with an audience of 250,000 readers (Grogg, 
2010). Farber (2012) says that, although less than 5% of the adult 
population is reached by the Catholic press, these publications have 
been the most significant alternative to the regime’s media monopoly 
and have set up new audiences. Among these publications, the Catholic 
magazine Espacio Laical has been one of the most outstanding vehicles 
of the critical public sphere tolerated by the government. Founded in 
2005 by Cardinal Jaime Ortega and led by the Lay’s Council of the 
Archdiocese of La Habana, the magazine proposed “to create a space 
for the different spheres of social, political, economic and cultural 
activity, with the commitment of insert ourselves and contribute... 
[to] an increasingly prosperous and fraternal society.”1
However, the insufficient number of Catholic intellectuals willing to 
send collaborations prevented the magazine from being consolidated as 
a Catholic publication in the style of the Italian magazine 30 Giorni12 
(González, 2015, interview). During the advisory processes required 
by the Party, the editors of Espacio Laical, Roberto Veiga and Leinier 
González, considered the possibility of making the journal a facilitator 
of social dialogue, taking into account the diversity of actors that 
did not have spaces to publish their opinions, expanding the scope 
and inclusion of the magazine. Thus, in a context characterized by 
state control over public spheres, they felt the need to make visible a 
plurality of actors who were outside the official institutional framework 
(González, 2015, interview). Between 2008 and 2010, the magazine 
started to present more politicized speech (Corcho, 2014; Crahan, 
2013; Padilla, 2016). In different texts and articles published until early 
2014, it openly defended that change, as well as the strengthening of 
economic reforms initiated by President Raúl Castro, and the changes 
in the political and legal order to promote people’s involvement in 
the shaping of their own destiny. In 2013 around 4,500 copies of the 
magazine were published; every three months 3,000 were circulating 
in churches and facilities of Havana’s Archdiocese, the remainder were 
sent to other archdioceses of the country; the magazine also has its own 
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website (www.espaciolaical.org). By 2013, the site was receiving around 
20,000 visits each month. Additionally, an email bulletin was used to 
inform the readers with little or no access to the internet (González, 
2014 cit. Corcho, 2014). In April 2006, a digital supplement to deliver 
the contents produced between issues also started.
In 2012 the magazine ceased to be an official organ of the Council 
of Laity—whose leadership did not approve the political turn of the 
editorial line—and renewed its editorial board, which maintained the 
preponderance of Catholic laity but incorporated intellectuals who 
did not profess that faith. In this new phase, the editors reaffirmed 
their commitment to dialogue and consensus among Cubans with 
divergent political positions. In addition to continuing to critically 
and constructively accompany the progress of economic reforms, 
they advocated a political adjustment that would facilitate the flow of 
all political pluralism in the nation. It would continue an open-door 
policy to encourage citizen participation in discussions sponsored by 
the magazine (Espacio Laical, 2012). From there, some opponents of 
the government begin to participate in the debates.
On October 29, 2011, the intellectual Alfredo Guevara, former 
president of ICAIC and with institutional and personal ties with 
Fidel and Raúl Castro, led the conference Dialogar, Dialogar. Guevara 
expressed his views on the economic adjustments promoted by the 
government, criticized the bureaucracy, and advocated respect for 
diversity and tolerance, as promoted by Espacio Laical (Guevara, 
2013). What was most significant were not the words of the speaker 
but the presence of Cardinal Jaime Ortega, lay leaders, intellectuals, 
and academics linked to state institutions, opponents, and ex-political 
prisoners. At the end of his presentation, Guevara answered questions 
from the audience, including those of dissident economist and former 
political prisoner Oscar Espinosa Chepe. Chepe thanked Espacio Laical 
for organizing civilized debates, without offense, without exclusions or 
absurd prejudices, because, he felt, ideological diversity exists in Cuba. 
Despite the natural ideological disagreements between a state official 
and an opponent, the economist also thanked Guevara for the open, 
illustrative, and democratic character of his conference.
On March 30 2012, at the Centro Cultural Félix Varela in Havana, 
Cuban-American Carlos Saladrigas, an important businessman and 
chairman of the Cuba Study Group, gave a lecture entitled “Cuba 
and its diaspora: attitudes and policies to be adopted by the diaspora 
to reintegrate into Cuba” (Saladrigas, 2012). This was one of the 
rare occasions when a Cuban exile who was linked to anti-Castro 
organizations spoke publicly in Cuba. In this second meeting were Party 
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members (for their own interest or sent to monitor the event), priests, 
laymen, opponents, academics, diplomats and correspondents of the 
foreign press (Ravsberg, 2012). Access was free. In the crowded room 
there gathered around 200 people. You could see alternative bloggers 
such as Yoani Sanchez or Miriam Celaya; independent journalists such 
as Reynaldo Escobar and Miriam Leyva; dissident economists such 
as Oscar Espinosa Chepe; activists for the racial integration such as 
Juan Antonio Madrazo and Leonardo Calvo, and the new dissident’s 
generation, such as Eliecer Ávila or Antonio Rodiles (Muñoz, 2012). 
In contrast to the silence of the Cuban media, the foreign press covered 
Saladrigas’ lecture and the debate between him and the members of 
the audience (García, 2012). According to Fernando Ravsberg, BBC 
correspondent in Cuba, the interventions of the members of the 
audience made evident the controversy between the different points 
of view: on one side the defenders of the free market and on the other 
side, critical communists of the government that refuse the Cuban-
American capitalist’s participation in the Cuban economy and insist on 
the construction of a true socialism system. About the politicians that 
attended the meeting, he said that they did not have much experience 
in debating with an adversary but he praised the fact that persons with 
antagonistic ideas can gather and share their differences with respect 
(Ravsberg, 2012). The presence of Saladrigas in Cuba was a step for 
his inclusion in the national public debate (Arreola, 2012). 
The multiplicity of subjects, ideologies and currents of thought 
that converged in Espacio Laical, through the publication of articles, 
interviews and dossiers of questions on issues related to the press, the 
future of the Communist Party, and the rule of law, among others, 
formed an arena of public discussion based on rules and dynamics close 
to those described in the Habermasian model of the public sphere. 
However, the most evident legacy of the magazine was to show and 
to legitimize the dissent in a more diverse and plural society. 
Between 2010 and 2014, activists, bloggers, intellectuals close to 
government, critics and dissidents, university students, officials of state 
institutions and Party militants, Cuban religious leaders, and academics 
residing abroad collaborated directly with Espacio Laical by sending 
papers or participating in face-to-face discussions. According to Veiga 
(2015, interview), Cuban emigrants wanted to make the most of the 
opportunity to exchange ideas with their fellow citizens living on 
the island. The magazine defended the diaspora’s participation in the 
debates about the present and the future of the country. Collaborators 
and participants accepted the rules of the debates in a civilized way, 
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based on respect of diversity of thoughts. That dialogue reflected a 
pragmatic prudence of the editors and the Church, who wanted to 
maintain good relations with the government. It also closed doors to 
overt opposition, and related ideological positions. However, academics 
like Rafael Rojas, Haroldo Dilla, and Carmelo Mesa Lago, critics of 
the economic model and institutional Cuban policy, published articles 
in the magazine. But at the same time, social-democrat or Catholic 
thinkers, like Manuel Cuesta Morúa and Dagoberto Valdés—known 
by their opposing activism—who maintain moderate political positions 
towards the government and are intellectually highly productive, 
were not invited to publish their papers in the magazine. However, 
the interventions of the participants in the debates—including the 
dissidents—were entirely published. 
We believe that Espacio Laical, as part of the public sphere, gave 
dynamism to the Cuban public space and created a network between 
public spheres from which collaborators emerged (to publish and to give 
lectures). The participation of Roberto Veiga and Leinier González in 
discussions organized by semi-official publications (such as Temas and 
Criterios), and the presence of Rafael Hernández in events sponsored 
by Espacio Laical portray the mobility of actors between different nodes 
of public discussion. Like most Cuban Catholic publications, Espacio 
Laical was not registered in the National Register of Serial Publications, 
which prevented its distribution in bookstores and newsstands, and it 
being made available to readers in public libraries. This state of quasi-
secrecy makes it difficult for the magazine to gain a larger audience. 
The influence of this publication was limited to the intellectual and 
religious spheres.
Political scientist Esteban Morales (2015, interview) also believes 
that the debate was incomplete, because important academics and 
representatives of civil society did not collaborate with the magazine 
or take part in the debates. For Valdés Paz (2015, interview), himself 
a collaborator, the editors were able to connect actors with different 
visions, promote a dialogue between them, and spread it. The 
relationship established between groups of reviewers, the exchanges 
between them, the magazine itself, and public exhibitions constitute 
an insufficiently connected micro-network. Reception studies would 
be needed to prove that Espacio Laical articulated a larger network. 
Knowing the limitations that the distribution of the magazine 
would imply outside the Church’s spaces, its editors decided that the 
publication would be sent directly and essentially to the academic field, 
the intellectuals, key actors within the Cuban government and Party, as 
well as all people interested in discussing political, economic, cultural, 
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social and religious issues (González, 2015; Veiga, 2015, interview). 
According to Veiga (2015, interview), the collaborations of specialists 
in areas deemed strategic for the development of the country captured 
the interest of the authorities, who began to look at the magazine 
with more interest.
This interest and the improvement of the distribution channels 
allowed Espacio Laical to be read by the political class. Nevertheless, 
Pablo Odén Marichal, Reverend of the Episcopal Church, has 
confirmed that he knows the magazine but does not believe that it has 
affected political activity or that the debates in the National Assembly 
take into account what is said in that publication (Marichal, 2015, 
interview).
Although no political leader has praised or objected to the work of 
the magazine, arguments between both detractors and defenders of 
the Cuban government exemplified pluralism of the Cuban public 
space. These controversies reinforce the idea of the public sphere as 
an arena for ideological dispute. Unfortunately, in these disputes, the 
intervention of unofficial spokespersons (but supported and oriented 
by political authorities) is not to encourage dialogue about differences, 
but to question the political debate or any citizen initiative that emerges 
outside the political system (Padilla, 2016).
In an interview published on the official website Cubadebate, 
Director of Temas Rafael Hernández referred to the different spaces 
and publications that promote social criticism. Hernández emphasized 
the importance of religious magazines such as Espacio Laical, and stated 
that he had cooperated with the journal more than once and defended 
its legitimacy (Sánchez, 2013). In the words of Valdés Paz (2015, 
interview), the great success of Espacio Laical was to be the greatest 
space of plurality the country had at that time. Neither governmental 
institutions nor mass organizations provided a space for pluralized 
dialogue in the way that Espacio Laical did. It included Cubans residing 
on the island and those who had emigrated, supporters of the Cuban 
revolution and oppositionists, as well as others who, despite advocating 
the continuity of socialism, are excluded from public debate. The 
magazine not only had an impact on the Cuban public sphere, but 
also marked a new possible path.
Conclusions
The notion of the public sphere refers to social models ruled by the 
principles of a liberal democracy and with a legal framework that 
guarantees the free exercise of association, expression of ideas, and their 
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dissemination by any means. However, research has shown that the 
de-Stalinization process of Soviet-style societies favored the flourishing 
of autonomous and semi-autonomous debate spaces, mainly among 
intellectuals.
Since the Cuban revolution, especially after the adoption of the 
Soviet model in the 1970s, the history of the transformations of 
public space has been characterized by cycles of openness and closure; 
moments of tolerance, and practices of coercion and repression. In 
Cuba, the existence of a public space composed of semi-official and 
relatively autonomous public spheres is observed. Within this universe, 
academic and cultural publications, along with some edited by the 
Catholic Church, have contributed to the configuration of a more 
diverse public discourse that, because of its critical nature, distances 
itself from official political discourse. However, it is a precarious public 
space, without legal protection, lacking in political recognition; a result 
of a mixture of thrust from below and tolerance from above, at any 
time reversible.
In this context, the Catholic magazine Espacio Laical contributed 
to the expansion of public debate. Between 2008 and 2014, this 
publication was the focus of the debate on social issues and a critical 
accompaniment to the process of economic reforms initiated by 
President Raúl Castro. Espacio Laical configured and sustained a true 
public sphere, belligerent and plural—an arena in which Catholic 
thinkers, liberals, and Marxists could accept each other, and discuss 
with civility and respect. It was a space of limited pluralism, based on 
the links with the Church and the type of discourse assumed by its 
editors, but still much wider than that of other Cuban publications 
that critically analyze the reality of the country.
Notes
1  Although Habermas initially expressed his pessimism about the role of traditional 
media, in the 1990s he recognized the complexity of its participation in the 
discursive processes of legitimation and political participation (Maia, 2009). Without 
forgetting the mediations that affect the production of its contents, the German 
philosopher affirmed that in the public sphere the media acts as a kind of boundary 
and permeable space between the different sands that make up the center and the 
periphery of the political system (Marques, 2008). The media and information 
technologies play a key role in the constitution of public spheres, especially when 
the public involved are in different locations and time zones.
2  Lenin defined the functions and principles of the revolutionary press. According 
to him, the press should be an instrument for information, organization, and 
social mobilization (García Luis, 2013; McNair, 2006). In 1905, Lenin advocated 
a centralized press model (Hopkins, 1965) in which the media would act as 
propaganda vehicles and cause collective agitation.
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3  It is probable that before the 1990s the Habermasian model was little known 
in the international academic field. His book Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. 
Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, published in 1962, 
was translated into English as The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An 
Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
4  Fidel Castro occupied the apex of the pyramid during his long presidency, during 
which he enjoyed all-encompassing powers. After his death, in 2016, attempts have 






10  A space for debate organized by the magazine Temas, it aims to stimulate critical 
reflection and diversity of perspectives on specific issues, to examine current 
problems of a cultural, social, and ideological nature that have an impact on the 
situation of Cuba and the world, and to facilitate a flexible and flexible discussion 
on these issues, for a broad audience, not necessarily specialists; www.temas.cult.
cu/ultimo-jueves
11  www.espaciolaical.org/contens/ind_qs.htm; With the change of editorial board 
after the departure of Roberto Veiga and Lenier González (in the latter half of 
2014), the magazine’s objectives have undergone some modifications; this chapter 
refers to the magazine’s approach before that change.
12  30 Giorni is a monthly magazine, established in 1988, which discusses ecclesiastical 
geopolitics.
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Argentina: The Philosophical 




In 1976, a terrible dictatorship was established in Argentina, even 
before Foucault (2007, p.265) claimed with crystal clarity that the 
fundamental difference between classical liberalism and neoliberalism 
was the substitution of the homo economicus—related to the exchange—
by the homo economicus as entrepreneur of himself (lecture delivered 
on 14 March 1979); and also before Margaret Thatcher confirmed 
Foucault’s analysis stating that: “Economics are the method; the object 
is to change the heart and soul.” In the same year, Milton Friedman 
received the Nobel Prize in Economics. The explicit purpose of the 
Military Junta was to promote a profound cultural transformation, based 
on the premise that the causes of the alleged “underdevelopment” were 
not so much economical but cultural and political.
Nevertheless, as García Delgado and Molina (2006) pointed out, 
the problem is not related to a sort of inevitable structural poverty, 
due to the culture of our people. It is a matter of a decline in society, 
produced by the policy orientation of the dictatorship. Until then, 
the income distribution was similar to that of the countries from 
Southern Europe with an almost frictional unemployment. Until 
the coup d’état, Argentina had a poverty rate of 8% and the best 
distributive structure of income in Latin America. However, 1976 was 
a turning point; the surge of the neoliberal model promoted a process 
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of over-indebtedness, wealth concentration, unrestricted opening of 
markets with an unfavorable exchange rate for national industry, labor 
flexibilization, with the insertion of a competitive globalization of 
“savage capitalism” that “strengthened the asymmetries and transfers of 
resources from the periphery to the center. This concept differs from 
thinking about inequality as a problem related to culture, corruption 
and poor institutional quality.” (García Delgado and Molina, 2006)
Despite the overwhelming adverse evidence, it is still commonplace 
to blame all the ills of our society on that culture, the maximum 
expression of which would be Peronism. In fact, the great majority of 
disappeared people during the dictatorship were Peronist political, trade 
union, and social leaders. The motto of the Ministry of Economics 
during the dictatorship was “towards a change of mentality.” The 
current Argentine situation, in terms of advances of neoliberalism as 
well as resistances to it, cannot be understood without referring to the 
dictatorship. In Poratti’s words,
the coup d’état of 1976 does not only put an end to a 
government, a political system and project, but also to a 
‘world’ in which Argentinians were living at least from the 
independence project of 1810. In those days, there was not 
an abrupt differentiation between generations and, in many 
aspects, people could identify themselves, diachronically, 
with a historical line beyond the particular generational 
characteristics. (Various authors, 2009)
These aspects go along with others that appeared in other areas, such as 
the implementation of new computer and communication technologies 
and, as a consequence, individual and social fragmentation. The impact 
of these technologies on daily life was decisive to the emergence of what 
some authors, like Sloterdijk (2002), called “mass individualism.” No 
doubt, this is a necessary factor in explaining the rise of the neoliberal 
subjectivity in developed countries. Yet, in Argentina, the existence 
of political, social, trade-union, and ecclesiastical movements based on 
popular roots, with solidarity as a fundamental value, hampered the 
conquest of the “heart and soul” in 1976; and they are still now an 
obstacle to be overcome by sectors interested in imposing a neoliberal 
model. It is impossible to explain any isolated phenomenon of popular 
resistance to the hegemonic attempts from neoliberalism without 
analyzing the common conceptions and understandings found in 
Argentina. Indeed, the popular culture substrate in Argentina is made 
up, mainly, by the confluence of different cultures: Andean, Guaraní 
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Indians, Afro, and Criollo (native). All of them are characterized by 
their relational and solidarity conceptions, intrinsically opposed to a 
subjectivity that conceives the individual as an entrepreneur of himself/
herself.
Cultural traditions and neoliberal subjectivity
In recent years, we have observed a retrieval of those subjectivities 
considered as the matrix of our culture. In this respect, it is worth 
noting the importance that some lines of thought developed some 
decades ago—such as philosophy and theology2 of liberation—are 
rebuilding. At the same time, new theoretical approaches like the 
decolonial perspective are emerging and gaining presence in several 
disciplinary areas, such as philosophy, literature, social sciences, political 
sciences, economy, and history. It is remarkable to note the boom of 
these perspectives despite the opposition of the traditional academic 
spaces, and of a great part of the mass media. This chapter attempts 
to point out some of the distinctive characteristics of these theoretical 
approaches. To understand them in depth, we will compare them 
with European philosophies. For the sake of brevity, only an outline 
will be presented trying to help us to understand reality, but it cannot 
account for the whole reality.
Different philosophies
In the famous thesis XI on Feuerbach, Marx stated that “the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point, however, is to change it.” If we accept that social reality is 
largely a discursive construction, we should conclude that the action of 
interpreting the world is, in turn, a way of constructing and, therefore, 
of changing the world. Moreover, as there is no zero point—a place out 
of the world from where it could be interpreted—every interpreter is 
the product of previous interpretations. Hence, when the philosophy 
of European matrix is referred to as “the” philosophy, the intention 
is to establish a peculiar way of conceiving and constructing the world 
as if it were the unique valid way of doing philosophy, forgetting or 
ignoring other philosophical perspectives. It is worth nothing that, 
reciprocally, when we mention the Andean, Tupí-guaraní or Bantu 
philosophy, for instance, we are not referring to a “pure essence” that 
should be rescued from oblivion; because we, the interpreters of those 
other lines of thoughts, are already “influenced” by the European 
philosophy in which we have been educated. Therefore, there is 
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no pure or “uncontaminated” thinking, and far less in Argentina, 
where foreign invasions and migratory flows—and, therefore, cultural 
contributions—from many areas have been coming for at least five 
centuries. Impositions, resistances, dialogues, and cultural crossings 
of every type generated—and are still generating—diverse ways of 
knowing and producing reality. To do philosophy in Latin America 
in general, and in Argentina in particular, does not consist in copying 
uncritically the academic production of the North, or in romantic 
attempts to rescue the roots of a native philosophy. It consists in thinking 
about what we are not: Westerners with a presumed right to dominate 
the Earth in the name of God, owners of reason, of democracy and 
market; or descendants of the native peoples with arcane knowledge, 
intended to save the planet from predatory capitalism.
This particular way of being places us in a good position to understand 
and assume that every thought is a situated thought because the gravity 
of ground not only involves things but also thoughts. In Kusch’s words:
… the ground, conceived in this way, is not a thing, or 
something that can be touched, but it weighs. It is the 
only answer to the question about the culture. The issue 
is to ask about the meaning that the supposed universality 
has for those who do not understand the problem. There 
is no other universality than the condition of being fallen 
on the ground, no matter if it is on the Andean highlands 
or the jungle. (Kusch, 1976).
It is not about the ground/fundament on which we are (which would 
lead us to an essentialist thought), but the ground where we are being,3 
a ground without which any relationship with the others and the 
cosmos would be possible.
Regarding the ways of doing philosophy, the European matrix is 
a philosophy that comes from various academic fields. Philosophy 
became a profession like any other one; and, as a profession, it belonged 
to the domain of a technique. For this reason, the academic philosophy 
tends to privilege the technical aspects (how to philosophize) over the 
experience-based aspects (about what to philosophize), contributing to 
generate the illusion of the possibility of thinking in a “pure” form, 
disregarding any relation to a certain time and space. As Kusch (1976) 
stated:
This transference of the problematic to the visible field 
− with the help of the technique − provides us certain 
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capacity for handling the means and reality, contributing 
precisely, to the loss of the act of philosophizing. It can 
be helpful when doing philosophy that is not the same as 
philosophizing; because the former is reduced to a myriad 
of techniques accumulated over time in the Western 
world where technique was created. Thus, philosophizing 
is nothing more than the handling of a technique, and 
therefore, the professionalism of the philosopher becomes 
encrusted, self-sufficient, and useless in America … a sterile 
activity or better said, sterilized and aseptic due to academic 
reiteration.
The problem of the fundament
The problem of the fundament—of things, politics, law and society—is 
where we can strongly notice that thinking is, always, a geo-culturally 
situated thinking; and, thinking the world is, in turn, to participate 
in the construction of the world. In effect, when the modern subject 
asks themselves why they are the entity rather than “nothing,” they 
note that there is no an ultimate fundament of reality, that things and 
ourselves might not have been. Then, that subject (conqueror and 
owner, belonging to the European cultural matrix) tends to think 
that everything is absurd, that nothing makes sense. Instead, the Latin 
American people tend to think that if there is no fundament, then 
their existence is gratuitous (gratuit) and, therefore, can or cannot be 
meaningful; but the important matter is that things and people are-
being (be-being4). The notion of gratuitous implies an attitude of 
gratitude as it happens, for example, in the Andean cultures in which 
they thank the Pachamama and Inti5 by holding ceremonies in which 
ritual offerings are given because of the blessings received (Estermann, 
1998).
Since the average European considers their existence as substantial, 
it is difficult for them to think the substance as derived from a relation: 
that which does not have a substantial existence does not exist. This is 
the conclusion drawn by some intellectuals who try to philosophize, 
based on the findings of quantum physics: if there are no elementary 
particles (atom or whatever), there is nothing. According to one of 
Houellebecq’s (1999, p.79) characters: “we should renounce to a 
concept of elementary particle having intrinsic properties when there 
is not any observation. In this case, a profound ontological vacuum 
has to be faced, … renouncing definitely to the idea of an underlying 
reality.” Why not think that if there is no substance it is because there 
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is a relation; or, likewise, if there is no fundament, it is because there 
is gratuitousness? Unlike the main streams of European thought, the 
Andean, Bantu, and Eastern philosophies have no problem in accepting 
this fact (Dussel, 2001).
To shed light on this concept, we present the following example: the 
ecosystem is, for a European, either a sum of entities with a substantial 
existence that are related one another (a tree plus another tree, plus 
a river, plus the air, plus the earth, plus the animals… and so on), 
or it is conceived as a sort of mega-substance (Gaia, Gea) in which 
things, plants, fish, birds, minerals and ourselves are only parts of that 
great substance. Instead, in Andean metaphysics, things exist because 
they are in a relation: the Pachamama is not a substance that exists by 
itself—it is itself a relation (Estermann, 1998), a relation that is prior to 
substance. Similarly, in Bantu philosophy, a child has to be educated by 
the entire people, and a tree needs the whole ecosystem—to use the 
Western category—to grow. In other words, the child and the people 
exist, but not substantially but in relation, as the tree with respect to 
the ecosystem, and reciprocally.
Nowadays, societies are aware of the lack of a substantial fundament—a 
lack of fundament that goes beyond the mere uncertainty—assuming 
the radical contingency of the individual and life in common. In sum, 
they discover the radical contingency of the entire existence: it is the 
entity, but it could be the nothing too. Although several thinkers have 
been pointing out this matter for some time, only now these concerns 
are being addressed since they characterize the metaphysic élan of our 
hegemonic societies. All societies have a way of approaching the being 
and existence: the mentioned élan is not exclusive of the Europeans. 
Probably, the most radical question regarding the being has been made 
within the European matrix, since the most radical question concerning 
the nothing has probably also been European (Casalla, 1998). The fact 
is that, for other peoples, like Latin Americans, these questions have 
never concerned themselves so much, precisely because, for them, 
things are not, they are-being.
“The rose is without ‘why’; it blooms simply because it blooms.” If this 
phrase by Silesius touched Heidegger so much, it was not because in 
other regions nobody had posed this matter. On the contrary, it was 
because people tend to think more about what worries them than about 
what is taken for granted. Therefore, the concern about the fundament 
is a characteristic of those metaphysical élan who believe that what does 
not have fundament is absurd. But it is not a characteristic of those 
who think that what does not have fundament, is just because it is 
gratuitous. In fact, the entire Western philosophy cannot be included 
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in this model. However, we accept the validity of geo-cultural and epochal 
paradigms—as Scannone (2005) called them—which would exert more 
or less influence on the spirit of the times, depending on the different 
authors’ perspectives.
The neoliberal dilemma: Individualism or collectivism
Classical authors of neoliberalism, such as Hayek, Nozick, or Popper, 
pose a basic dichotomy: either what exists (the substance) is the individual 
or what exists is the collectivity. One or the other: there is no such 
thing as a superior synthesis of this antagonism. For that reason, every 
concession made to the collective, even in terms of “social justice,” is 
only the beginning of a road that leads to serfdom (Hayek, The Road 
to Serfdom, 1944). In political terms, the option would be liberalism or 
socialism. Latin American popular thinking does not share the Western 
obsession about finding in everything and to everything the essence or 
substance; instead, it is part of the philosophical traditions that consider 
relations prior to substance. From this viewpoint, it is possible to find 
adequate concepts to describe some Argentinian political alternative 
positions, which are generally and hastily defined as “populist” because 
they do not fit in the molds predetermined by classical liberalism, 
neoliberalism, or socialism within the European matrix.
Society and individual from a relational perspective
Indeed, from a relational perspective, it is possible to affirm that the 
people, the community, exist without denying the individual and vice 
versa. However, dominant European thought struggles to accept this 
concept. They would say that, if a relation exists, it is because there 
is “something” (substance) that relates to another thing. This explains 
why so many excellent contemporary political philosophers exert 
themselves to find the fundament of society and politics. When they 
do not find it, instead of accepting that things are just like that, they 
end up denying society and politics. If there is no fundament, it means 
that there is gratuitousness. Philosophical thought opened to other 
ways of understanding reality—such as the assumption of fraternity 
as the main concept to tackle politics and society—shows how sterile 
the obsessive search for a fundament is.
The category “relation” prior to substance is how our peoples 
understand the world and society. This does not mean that they support 
an “anti-substance” thinking. They consider that there are things and 
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that they have their substance, but assume that substance derives from 
the relation and not the other way around.
It is worth insisting that these ideas are the philosophical expression 
of knowledge and practices that peoples express more experientially 
than theoretically. In Alejandro Moreno’s words (2005),
a man of the people is not a being in the world but an 
experiential relation that exists. It is not subjectivity, rationality 
or individuality but relation. In the relation, singularity, 
rationality and subjectivity deconstruct and construct − but 
not reconstruct − themselves.
It is not about overcoming the antinomy of collectivity versus 
individual, but to make explicit the permanent tension between 
them. Society is not the addition of subjects/substances, neither is the 
individual just a part of a mega-subject.
In this respect, a critical and non-naïve analysis of popular thinking, 
such as that developed by Kusch (2008), leads us to understand some 
prevailing conceptions of Argentinian popular sectors. Along with 
their load of resistance to individualistic, competitive and entrepreneur 
neoliberal subjectivity, they have the potential to resist and to propose 
that is worth analyzing. Clearly, naïve standpoints that consider all 
that is popular/Latin American as good, and everything modern/
European as bad should be avoided. This type of approach does not 
have empirical validity, theoretical sense, or ethical foundation, so is not 
worth analysis. However, it is important to consider those aspects of 
popular thinking that give us the basis for examining the contemporary 
situation of Argentina. That said, this popular/relational conception 
adopts the ideals of modern democracies synthetized in the liberal 
trilogy of liberty-equality-fraternity, but re-signifies them by placing 
fraternity at the top of the reflexion.6
Romulus and Remus, Cain and Abel, Jacob and Esau, Tupi and 
Guarany, Manco Capac and his brothers: all around the world, we find 
myths of origin related to struggles among siblings, especially between 
brothers, that sometimes end up in fratricide. The daily experience of 
any parent of two or more children can confirm that siblings fight with 
each other. However, against all evidence, mothers insist on telling 
their children not to fight, but to love each other as siblings. Moreover, 
when two friends want to express that their relationship is very close 
and strong, they say that they are like brothers.7
The point is that sisterhood/brotherhood or fraternity may be 
understood in two different senses: what it actually is and what we think 
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it should be. In the first case, the struggle among siblings shows us a 
fact: the horizontal relationships encourage the conflict. In the second 
case, what we have is a desire: to avoid the conflict so that everyone can 
be happier. If the fraternity concept is extrapolated from the domestic 
field to the public one, when mentioning universal fraternity, we refer 
to either: a) the original condition of society—there is no father and 
no mother—therefore, conflict is always present, in a latent or manifest 
way; or b) the invoke of an ideal, an unattainable goal—a harmonious 
society in which everyone can freely display all their potential.
Accordingly, fraternity has two faces like Janus: one face looks with 
hope to the future we should construct, and the other one alertly 
observes the past from which we have been constructing this present. 
One face dictates an order; the other describes a datum. Paradoxically, 
the realistic face gives us the datum (the “given”) that nothing is given 
in advance and, consequently, everything is a matter of constructions 
that are never definitive; but they are the dynamic result of struggles 
and consensus, of dialogues and impositions. This conception both 
harmonious and conflictive is part of the most rooted political 
ideologies in Argentina, such as Peronism and radicalism, so difficult 
to understand in other countries.
Every extrapolation from the private to public arena has its risks 
and issues. For this reason, many people have discarded this concept 
as a useful political category. Hence, it should not be forgotten that 
fraternity is a catachresis: it does not refer to family. The temptation 
of thinking it as a metaphor is very strong. That is why its meaning is 
often trivialized. However, it is so profitable for understanding political 
ideologies and the practices of our social, union movements that it is 
worth running the risk of using it with the due precautions. The first 
risk is that, within a family, the verticality that parents established tends 
to dissolve the conflict. Instead, in the public field, there is not, and 
there has never been a father or mother: there is no person or group 
that may exercise “naturally” the parent’s role of establishing the law 
or of dissolving every antagonism. Universal fraternity warns us that 
life in common is a construction that depends on us, a primary and 
ideal reality to be reached: in the tension between these two ends, 
the collective existence is constructed, which does not allow any 
naivety. It shows us that we are people in its double sense: as populus or 
harmonious totality of those “above” and those “below”, of patricians 
and plebeians8.
Life in common is a collective construction. We are definitely not 
beautiful souls capable of living in a world free of conflicts once the 
“others” have been annihilated, the bastards that do not allow us to enjoy 
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this perfect world. There is no option: we have to take responsibility 
for ourselves. This is where fraternity may cause a disturbance. In 
consequence, it is set aside in comparison with “strong” principles 
such as liberty, equality, or justice. The problem is that those principles 
refer to “what ought-to-be,” while fraternity forces us to confront 
“what is,” what we are, or what we are being. Liberty and equality 
are no longer attributes of the substance “man” to become goods that 
can be obtained, kept, or lost. This fact disturbs those right-wingers 
who believe that societies are “naturally” stratified, as well as those 
left-wingers of enlightened vanguards who consider the subalternized 
people as children to whom they have to explain their condition of 
subjugation and to show the means to emancipate themselves. It also 
annoys others who prefer to ignore their responsibility hoping that 
“someone else would do something.” Fraternity forces us to face the 
fact that we are always necessarily responsible: we must respond to 
the others. If someone knocks at the door and there is an adult in 
the house, they would be the one to answer; but, as there is no adult, 
even our silence, our option of remaining silent is indeed an answer. 
All the same, it is rather ineffective because we cannot live always in 
silence and inside our houses, afraid of who may virtually knock at our 
doors. The excluded people from the feast knock at the doors of the 
satisfied who enclose themselves in private neighborhoods and build 
walls along the highways they commute back and forth from the city. 
Yet, the poor, the indigenous, the afro-descendants, the marginalized 
of every kind still knock at their doors every time they are left outside. 
From this perspective, fraternity leads us to re-think society and, thus, 
to resignify liberty, equality, and justice.
Liberty becomes liberation
According to this relational perspective, liberty cannot be thought as 
a fixed status, but as a process. We “are” not free as if it would be a 
part of an apparent nature or human essence; but we are being more 
or less free as a result of struggles, agreements and consensuses that 
are always unstable. The history of Western thought shows a constant 
concern in relation to the defense of individual freedom from the 
power of institutions, especially political and religious ones (but not 
so much from the economic institutions) and, in consequence, power 
is considered the opposite of freedom. In contrast, from our point of 
view, power is the opposite of impotence, and liberty is the result of a 
process of power construction, particularly with respect to economic 
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and financial powers. As freedom is not a fixed status, but a part of a 
process, thus, freedom becomes liberation.
In other words, if we omit our unavoidably fraternal human 
condition, we may think that our freedom has been provided who 
knows by whom and since when, and that “your freedom ends 
where my nose begins.” In this case, to be completely free, the only 
inhabitant in the planet should be me, being the rest of the people 
the limit, the obstacle to the full and absolute exercise of my freedom. 
However, with fraternity we notice that it works otherwise. History 
indicates that liberty and particular liberties are conquered and kept by 
fighting shoulder to shoulder with others. Therefore, it is not a matter 
of possessing a substantial attribute, but of being part of a collective 
process. There are always references to life and to what is in common/
and to life in common, not to the being, but to the be-being (estar 
siendo). It is not a matter of finding a supposed “essence” of liberty, 
but of understanding that the definition of liberty, as it happens with 
every political concept, is a construction that results from a play of 
power, which, when considered assuming our fraternal condition, will 
bring to light elements of a strong heuristic and performative nature.
Equality as social justice
The continuity and ubiquity of conflict and the supremacy of relation 
over substance show that it is not possible to achieve a “state of equality,” 
a society which is “essentially” equal. Instead, from this perspective, it 
seems more proper to understand this longing or desire for equality as 
struggles for social justice. We do not define social justice here. The 
same as what truly matters—love, freedom, time, life or space—social 
justice cannot be grasped or restricted within the boundaries of a 
conceptual definition. However, we will try to describe the prominent 
dimensions of social justice with respect to fraternity.
Distributive justice
The social democracies of the middle of the last century, and the 
most widespread discourse of international agencies have privileged 
indicators such as the Gini coefficient and other similar indicators 
to “measure” social justice. Nevertheless, social justice cannot be 
reduced to a mere equality or equity with respect to wealth or income 
distribution. Considering the huge current inequalities of wealth and 
income, democracy and life in common are at risk in our planet. 
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However, distributive justice is not enough to achieve social justice; 
two other dimensions are also required.
Acknowledgment
A homosexual man or woman, indigenous native, afro-descendant 
person, a Jew or a Latino can have as much money as a white and 
heterosexual man, but they are going to be discriminated against because 
of their ethnic condition, religious choice, or sexual orientation. Their 
rights would not be acknowledged de jure or de facto, and thus, they 
become victims of an injustice. Since this topic has been sufficiently 
analyzed by political theory and philosophy and, more precisely by 
cultural and gender studies, we will not expand on it.9
Contributive justice
The professor, the executive, the retired public servant who receives a 
good pension and every year is honored does not suffer injustice from 
the two above-mentioned dimensions. Neither does the unemployed 
worker who receives an allowance or the businessman’s wife who “lives 
for the family.” Nevertheless, they know that they can contribute much 
more to society in general in several ways, not only economically 
or financially, but they do not have the opportunity to do it. This 
dimension, called “general justice” by medieval philosophy, was 
forgotten by Western modernity, because it considers the individual 
as a substance instead of a relation (with oneself, the others and the 
cosmos). We are referring to the dimension of social justice that consists 
in ensuring each one the right to their self-realization through their 
contribution to the others’ realization.
Modern philosophy and science have an evident incapacity to notice 
this constitutive dimension of human beings (Mate, 2011). For that 
reason, they tend to reduce the need to do something for others to the 
previous dimension (seeking recognition) or to a form of narcissism. 
However, this is not the case: we all know people who dedicate their 
free time to work as volunteers without anyone knowing it. Someone 
who knits warm clothes to give to charity anonymously or those who 
donate money in secret are examples of it. But beyond these clear 
cases, a doctor who saves a life, do they not feel satisfied because of 
the mere fact that they have saved a life? Or is it the eagerness for 
recognition that drives them? In fact, it is not necessary to give more 
examples of this independent dimension of justice since the reader 
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has surely experienced sometime the feeling of being happier giving 
than receiving.
To sum up, if we adopt the hegemonic conception of freedom, 
we can easily understand power as the opposite of liberty. However, 
thinking about power in terms of liberation will lead us to interpret 
power as a necessary instrument for generating a social change. For 
that reason, the classical tension between liberty and equality dissolves 
away in Argentine popular political thinking, because liberation/process 
(not liberty/state) is conceptually assumed as the path to social justice.
An aspect to consider regarding social justice in Latin America in 
general, and in Argentina in particular, refers to the democratization 
of access to desired goods. That is, broadly speaking, the enjoyment 
of elites is linked to the non-enjoyment of the majority. That is part 
of a game generally accepted. In terms of a Republican song during 
the Spanish Civil war, it would be as follows: “Time is coming up / 
to turn the tables / for the poor to eat bread /and the rich just shit.” 
However, this is not what popular political parties from this region 
propose. They claim that the rich should still eat their bread, and 
that the poor should eat bread of the same quality, seated at a similar 
table and drinking the same wine as the rich. This is unbearable. This 
disrupts the rules of the game, which states that in order for a person 
to enjoy themselves, another should have no joy. For that reason, the 
first statement that the neoliberal rulers express is that “the party is 
over.” “They made you believe that you could live like that forever” 
is an expression repeatedly affirmed by “anti-populism” politician and 
social communicators.
Subject, people, state: toward a continental post-
neoliberalism
Universal fraternity entails the absence of a parent that provides meaning 
to life; meaning is the result of conflicts,10 struggles and agreements 
among siblings. It is the result of a hegemonic construction, and not 
a pre-existing fundament. The fundament of society as such does not 
lie in anything stable; it is not a “substance,” it is constituted by the 
relational interweaving, which is, obviously, dynamic and contingent. 
In that dynamic, some sectors impose their conception of reality as 
“the reality” or, at least, as the right and true conception. Nevertheless, 
politics, economy, sexuality, as well as equalities and disparities, are 
not given by nature. Nothing is established once and for all. It is also 
about accepting that the field of the political cannot always be based on 
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dialogue—which is, instead, always recommendable for the field of 
politics and policies. The political field is founded without fundament.11
In core countries, there is always someone who believes that the 
problem of the absence of fundament can be solved through dialogue 
and consensus in relation to political decision-making processes. If we 
forget, indeed, the conflictive dimension of fraternity, we may easily 
end up taking the naïve stance that holds that “every conflict may be 
channeled if the parts involved defend their interests with intelligence.” 
This would be possible if the parts concerned were able to defend their 
interests wisely, but—as history and daily experience show—conflict 
tends to cloud the intelligence and, frequently, it is replaced by the 
most destructive passions. However, this is not the main obstacle for 
the channeling of conflicts. In fact, there could be an impartial third 
party that stays reasonable, and somehow manages a solution beneficial 
to all concerned. The problem is that nobody actually knows their 
own interest. There are a lot of tales and myths about the bad luck 
of those who have their desire fulfilled. That desire which we think 
is “in our own interest” is hardly such. Generally, it is the interest of 
hegemonic sectors of society.
Unfortunately, it is not true that “people understand each other 
by talking and can come to satisfactory agreements with all parts 
concerned.” This is not so, because, to make that possible, it would be 
necessary that all of them: a) know what they really want; b) know how 
to express effectively what they want; and c) that others understand 
fully that demand (Žižek, 2013). This problem escalates when we refer 
to collective demands instead of individual wishes: the undetermined 
third party takes part there. Thus, even if some people know what they 
really want through a deep knowledge of their selves, and the other 
person could understand and satisfy their demand through an open 
and sincere dialogue, there will always be others directly or indirectly 
affected by that decision.
The neglect of these aspects leads to the minimization of 
contemporaneous political, social, and economic conflict, becoming 
a matter of public debate in which people try to agree on propositions 
and definitions in order to achieve agreement and consensus. The bad 
news is that this matter is far more complex. The trap of neoliberalism 
as the dominant ideology of consumer capitalism—instead of traditional 
liberalism linked to a capitalism characterized by accumulation—is to 
make us believe that we always know what we want and that such wish 
emerges spontaneously from inside of every person. Yet, there is also 
good news: conflict is not a synonym of a “struggle to the death,” it is 
what makes us live in a certain society. An example that may be helpful 
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to explain the core of this thesis: without rivalry among football teams, 
that sport would not exist. The problem is that, in a society, there is 
not minute zero—a starting point—a previous moment to the match 
in which rules could be agreed. Instead, we are constantly playing 
according to rules that are imposed by those who have the power to 
do so; this is how hegemony functions. It is true that the lack of rules 
would be worse: the law is always an imposition of the strongest, but 
even they must somehow pretend that they are complying with the 
law. The inexistence of law is equivalent to the constant and explicit 
fulfillment of the mere will of the strongest.
The abovementioned leads us to pose the problem of the state. 
From Hobbes onwards—including the outstanding contribution of 
Hegel—as societies secularize, the state gradually takes the place of 
God. A God modeled on image and likeliness of the modern subject: 
male, one, sovereign, omnipotent. In consequence, if God is One 
and only secondarily Triune, the state is also One in first place and 
Triune in second place (the separation of power into three branches 
of government: legislative, executive and judicial). God is sovereign; 
it is super omnes, it is over everything, ergo the state is sovereign. God 
is omnipotent, the state is omnipotent. In this context, the reference 
to popular sovereignty is a matter of mere demagogy that lacks any 
fundament.
However, if instead of considering God as One, unique, exclusive, 
excludable, super omnes—a God of a totalizing totality—God is thought 
as Triune (a God that is a relation rather than a substance in the way 
the Latin American popular religiosity conceived it), and the state 
is considered a relation, new horizons can be opened. Up to now, 
sovereignty has been regarded as an attribute of the state. On the 
contrary, considering the state as a relation, sovereignty appears to be 
also constitutive of such relation and not an attribute of the substance. 
By this perspective, the sovereignty of the state can be understood 
“internally” (ad intra) as the relation among the three elements 
that make it up: territory, population and government. Thus, the 
government’s interaction with the people can be analyzed in terms of 
popular sovereignty; and when government and people interact with 
the territory, it can be studied in terms of ecological sovereignty.
From this standpoint, a state is, “externally” (ad extra), more sovereign 
when it is better connected to other states. Nowadays Argentina, to be 
truly a sovereign country, needs to interact closely with the countries 
of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). There is no 
true chance of being really sovereign without a relation with other 
states. This does not mean that there will not be conflicts among the 
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state members of a supranational organization. A fraternal conception 
of sovereignty does not suggest that states must behave properly with 
the others. It is just that no one can take the place of the parent because 
relations are horizontal; asymmetrical but horizontal relations, in the 
same terms as relations among siblings are constructed.
The foundational ideal of the leaders of the independence process, 
such as San Martin, Artigas, and Bolivar, was to construct a united Latin 
America. It was not a whim, an abstract idea suggested by academicians, 
or the result of an ideology: it was an ideal consistent with the most 
profound understanding and feeling of our peoples. In that context, 
there was not then or now any other more effective way of facing the 
interests contrary to the full realization of every person and people.
Notes
1  Translated into English by Lidia Unger, María Mercedes Palumbo, and Laura 
Celina Vacca.
2  One of the best-known expressions (though not the only one) is the popular 
theology of liberation which is in the basis of the doctrine established by Pope 
Francis (Cuda, 2016).
3  The verb “to be” (ser) is a particularity of the Indo-European languages that 
dramatically hampers the dynamic and unstable comprehension of the existence 
perceived, for instance, in the notion—widely used by Kusch and the Latin 
American philosophers—of “be-being” (estar siendo). Kusch (1922–79) is 
intentionally quoted here because he is one of the “damned philosophers.” Just the 
reference to the author during dictatorship—and even later—meant the exclusion 
from the academic field. Any internet search is enough to show the significant 
increase in interest in this author and in many others related to the “philosophy of 
liberation,” such as Enrique Dussel, Juan Carlos Scannone, Arturo Andrés Roig, 
Mario Casalla, Carlos Cullen, and Armando Poratti, just some of the Argentinian 
philosophers more representative of the different perspectives in this line of thought.
4  According to Kusch, estar siendo is the concept that defines the Latin American 
mode of existence. It must be noted that the term estar siendo is untranslatable to 
English; “to be-being” is the most accepted interpretation in the academic field. 
Likewise, the idea of ser (to be)—as the concept that defines the European mode 
of existence—is untranslatable in non-Indo-European languages.
5  Pachamama would be equivalent the Western concept of ecosystem and Inti, of the 
sun, but, in both cases, the reference is related to relational and complementary 
entities and not to substances, people or “things.”
6  It is understood as fraternity/sorority, given the importance that the popular 
thinking assigns to the complementarity principle. Within this principle, the 
masculine cannot be thought without the feminine, or vice versa (Estermann, 
2008).
7  Strictly speaking, it is a catachresis—a figure of speech, a sort of metaphor. This 
expression refers to a word used with a different meaning from its original one, 
with the purpose of describing something that lacks a special name. For example, 
when we say the “neck” of a bottle or the “arm” of an armchair, we are not talking 
about the “neck” or the “leg” in the original sense, like the neck or leg of a living 
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being. For a detailed analysis of the implications of the concept of fraternity, see 
Del Percio (2014).
8  Briefly, plebs refers to a part of society composed of the poorest, but curiously, 
this term has the same etymology as pleno (full), plenitud (plenitude). We may ask 
ourselves whether this etymology is leading us to think about plenitude in relation 
to lack, and harmony in relation to conflict.
9  For an excellent critique on policies of recognition of indigenous people and Afro-
Americans promoted by international organizations, see Gómez Michel (2014).
10  Regarding conflict as constituent, see Marchart (2009, p.126).
11  For an introduction to the “post-foundational” thinkers, especially “post-
structuralists,” see Stavrakakis (2010) and Marchart (2009). With respect to the 
problem of the fundament in the Ancient Greeks from an Argentine popular 
philosophy point of view, see Poratti (1993).
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Fleeing (Post-)Chávez Memories: 
The 1990s and the Black Friday 
Generation
Magdalena López
There is no original past to redeem; there is the void, the 
orphanhood, the unbaptized earth of the beginning, the 
time that from within the earth looks upon us.
Ana Mendieta
Introduction
Over recent years, we have witnessed the end of the so-called Latin-
American pink tide. After the neoliberal decade, leftist governments 
that occupied power in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela might not have fulfilled the 
political and social expectations they generated at the beginning of the 
21st century. Some recent articles even refer to the failure or setback 
of the left.1 The uncertainty generated by this end of an era compels 
us to inquire about the paradigms that sustained some of these post-
neoliberal projects. In particular, Laclau’s theory on populism offered 
a conceptual foundation for the legitimization of these governments, 
positing that politics serve to discursively constitute an antagonism 
between two subjects: on the one hand, the people, and on the other, 
the one anathematized as anti-popular, elitist, oligarchical, imperialist 
(Laclau, 2005, p.99). Venezuela, as any other country in the region, 
reveals the devastating consequences of the construction of political 
binary imaginaries, not only those of the state power but also those 
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from its opposition. As we face the collapse of the Chavist hegemony, 
by now bereft of a concrete alternative horizon, it is helpful to 
review the subjectivities and affects that did not enter the polarized 
political discourses of the last decade. Memories of the 1990s offer a 
particularly productive field, as it was in that period when disputes for 
the interpretive legitimacy of the current socio-political crisis were 
first staged.
Memory conflicts
After the early—and still unexplained—death of Venezuelan writer 
Alejandro Rebolledo on August 18, 2016, a debate about the “literary 
value” of Rebolledo’s only novel, Pim Pam Pum (originally published 
as Pin Pan Pun in 1998) erupted on social media, reaching visceral 
tones. In a way, it initiated a rekindling of the debate that the work had 
triggered in the late 1900s, when its juvenile and irreverent proposal, to 
a great extent disconnected from the national lettered tradition, burst 
onto the literary scene. On this occasion, though, the debate about 
Pim Pam Pum was magnified by the historical perspective provided 
by the 17 years of Chavist rule. Aesthetic considerations got mixed 
with discussions about memory and the “true” rendering of the years 
immediately prior to the political change. In its appeal to memory, 
the official discourse has erased or Satanized the period of Venezuelan 
two-party democracy in order to legitimize its own hegemony as 
a social and historical claim pending since the 19th century.2 The 
majority of intellectuals, however, has resisted Chavism by means of 
a romanticization of that period, turning it into a legacy that must 
be salvaged from populist “barbarism.”3 Both the recurring “we were 
happy and we didn’t know it” and the call to achieve Simón Bolívar’s 
epic feat are two sides of the same coin; two approaches that aim at 
encapsulating the hermeneutic paradigm of the nation in a pristine past. 
The dispute about memory stems from a nostalgic affectivity that seeks 
the permanent restoration of that which was lost in terms of absolute 
truth (Boym, 2001, p.xviii). The appeal to the past, which has sustained 
the political hegemony of the official imaginary, has served for the 
intellectual opposition to attempt—and acknowledge the impossibility 
of—the recovery of its own hegemony (Beasley-Murray, 2010, p.177). 
The embrace of a remembered authenticity expels those antagonistic 
and illegitimate elements with respect to the national narrative. A 
melancholic reasoning imposes boundaries and understands memory 
in the dichotomic terms of political polarization, such as civilisation 
versus barbarism, and oligarchy vs. the people.
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The Black Friday Generation
There is a way to read the 1990s, though, which reveals departures 
from the two nostalgic discourses. Neither the official Chavist paradigm 
nor its lettered opposition fully capture the subjectivity of the youth 
of that decade, who now feels scarcely represented, in those discourses 
that abound in the virtues of liberal representative democracy and 
those that underscore the epic quest for independence that began in 
the 19th century. Bearing in mind the arbitrariness of any generational 
characterization, which might attenuate differences in ideology, 
class, ethnicity, and gender, I propose to use the term “Black Friday 
Generation” to refer to the Venezuelan youth born in the late 1960s 
and most of the 1970s. Black Friday alludes to the year 1983, when 
the national currency suffered a spectacular devaluation that shelved 
for good the myths of the successful Venezuelan modernity and the 
exemplariness of its democracy for the region. This historical event 
activated the consciousness of its own country for this generation, and 
in turn inaugurated a state of permanent crisis.
Three main characteristics allow us to define the Black Friday 
Generation. First, its unremitting experience of the failure of the 
modernizing project during a series of historical events: Black Friday 
(February 18, 1983), the Caracazo4 (February 27, 1989), the first coup 
(February 4, 1992), the second coup (November 27, 1992) and the 
electoral victory of Hugo Chávez, which marked the end of social 
democracy (December 6, 1998) and the beginning of the “Bolivarian 
revolution” (1999 to the present). Second, its in-between situation, 
book-ended by seemingly different and opposite historical contexts 
and political projects. And third, the assumption of a constitutive 
alienation with respect to previous generations. On this last point it 
is worth noting that many of the generation’s subjectivities show, as 
Raquel Rivas Rojas posits, a “radical disagreement with the imaginary 
of roots,” a “rejection of identity” with “very little antecedents in the 
local [literary] tradition” (2013, p.11). This characteristic of the Black 
Friday Generation, which estranges it from the meaning of the nation, 
removes the generation from previous modes of knowledge and value 
systems, resulting in an alienation from any code of belonging which, 
in a way, is equivalent to the subjectivity of the migrants.
In the book Emergencia de Culturas Juveniles, Rosanna Reguillo-Cruz 
affirms that social movements are sustained by two opposite forces: a 
centripetal force that “keeps bodies rotating around a core” and which 
“manifests in a constant return to a past that got lost, somewhere 
along the path,” and a centrifugal one, “which keeps bodies away from 
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core and in a tangent line” and that expresses itself in “movements of 
withdrawal, self-marginalisation in the face of a present that is perceived 
as chaotic and hopeless.” (Reguillo-Cruz, 2000, p.153) In what follows 
I propose to revisit the ways in which some writers of the Black Friday 
Generation have elaborated an alternative centrifugal archive of the 
1990s from juvenile perspectives. With different nuances, not exempt 
of centripetal forces and different class positions, the novels La Última 
Vez (2007) by Héctor Bujanda, Bajo Tierra by Gustavo Valle (2009), 
Valle Zamuro (2011) by Camilo Pino, and Pim Pam Pum (1998, 2013) 
by Alejandro Rebolledo propose stories disconnected from national 
mega-narratives and avoid the substitute operations of nostalgia. Based 
on a close reading of these four novels, I will set forth an itinerary 
that starts with the attempt of an impossible recomposition of the 
past stemming from alienation, to the full acceptance of a centrifugal 
subjectivity, ungraspable for the predominant yet conflicting discourses 
about the memory of the 1990s.
Despite political change and the passing of time, we acknowledge 
that the hostile and chaotic Caracas of the end of the century is still 
recognizable. Little seems to have changed between the present and 
the past city, a city of poverty, violence, rubbish, lines to buy food, 
inflation, disproportionate electoral propaganda, and forecasts of 
disaster. We witness an urban landscape suspended in a perpetual 
present, unaffected by the new millennium; a suspension that translates 
into the existential milieu of the majority of protagonists: students or 
permanently unemployed young men, or those who ramble the city 
without purpose. These narratives reveal contextual continuities, not 
only between the neoliberal and the Chavist period, but also, as we will 
see, between the 1990s and the previous decades. We thus encounter a 
paradox at the heart of the Black Friday Generation: as their perspective 
breaks away from the inherited foundations of the nation, its reading 
of the past does not express a rupture with the present of Chavist 
(post)hegemony. There is no justification, then, for nostalgia. It is 
precisely for this reason that this generation departs from the dominant 
imaginaries and abandons the ideological frameworks that determine 
the interpretation of reality and the past. In the meantime, the Black 
Friday Generation acknowledges the continuity of a catastrophe that 
affects both late 20th century neoliberalism and, implicitly, 21st century 
socialism.
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The fathers of the “archive fever”
In a historical context delimited by financial crisis, shortages worsen 
by neoliberal cuts, social violence in the wake of the Caracazo, two 
coup attempts, and the 1990s emptying of political language (Reguillo-
Cruz, 2000, p.22), the young protagonists of Bujanda and Valle’s novels 
try to keep afloat by means of a search for their fathers. They display 
a centripetal motivation, so to speak, which aims at finding sense by 
turning toward the origins. Both novels present absent fathers: one 
disappears after the burial of his elder son, dead by AIDS; another is 
supposedly killed while working in a subterranean excavation in the 
subway. These characters never get to find their fathers, though; the trip 
toward the original seed, the search “for the tunnels of the ancestors” 
(Valle, 2009, p.211) implies a growing estrangement from reality. In the 
case of La Última Vez, historical references to the Caracazo are central 
to describe the atmosphere of paranoia, madness, and violence of the 
months immediately prior to Chávez’s ascension to power (1999). In 
Bajo Tierra, the main historical referent is the Vargas landslide in 1999,5 
right before the new century.
Luis Duno has pointed out the recurrence of an imaginary of 
sickness and natural catastrophe “to respond to the generalised anxiety 
caused by the socio-political reordering of the last decades.” (2009, 
p.401) There are, however, three reasons why this interpretation of 
the phenomenon is problematic. In the first place, it connects sickness 
and catastrophe to political polarization (the other being a sick person 
or destructive agent); second, it links pathological metaphors with 
19th century literary biologistic discourse; and third, Duno seems 
to understand that the emergence of these imaginaries occurs in the 
midst of contexts of radical transformation. While the first approach 
reduces the hermeneutical framework of sickness and catastrophe to 
the dichotomies of polarization, the second reveals an enlightened 
epistemic matrix, under which literature retains a function of social 
regulation. Finally, the third notion seems to assume the official 
narrative of emergence of a Bolivarian revolution, which effectively 
would amount to a radical rupture with the past similar to the French 
Revolution, the example posed by Duno. Contrarily, I would like 
to underscore a kind of narrative that resists the binary logics of 
polarization and promotes the reading of the continuities between 
the 1990s and the present; a present in which literature has forfeited a 
guiding function. These novels narrate their insufficiency both to order 
as well as to represent the affectivity of turn-of-the-century Venezuela. 
Any diagnosis of the nation fails because the hermeneutical collapse 
FLEEING (POST-)CHÁVEZ MEMORIES
182
A POST-NEOLIBERAL ERA IN LATIN AMERICA?
affects writing as well. Thus, the narrator of La Última Vez admits 
that “nothing in this story has been easy. I have tried to unsuccessfully 
arrange an impossible quantity of events” (Bujanda, 2007, p.118). 
Fictional imaginaries float adrift in a dimension in which topics such 
as sickness and natural disaster become ungraspable metaphors. While 
they do not dodge historical consciousness, they resign the explanatory 
sufficiency of naked historiographical or social data.
I would like to pick up here on Javier Guerrero’s (2012) allegorical 
reading of the Venezuelan family in order to discuss the nation and its 
violence. The figure of the (disappeared or spectral) father is particularly 
productive to consider how and from which position one thinks about 
the exclusion from the codes of belonging to the country. Allegory 
must not be understood here in the way prescribed by Frederic Jameson 
(1986) for third-world literature. Fathers in these novels do not fit the 
norm of Bolívar, Chávez, nor their condemned opponents; rather, they 
can be better read under Ignacio Álvarez’s terms: “National allegory 
is not necessarily a reflection of the real conditions of our existence 
or a blind adherence to any type of nationalism. It is rather the place 
where political inquiry settles” (Álvarez, 2004, p.4, my emphasis). Such 
inquiry would then be different from the discursive Manichaeism of 
the national, and cautious of any ideological reordering.
The main character of La Última Vez, José Ángel, is a journalist 
who in 1998 tries to discover what happened with several missing 
weapons after the 1992 coup d’état. In parallel, he tries to find out 
the whereabouts of his father, who abandoned him, his mother and 
sister in the cemetery right after the burial of his older brother. José 
Ángel’s investigations about the rifles and about his father José Ramón 
end up converging in the same plot line when his father is identified 
as a guerrilla member involved in an obscure confrontation between 
the police, the army, the narcos, and the guerrilla for the missing 
weapons. José Ángel is astonished by the possibility that José Ramón, 
who disappeared three years ago, might be in reality a member of a 
clandestine unit of the Bolivarian Movement for Justice (Movimiento 
Bolivariano por la Justicia, MBJ). The image of a hyper-virile father 
who shoots guns utterly contrasts with the image José Ángel keeps of 
his father, a man who had spent the last 20 years in college studying law 
without ever obtaining the degree while always taking the worst part 
in court cases. For the narrator, then, his father is a totally fragmented 
figure, constituted by the polarities of a familiar-legal failure and the 
hyper-virility of a guerrilla fighter. In Lacanian terms, José Ramón is 
clearly not capable of structuring any symbolic or legal order, not even 
under the new guise of his father, whose nonentity is summarized in 
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the narrator’s conclusive sentence: “The only thing that José Ramón 
did well in all his life was to disappear” (Bujanda, 2007, p.46). Paternal 
insufficiency is reinforced by his rejection of his elder son, whom he 
abused and beat because of his homosexuality. When the son dies of 
AIDS, the father’s shock is so great that he literally vanishes from family 
life. The true “monster,” then, to use Guerrero’s terms, is not the gay 
son but the homophobic father-turned-guerrilla fighter. The abuse and 
abandonment of his sons combines with the image of the ailing body 
of his son: ulcerated and scrawny after surgery, affected by diabetes 
and pneumonia. The exhibition of violence on that body does not 
aim at the normalization of the family, but rather uncovers an intimate 
process of long-term destruction. José Ángel pieces together childhood 
memories to determine when the familiar disintegration began. Some 
of the episodes of the past include failures in employment, political 
crookedness, genealogies of suicide, double lives, and grandiloquent 
fantasies. Among these memories, the allusion to the Caracazo is the 
most intense. The narrator’s brother is buried close to the “new pest,” 
the area of common graves for the unidentified corpses of the Caracazo 
in the Cementerio General del Sur. The latent presence of anonymous 
countrymen murdered is reinforced by the walls of the building where 
José Ángel lives with his mother, pierced by bullets in 1989 (Bujanda, 
2007, p.76). The Caracazo thus becomes omnipresent and stifling, 
gradually causing the mother to go insane. In turn, José Ángel discovers 
that the missing weapons are being used by different and apparently 
opposite social actors, including the narcos and policemen, the army 
and guerrilla bands complicit with the media. Far from announcing a 
true political-social transformation, this fact implies merely to “move 
some pieces in the bedroom so everything remains the same” (Bujanda, 
2007, p. 134). For the narrator, the coming replacement of the political 
casing is as somber as everything that surrounds his father. Not only 
does he never find the father, but also he is himself demoted and ends 
up losing his way in a city affected by several explosions. By then, 
though, several works of graffiti cover the country, foretelling the 
future: “You must choose: destruction or destruction” (Bujanda, 2007, 
p. 99). This recurrent sentence first appears in a letter that a mysterious 
commander Maigualida of the MBJ had sent to José Ramón. Upon 
reading it, José Ángel tries to decipher the discourse of an illuminati 
that invites his father to join an “indestructible process” that will spread 
through the galaxy driven by God (Bujanda, 2007, p. 119). Although 
given the rampant corruption, a coup by the military and groups of the 
MBJ seems imminent; the political change that José Ramón embraces 
would perpetuate and even aggravate the catastrophe. The novel does 
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not underscore the regenerative aspect of the revolutionary movement 
but rather its destructiveness as demonstrated in such millennialist 
discourses. Paradoxically, in her obsessive drive for destruction, 
commander Maigualida is a product of the past, on which she depends, 
even if it is by negation, to sustain her legitimacy. The delirium of the 
commander, shared by the father, and the mother’s madness, trapped in 
the terror of the Caracazo, do not enable José Ángel to find meaning 
in what happens to him. Such interpretative impossibility is evident in 
the final dissolution of the family: his sister migrates to Spain and ends 
all communication with José Ángel, and the mother is confined in a 
psychiatric institution. Due to the open ending, we ignore whether 
the main character flees the city or commits suicide. It is clear that 
José Ángel’s path toward his father becomes centrifugal, and that the 
protagonist ends further away from his father than he started.
Significantly, when José Ángel deviates from the hard-boiled editorial 
line of the newspaper where he works, his boss removes him from 
the investigation and relegates him to the archival section. For Jacques 
Derrida, the relationship between the archive and power is based in 
the latter’s retention of memory (2001, pp.13–14). What the French 
author termed “archive fever” is summarized by Murguia as “placing 
oneself at the origin in order to always return to it. This eternal return 
evades the very impulse of life: the act of abandoning origin one’s 
origin” (2011, p.27). In Bujanda’s novel, the archive-punishment reveals 
the deathly impulse of authority over a memory, which José Ángel 
inherits without partaking in it. Thus, his boss rebukes any attempt 
for journalistic autonomy:
Are you forgetting who feeds you? It was me who gave 
you a fucking chance to grow in this company and develop 
a serious journalistic career. We gave you the green light, 
we blindly trusted in you, and that’s how you pay us back? 
(Bujanda, 2007, p.133)
“Archive fever” connects in this manner with the search for origins 
through the father figure, a fruitless search that only generates 
estrangement from the country and the acknowledgment of an 
unliveable reality.
The word “apocalypse” encompasses the meanings of destruction of 
the old order and revelation of a truth (Fabry and Logie, 2010, p.12), 
but Bujanda’s imaginary does not include the second sense. The archive 
only reveals the redundancy of its own power. José Ángel’s stubbornness 
to find the origins of his tragedy preserves the desolation of the past 
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in the present, and turns the future into impossibility, because “there 
is no after-trauma” (Fabry and Logie, 2010, p.18). Paradoxically, the 
apocalypse does not signal the end but rather prolongs it indefinitely.
In Valle’s Bajo Tierra, which also narrates a search for a missing father, 
the investigation into the origins is also problematic. Sebastián C is a 
30-year-old student on a “spiritual, physical and metaphysical drift” 
(Valle, 2009, p.19) and whose father (a Bolivian immigrant) disappears 
in the tunnels of Caracas subway when Sebastián is 12. In December 
1999, Sebastián and his friend Gloria, whose father also vanished some 
years ago in Trinidad during a work trip, decide to descend to some 
subterranean tunnels guided by Mawari, an indigenous beggar who 
had to abandon his lands in the Orinoco delta due to the exploitation 
of mining industries. Their original pretext is to help Mawari find his 
wife and son and a subterranean path to the sea, which the Mariche 
natives may have used to escape the Spanish conquistadores. However, 
Sebastián and Gloria are in reality driven by the hope of finding 
their respective fathers. Sebastián is fascinated by Mawari’s physical 
resemblance of his father:
I fantasised that Mawari was a simulation of my old man, his 
impossible double. And I wanted to believe (I swear) that 
he might take me to where he was. Somehow I convinced 
myself that his search coincided with mine. (Valle, 2009, 
p.104)
Again, the father figure is offered as motivation for a centripetal trip 
toward origins. In Sebastián C’s words:
down here everything is anchored in the past. You don’t 
even live a present or a meanwhile, even the air seems to be 
dominated by a slow and foreign time, which is not yours, 
not anybody’s, only belongs to these caves. And I am not 
exaggerating when I say that this suffocating space, narrow 
as a trap, constituted everything, absolutely everything. As 
if these stone walls had swallowed time, as if they contained 
it and did not let it scape. (Valle, 2009, p. 173)
As if a trip to a frozen past, the young man finds a “cavern of readers” 
who seem “engineers of prehistory” (Valle, 2009, p. 175): some 15 
indigenous people sit and “read” handwritten letters aloud in an 
incomprehensible language; then they register them in a rolled-up 
scroll of papyrus and store them in one of the underground galleries. 
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In this way, the trip toward the center of the Earth becomes a discovery 
of a sort of primordial archive, made of thousands of letters from the 
1990s that never reached their destination. We soon learn that Mawari 
is a former shaman who has guided these indigenous people there to 
carry out that activity, persuading them that they would only be able 
to reconstruct their past by stealing the words from the white people. 
But the archive, in truth, serves Mawari to take revenge from those 
who forced him to abandon his land, lose his family, and live like a 
beggar in Caracas. In contrast to him, his companions are illiterate, and 
they merely imagine what the letters say, “translating” them into their 
own language. Ignorant of the written text, they have been deliberately 
manipulated by the former shaman. The narrator comments that the 
letters constitute “the memory and the unlived past.” (Valle, 2009, 
p.183) Thus, Mawari’s archive alludes to a kind of uprooting which 
compulsorily demands the recovery of what was lost. This recovery, 
however, as a product of a desire for vengeance, is deadly. It constitutes 
the collection of fossilized, unlived, and even frustrated memories for 
the senders and addressees of those letters from the 1990s. The “Cosmic 
egg” that Mawari tries to reproduce in the subterranean caves following 
a mythical memory does not bring liberation to the natives who are 
literally subjugated by the obscure archival practice.
The journey below the ground of Caracas is punctuated by a series 
of accidents that inevitably threaten the characters’ lives. Gloria gets lost 
in one of the tunnels and Mawari presumably dies under the rubble 
of the landslide of Ávila. Only Sebastián C seems to survive as he is 
abruptly expelled by the Vargas Landslide, from the center of the Earth 
toward the sea. His accidental discovery of the mythical exit to the 
Caribbean does not display utopian traits. Rather, the main character 
witnesses the ravages of a three-day continuous deluge: houses and 
trees drag by the water, drowned animals and bodies shattered by the 
force of the stream. The expulsion from the core of the Earth to the 
sea marks the ultimate centrifugal movement in the story and alludes to 
the alienation that traverses the subjectivities of the 1990s. Even more 
than Bujanda’s novel, Bajo Tierra marks this alienation as a common 
element of the characters: the immigrant father, the indigenous people 
exiled by mining operations, the Chinese who own a bar in Caracas, 
the Trinitarian governess of a grubby boarding house, Gloria, who 
abandons Canoabo for the capital and whose ancestors migrated 
from Stockholm. While previous generations seem to have had some 
options to accommodate themselves to the circumstances, the current 
cohort finds it impossible to integrate into society. For all the efforts 
of Sebastián C to regain his family’s past, despite the authoritarian 
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drive of Mawari’s archive, it all comes to nothing. Sebastián C’s father 
is never found, adding to the thousands of missing people after the 
Vargas landslide in 1999. The natural disaster, metaphor for the ending 
of the novel, represents the violent dislocation of the characters and 
the myriad of orphans already existing before these last days of the 
20th century. As in La Última Vez, we find an open ending in which 
“there is no after after trauma.” The young main character is left with 
only an apocalyptical landscape of loot and ruins, of wounded and 
missing people.
Animal revelation
Camilo Pino’s novel is also set in an apocalyptical urban landscape. 
The plot, which unfolds between 1988 and 1989, presents Alejandro 
Roca, a high-class young publicist who quits his job even though he 
lacks any other prospects. In contrast to the precarious condition of 
the characters of the other two novels and their search for origins, 
Pino’s novel narrates a rather frivolous quest. Alejandro wants to write 
a novel about an old hippy sect that established a commune in the 
inner country to impress Romina and his other friends. The story 
invites us again to visit the past, not just the immediate past of the 
months before the Caracazo but it also takes us back to the 1970s that, 
in contrast with the 1990s, represent the apotheosis of the Venezuelan 
project of modernization. At the time, a group of youngsters, including 
some North-Americans, founded “a commune in Boconó, an idyllic 
and isolated village in the Andes, which remained anchored in the 
past” (Pino, 2011, p.21). Utopia makes its appearance here in a past 
temporality imagined as a primary space that contrasts to the Babel-
like Caracas, somewhat similar to Mawari’s lost origins in his native 
community in the Orinoco delta. As in Bajo Tierra, Alejandro’s 
reconstruction of the past does not end well. A young girl from the 
commune, the daughter of a hacienda owner of the region, fell pregnant 
by an unknown father, as they all practiced “free love.” This enraged 
the family and villagers, triggering the murder of the hippies and the 
destruction of the commune. Alejandro travels with Romina and a 
couple of friends to Boconó to compile information about the events. 
The pastoral inner country reveals to be a semi-feudal space under the 
rule of Alejandro’s uncle and other hacienda owners, with the complicity 
of the army. Governmental authority fades, as revealed in a delirious 
episode in which the uncle and a soldier target practice on a billboard 
of the presidential candidate Carlos Andrés Pérez. The reference to 
the politician is not random, emblematic as he was of what Fernando 
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Coronil termed the “magical State” in his homonymous book (2013), 
referring to the way in which the Venezuelan state is constituted in the 
collective imaginary as providential given its control and distribution 
of wealth derived from the oil reserves. Carlos Andrés Pérez’s second 
term as president after the 1988 elections seemed to herald the return of 
the “magical State,” which he himself had built in the 1970s. However, 
his electoral victory was followed by the announcement of budget 
cuts of a neoliberal bent, ultimately causing the end of his rule and 
of two-party democracy. Thus, the archive that Alejandro constructs 
for his novel also documents the failure of a (national) communitarian 
utopia back in the 1970s.
The shattering of the utopia is revealed in the apocalyptical imaginary 
of Caracas to which the young friends return after their research in 
Boconó. Different elements present in the other novels reappear in 
this urban landscape: the 1989 Caracazo, AIDS, the prophecy that 
the Ávila ridge will split in two, and finally, a sort of “natural disaster,” 
materialized under the guise of an infestation of zamuro vultures in 
Caracas valley. In contrast to Bujanda and Valle’s novels, in Camilo 
Pino’s Valle Zamuro the itineraries across this apocalyptical scenario 
are circumscribed to the higher echelons of society, quite different 
underworlds from the hovels in Avenida Baralt in La Última Vez, or 
the sections of the Los Caobos park packed with paupers in Bajo Tierra. 
In Valle Zamuro, social marks introduce the futility of a youth totally 
isolated from the rest of the country. The climax of social alienation 
occurs during the Caracazo, when the group of friends decides to hold 
a pajama party on the day the curfew is declared and constitutional 
guarantees suspended. Inspired by the vague news available, they declare 
theirs to be “the looting party,” and take over the castle-house of an 
eccentric local millionaire. The luxury of the party finds its parallel 
in the so-called “Coronation,” the pharaonic inauguration of Carlos 
Andrés Pérez celebrated a few days before the announcement of a 
package of neoliberal measures, and the subsequent social explosion. 
The contrast between these two celebrations and realities triggers 
Alejandro’s anagnorisis. As he tipsily walks away from a party after 
an adolescent sentimental quarrel, he is detained by a military patrol 
and experiences the hellish repression unleashed in those days, even 
being forced to throw the corpse of a homeless person into the Guaire 
river. During his nocturnal wandering, he witnesses another episode 
of target practice. On this occasion, the militia men “fusillade” a 
gigantic illuminated Santa Claus that garnishes the Ciudad Tamanaco 
Shopping Mall, a “warm up” for the task that awaits them during the 
night. Shortly after, Alejandro is taken to the Helicoide, an unfinished 
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mammoth structure situated in a poor neighborhood, initially intended 
to be the biggest mall in Latin America, where the army and the 
political police lock, torture, and execute the detainees. The images 
of the volleyed Santa Claus and the shopping mall-turned-detention 
center reveal the unterritorialized character of Venezuelan modernity, 
its biopolitics of consumption that allows the division of lives between 
disposable and non-disposable, between those that belong and those 
that do not belong to the national project. In the inner “outside” 
represented by the Helicoide, the protagonist firstly encounters people 
from different social classes, as well as “revolutionary” leaders as socially 
privileged as himself. The horror that transpires the place is immune to 
political rhetoric. A beggar imprisoned with a group of young leftists 
shouts back at them
that, if anyone, he is the one who knows about reality, he 
who knows all the realities of the city, who while they lived 
in their revolutionary bubbles … has been living under 
bridges, sucking dicks to be able to have lunch. (Pino, 
2011, p.208)
Reality acquires a density that blocks any ideological reductionism, an 
intensity impossible to be seized and that is alluded by an animalistic 
imaginary. Alejandro learns that one of the torture techniques 
practiced upon the prisoners is to lock them naked in a tight space 
with scavenger birds, where they suffer the prospect of a horrible death 
under the vultures’ pecks. As the ordering mechanism of modern 
Venezuela collapses in the late 1980s, human beings come closer to, 
even touching, animal life, the kind of life that takes over the city as the 
narration unfolds. While at the pajama party some of the youngsters 
had dressed up as vultures, ridding the signifiers of death of meaning, 
a state necropolitics settles in the depths of the Helicoide, turning the 
hierarchies between human and non-human irrelevant. The bodies 
of birds shot at by anonymous marksmen before the Caracazo are 
replicated in the bodies of those men tortured and murdered during 
the state of emergency. Zamuro vultures acknowledge the “bare life” of 
the detainees and merge with the “popular body,” which Alejandro and 
his friends, locked in their high-class underworld, had not previously 
noticed. Animality—like illness and natural catastrophe in the novels 
examined previously—does not burst in to herald a denouement; 
here, that which resists discourse demonstrates a protracted biopolitics. 
Hence the narrator states: “the zamuro vultures have been here for a 
long time and we did not notice,”
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we are actors in junk TV … obsessed with ourselves, 
determined to delay the grand finale until one day it arrives 
and bang!, it explodes in our faces, and not even then do 
we realise that we have been calling for it for years. (Pino, 
2011, p.190)
Despite this quotation, the “grand finale” never happens. Alejandro 
is released from the Helicoide due to his social status and abandons 
the country after a brief recovery. The final pages of the novel offer 
his perspective during his trip to the airport: the Caribbean sea glows 
elusively upon passing the poor foothill suburbs of Caracas. A new 
catastrophe has replaced the plague of vultures, the “Black Slick” 
along the highway that “will eventually cover of the structures of the 
city” (Pino, 2011, p.221). Thus, in Valle Zamuro, as in La Última Vez 
and Bajo Tierra, the apocalypse does not bring any final outcome. 
Rather, we witness a disastrous continuity, uninterrupted by the 
Caracazo, which expands to the present of the reader in the early 21st 
century. The apocalyptical tone does not only allude to a destructive 
process, however—it also signals a revelation. The protagonist’s infernal 
experience at the Helicoide forces him to see the inner “outside” in 
which life is disposable and that predates the Caracazo. One of the 
characters notes: “what occurs here happens everyday in the shanties” 
(Pino, 2011, p.165). Such revelation does not include a programmatic 
proposal, but motivates the character to flee the country. Thus, Pino’s 
novel decodes an historical event such as the Caracazo, co-opted by 
the Chavist narrative as a foundational moment of its emancipatory 
movement, by revealing the complicity of the army with the terror of 
those days. But the novel also demystifies the fantasies of modernity and 
consumption of pre-Chávez Venezuela. As in Alejandro’s unfinished 
novel about the hippy commune, there is no utopia to recover from 
a past that continues to dictate the centrifugal displacements of the 
nation’s youth.
Fleeing the archive
Written in the 1990s without the advantage of retrospective hindsight 
of the other authors, Pim Pam Pum turned prophetic. What is more, 
Rebolledo’s is perhaps the most contemporary novel of the group under 
study in this essay, given the way it bluntly rejects any nostalgic impulse 
and forfeits teleological intentionality. The main character, Luis Lapiña, 
is a young man who abandons his philosophy studies at college to live a 
leisurely life of sex, drugs and friendship in late 20th century Caracas. 
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This is but one piece, though, of an ensemble and fragmentary novel 
that maps a whole generation. Different narrative voices reflect the 
experiences of different young characters that cross paths in the city. A 
fake kidnapping, a party at the Country Club, a police operation that 
ends up in an execution, the death of a dog, the theft of an embassy’s 
coat of arms, the purchase of a gun, the selling of a motorbike, the 
emigration of an ambitious reporter, the social vulnerability of a radio 
host… these are some of the disorderly stories that unfold in the urban 
landscape. But Rebolledo’s novel is not merely a generational story, 
it is also a narrative proposal. Both the descriptive elements and the 
central plot about a failed kidnapping become irrelevant in front of the 
weight of language, the excited language of the urban tribes through 
which the different characters self-constitute. We discover nomadic 
subjects, alienated from the structures of the state. Youngsters “laugh 
their heads off” and de-territorialize any national referent, whether 
it be Carlos Andrés Pérez or Hugo Chávez, the Copei political party 
or the Bolivarian Movement. Luis affirms: “South America, Latin 
America, what the hell is that? Nobody cares” (Rebolledo, 2013, 
p.17). Once these subjectivities assume their alterity with respect to 
the predominant codes of belonging, the sense of community becomes 
different from that of previous generations. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that the Venezuelan literary establishment has rejected 
a proposal so distanced from its ideological and aesthetic parameters. 
We are left without origins to find or utopias to build. In contrast 
with the works of Bujanda, Valle, and Pino, the drifting of some of 
Rebolledo’s characters is not limited to their social class. Their radical 
estrangement causes a transversal displacement across different social 
spaces throughout the city. Some characters are aware of the disparity, 
which is often portrayed with caustic humor, but they do not use 
this fact to establish collective bounds. If there were one element 
that brings these characters together, it would be the drugs that push 
them to move and coincide in a slum or in the Country Club. Selling 
and taking drugs replaces the “magical state” in the configuration of 
a sense of community. The movement of the youth is not framed by 
a modernizing teleology, but by the oscillations of immediate desire. 
Thus, the turbulence of drugs provides the rhythm of the novel: the 
slowing down of marihuana, the explosiveness of acid, the rushing of 
cocaine. Drugs become the distinctive element of a hopeless turn of 
the century, but they also signify the possibility of liberation from the 
“Humanist North that set in motion the populist politics” of both pre-
Chávez Venezuela as well as of 21st century socialism (Valero, 2001, 
p.124). I would like to summarize the evasion of any “ideological 
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fastening of discourse” (Duchesne, 2007, p.76) on this ambiguity. 
The (self)destructiveness but also the self-government of the bodies 
parallel both their compulsive consumption—of drugs but also of all 
the referents of popular culture of late capitalism—and their chaotic 
decoding in a series of affective impulses. In the novel, the Black 
Friday Generation is defined as a circumstantial being-together, even 
in conflict. The fleeting forms of juvenile coexistence are determined 
by sexual pleasure, tripping of drugs, sudden rage, or fear. Toward the 
end of the novel, Luis abandons the capital and moves to Margarita 
Island. Shortly after, he decides to commit suicide in a humorous and 
ambiguous scene, in which we end up ignoring whether he succeeds. 
His move to the island in the Caribbean Sea and his intention to end his 
life foreground, once again, the late 20th century centrifugal intensities 
in what refers to uprootedness. Interestingly, Rebolledo’s novel also 
presents the figure of an absent migrant father from Spain and of a 
young man who emigrates from Cabimas to Caracas. While the latter 
does not manage to settle in the capital and finally moves to the US, 
the Basque father of Luis seems to achieve a certain degree of social 
mobility, though ultimately frustrated by his “good for nothing” son. 
Thus, the story confirms the generational rupture and apocalyptical 
landscape that characterizes a present without closure. As one of the 
characters notes, “I don’t know how I got here, nor I am interested 
in knowing. There’s nothing behind. Nothing exists, except today” 
(Rebolledo, 2013, p. 40). 
In sum, in the past few decades in Venezuela there has been an 
abundance of nostalgic discourses aiming to bestow legitimacy to the 
past in order to sustain or dispute the sociocultural (post-)hegemony 
of Chavism. The imaginaries of polarization, typical of the logics of 
populist antagonism, appear ossified in a past that cripples politics for 
common good and the definition of the nation. Unable to provide 
answers to both the post-neoliberal and the current Chavist crisis, 
these imaginaries equip themselves with a dichotomical hermeneutics 
that insists on establishing exclusions. Faced with this scenario, the 
revisiting of the 1990s Caracas youth that we find in some Venezuelan 
novels allows us to recognize certain centrifugal subjectivities in the 
archives of the nation. From their interstitial and groundbreaking 
perspective, the Black Friday Generation foregrounds perceptions of 
historical continuity denied by the discourses of nostalgia. By means 
of the representation of an apocalyptical Caracas at the end of the 
20th century, Bujanda, Valle, Pino, and Rebolledo’s novels point at 
a permanent crisis that determines the estrangement of the young 
protagonists. It is precisely this uprooting that allows subsuming 
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different meanings of what is common (and what is not), dynamic 
and alien meanings, alien to the ideological definitions that violently 
fracture the social fabric. Far removed from utopian mega-projects and 
binary logics, these young characters exhibit a democratic trait absent 
in the state’s discourses and in a part of the opposition’s: the “explicit 
acknowledgement of being carriers of no absolute truth in the name 
of which it is possible to exercise discriminatory power” (Reguillo-
Cruz, 2000, p.14).
Notes
1  See for example Martín Caparrós, “¿Fracasó la izquierda latinoamericana?” The New 
York Times, December 16, 2016; Massimo Modonesi (2015) “Fin de la hegemonía 
progresista y giro regresivo en América Latina,” Viento Sur 142; Marcelo Leiras, 
Andrés Malamud and Pablo Stefanoni (2016) ¿Por qué retrocede la izquierda?, Buenos 
Aires: capital intelectual; and the dossier “Crisis de la izquierda latinoamericana” 
in Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, July–September 2016.
2  For an analysis of Chavist historical teleology, see Ana Teresa Torres (2009).
3  On the intellectual reaction against Chavist hegemony, see my article “Sobre el 
culturalismo neoconservador y los gobiernos de izquierda en América Latina,” 
Condistintosacentos. Investigación y reflexión sobre América Latina (blog), December 4, 
2013, www.condistintosacentos.com/sobre-el-culturalismo-neoconservador-y-
los-gobiernos-de-izquierda-en-america-latina/
4  The Caracazo or Sacudón de febrero (February jolt) was the outbreak of violent riots, 
looting and the subsequent brutal police repression in Caracas and other inner 
cities in February 1989. Conservative estimates report 396 deaths (Ochoa Antich, 
1992, p.35).
5  The so-called Deslave de Vargas (Vargas Landslide) refers to a series of landslides in 
the Ávila mountains and floods in Caracas and Central Litoral area in December 
1999. Between 10,000 and 30,000 people were killed or disappeared.
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Re-imagined Community:  




Academic discussion has profoundly reviewed the effects of neoliberalism 
in Latin American countries, defined its origins and metropolitan 
directives, and even celebrated the programmatic responses that in 
some countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia have allowed a glimpse 
of interrupted neoliberalism—not without facing serious problems such 
as the severe crisis of post-Chavism and the conflicts of Evo Morales 
regime with some indigenous peoples and its recent setback in recent 
elections. Revising the case of the long and uninterrupted conflict 
between the Mapuche people and the Chilean state allows us to see in 
its extreme rawness the current struggle between global capitalism and 
the indigenous communities harmed by this system. Chile is not only 
an example of the strict implementation of the neoliberal model in the 
1970s—the first major practical experiment of what would be called 
the Washington Consensus in the 1990s, which all Latin American 
countries (except for Cuba) signed to escape, under the guidelines of 
the IMF and the World Bank, from the decade of economic stagnation 
caused by the debt crisis in the 1980s. It is also an example in Latin 
America where a neoliberal state frontal attack on an indigenous people 
was perhaps forceful, focused, and effective: the so-called agrarian 
counter-reform of the Pinochet regime of 1974 and Law 2,568 of 1979, 
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which repealed the continuity of land title deeds (Títulos de Merced). 
Even when the fall of the dictatorship and the return to democracy in 
Chile could open a scenario of hope for the Mapuche community, the 
reality has proved them wrong. Despite the opening of intercultural 
policies and improvements in the institutionalization of indigenous 
rights (with the enactment of Law 19,253 and the consequent creation 
of the National Indigenous Development Corporation (CONADI) 
in 1993) when faced with the protests and demands of the Mapuche 
people—particularly in regards to the recovery of ancestral territories—
the state response continues to be that of the neoliberal model of 
imprisonment and violent repression. It is difficult not to conclude that 
the Law 18,314, known as the Anti-terrorist Act, enacted during the 
dictatorship in 1984 and mostly created as a form of institutionalized 
repression for the political opposition to the regime, still effective 
even 28 years after the fall of Pinochet, remains as an infamous legal 
framework that allows the Chilean state to criminalize any type of 
social mobilization that could affect the hegemonic raw production 
and exporting model consigned to large private corporations (domestic 
and foreign). In addition to legal persecution, the framework offered 
by the Anti-terrorist Act allows a discourse articulation in the media 
that delegitimizes the Mapuche struggle on the recovery of territories 
taken from their communities, legally and illegally, since the time of 
the military occupation in 1883. As effective as this has proven to be, 
for much of Chilean public opinion (and even that of some scholars, 
such as the award-winning historian Sergio Villalobos) the Mapuche’s 
demands and protests are part of destabilizing, anti-modernist, regressive 
forces, which are wild, premodern, violent, criminal, and defamatory. 
In this sense, Goodale and Postero (2013) comment that, in the current 
scenario of Latin America, the challenges to the globalized neoliberal 
order coexist with exacerbated patterns of violence and exploitation 
that seek to drown radical forms of social change (some alternative 
forms of governance have been consolidated to a greater or lesser 
extent, such as the Zapatista autonomous communities in Mexico or 
the San Basilio palenque in Colombia).
In this sense, the uninterrupted conflict between the Mapuche 
nation and the Chilean state is an integral part of the colonial and 
the 19th century legacy inherited by neoliberalism in Latin America; 
inheritance that maintains racial, cultural, and linguistic prejudices, 
fermented with the ideas of ethnic homogenization under the signs 
of miscegenation and the (forced) integration to the Chilean national 
culture but, nevertheless, maintaining a structural exclusion. These 
contradictions, the diminishment of the Mapuche culture upon the 
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Western-mestizo culture in favor of the supposed horizontality of 
the Chilean imagined community—typical concepts of 19th century 
liberalism (Anderson, 1993)—have pushed a community with strong 
ethnic-cultural identification to align their claims with other anti-
neoliberal challenges in the region.
In this chapter, we want to review some of the most severe points 
on the conflict between the Chilean state and the Mapuche nation, 
their challenges and responses to state repression, and how they project 
a possible future for their people within the Chilean nation. First, we 
will revisit the origins of the eviction and consequent dispossession 
suffered by the Mapuche people after their military defeat of 1883. At 
that time, their lands decreased from 11 million hectares to only 5% of 
that original territory, which continued to shrink until the end of the 
20th century (Seguel, 2007). Reviewing the deepening of this problem 
during the Pinochet dictatorship we will reach the present time to 
review the struggles for the recovery of their ancestral territories and 
the direct confrontation with the extractive projects promoted by the 
Chilean state and the neoliberal economic policies—the most notorious 
among those are the Ralco hydroelectric dam and the forestry 
companies Mininco and Bosques Arauco (Franch, 2013)—which, 
regardless of the governments’ ideologies, have been uninterrupted 
since the coup of September 11, 1973. In the following section, we 
will analyze the development of the contemporary mobilizations of 
different Mapuche collectives at the end of the last century, their 
positioning in Chilean public opinion, and some of the positive results 
achieved, particularly in regards to the creation of the CONADI and 
some actions that in the context of the Indigenous Law have permitted 
the recovery of land for the Mapuche people. We also indicate the 
great limitations of these state policies, which, seizing the vindicating 
discourse of interculturalism, do not actually (or perhaps even intend 
to) build a solid foundation for a structural solution to the problem of 
land tenure for the native peoples of this country.
The reaction to the protests allows us to explore in the following 
section that ubiquitous face of the neoliberal states: repression and social 
discipline through the exclusive use of force and the implementation 
of the emergency rule in the face of any threat (or protest) to the 
status quo. As José Alwyn points out, the recently inaugurated Chilean 
democratic government—with the consequent expectations in relation 
to the political (and legal) treatment of social movements—in 1992 
convicted under the charges of occupation and illicit association 144 
Mapuche members of the All Lands Council (Consejo de Todas las 
Tierras-Aukiñ Wall Mapu Ngullam) for actions to recover land in conflict 
RE-IMAGINED COMMUNITY
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(Aylwin and Yáñez, 2007). Since that time until today, despite the 
international protest and the domestic debate around the Law 18,314, 
the Mapuche people who have chosen radical actions to recover lost 
territories (many of them illegally) have been prosecuted under the 
Anti-terrorist law and therefore received much harsher sentences. 
Within this legal framework, the Mapuche can (and are) treated as bare 
life subjects (Agamben, 1998) and sometimes their bodies sacrificed 
without legal consequences.
In the last part of this work we analyze some of the resistance strategies 
articulated by diverse Mapuche collectives to resist the current state of 
affairs. Here we examine responses from trenches built on the margin 
of political mobilization—although immersed in a broader framework 
of vindication that definitely falls within the political struggle of the 
Mapuche nation against the Chilean state—like the organization of 
urban collectives of descendants of the great Mapuche migration to 
Santiago, which through community workshops reconstruct the ethno-
cultural heritage of the Mapuche nation outside the ancestral territory 
of the south of the country (Abarca, 2005). Moreover, we analyze 
some literary expressions articulated by Mapuche poets, scholars, and 
journalists that are re-imagining the Mapuche nation and their historical 
struggle. It is important to note that these intellectuals are building 
a locus of enunciation that epistemologically resists the ignominious 
stereotypes Chilean state and society have used historically to exclude 
them from the national project. The re-emergence of the Mapuche 
ethnical positioning, as expressed by Pedro Cayuqueo, a journalist from 
Temuco, referring to the younger generation of Mapuche people, is not 
a search to return to “the lost community portrayed by anthropologists 
and social scientists or the rural reservation idealized by leaders and poets,” 
but that of a “Mapuche voice charged with modernity and future” 
which “establishes the welcome of the Mapuche and the goodbye to 
the mapuchito”1 (Cayuqueo, 2012; emphasis in the original). In this 
sense, we will pay special attention to the re-construction of an ethnic 
memory that opposes the disintegration of ethnic minorities’ identities 
that neoliberalism intensifies, largely through forced migration to 
large urban centers where conditions are extremely adverse for these 
minorities. This phenomenon indicates the ineffectiveness of the 
supposedly inclusive intercultural policies of recent years. Despite the 
worsened scenario—which is on a continuum started by the victory 
of liberalism in the 19th century—the Mapuche nation continues to 
rearticulate itself with immense sacrifices.
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From the “Pacification” to the dictatorship
1883 marked the end of the conquest war of the Mapuche territory 
(the so-called “Pacification of the Araucania”) by the Chilean state 
and the beginning of the loss of 95% of the lands that at that time 
comprehended the Mapu—the Mapuche nation territory—(Seguel, 
2007). Beyond the usual implications of demand for primary products, 
the desire of the Chilean state to insert itself and have a competitive 
place in it, taking advantage of more territory for its exploitation; 
despite the discourses of integration of all the confines of the territory 
of the nation state2; what marked the Mapuche defeat was, as in any war 
of conquest between nations, military superiority. Sergio Caniuqueo 
comments on the last Mapuche offensive of 1881:
Without a doubt, all the Winka3 had to be destroyed, but 
the Mapuche people did not innovate in weapons, although 
there was the possibility of doing so via corsairs or the 
smugglers who entered the border. Not getting involved 
in an arms race or appropriation of military technology; 
without weapons of greater destructive power it was easy 
to calculate that the Mapuche resistance was a matter of 
time. (Caniuqueo, 2006)
In the next 45 years the Chilean state took possession of almost all the 
Mapuche lands. From 1884 to 1929 the government carried out the 
program of reservations where the Mapuche nation was relocated in 
475,422 hectares (of 11 million original territory) and granted 3,078 
land title deeds (Títulos de Merced). This meant a double strategy of the 
Chilean state to cancel any possible organization and counter-offensive 
of the Mapuche people. With the extreme reduction of territory, the 
socio-political unity of the Mapuche nation was broken, forcing them 
to move from a very efficient horizontal community organization 
scheme to become individual owners, which also led to the breakdown 
of long-range family ties.
After annexing this vast territory, the government began the sale of 
properties for a colonization project for national and foreign groups 
made up of Chileans, Germans, Swiss, French, and Italians. However, 
the colonists’ pressure on the Mapuche lands continued and “between 
1929 and 1948, 832 indigenous communities were apportioned into 
12,737 hectares” (Toledo, 2003), enabling a greater loss of land. The 
relationship with the foreign colonists was diverse, and while the 
Germans avoided getting involved with the Mapuche, the Swiss 
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had a friendlier relationship, which did not prevent the process of 
accumulation of capital (and land) in favor of the foreigners to whom 
the Mapuche ended up serving as “agricultural worker and his wife as 
a domestic servant in the house of the colonists” (Caniuqueo, 2006).
This process of continuous dispossession had a significant moment 
of mitigation—although limited and later annulled—during the 
presidency of Salvador Allende. With the Law 17,729, which continued 
with greater effectiveness the Agrarian Reform of Frei Montalva 
presidency in 1962, the government of the Popular Unity “curbed 
the process of partition of the Mapuche communities and established 
the expropriation as a way to return lands to them” (Duquesnoy, 
2012). According to the Report of the Mapuche Autonomous Work 
Commission (Comisión de Trabajo Autónoma Mapuche, 2003), in 
this period an important aspect of this law is that:
The project aims to significantly increase the Mapuche 
lands through the following mechanisms: return of the 
land usurped, which for documents that were delivered 
within the Commission would be around 50,000 hectares; 
expropriation of lands that were part of land title deeds and 
are in the possession of individuals, which would constitute 
an approximate area of 100,000 hectares; and effective 
integration of the indigenous peasant to the process of 
agrarian reform and, also, to industrial and commercial 
activities, after the necessary training...
In summary, during the period of Salvador Allende, which 
lasted between November 4, 1970 and September 11, 1973, 
574 farms were expropriated in the Provinces of Malleco 
and Cautín, with an area of 636,288.3 hectares. The 
properties expropriated in favor of Mapuche communities 
or with Mapuche participation were 138, with a total area 
of 132,115.78 physical hectares, equivalent to 7,407.77 
hectares of basic irrigation
After the brutal Pinochet coup in 1973, the expropriated land was 
returned to the landowners and the community leaders suffered fierce 
repression. However, the Mapuche activities did not stop; on the 
contrary, they kept maturing more and more during the dictatorship 
and they articulated a discourse that integrated, in addition to territorial 
claims, the defense of their culture and ethnic identity. Even so, the 
offensive of the dictatorship against the Mapuche mobilization—and 
the Chilean people in general—had dramatic consequences. The 
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Law Decree 2,568 of March 22, 1979, authorized and promoted the 
partition of Mapuche grounds granted under land title deeds, disrupting 
communities by making them individual owners and inserting them 
unfavorably in the free market model of Chilean oligarchs. As Rodrigo 
Levil Chicalhual (2006) explains:
This law addresses and deepens the same objectives of all 
division laws: to convert the Mapuche communities into 
individual owners and to end the restrictions on their lands 
in order to homogenize the Mapuche population along 
with the rest of the small farm owners. It is provided that 
once the division is made, the lands and their owners will 
cease to be considered indigenous, as indicated by the Law 
in its first Chapter.
Under this law “2,000 communities were apportioned in some 72 
thousand individual land lots. What remained in the hands of the 
Mapuche from their “ancestral” territory was definitely divided into 
private plots” (Duquesnoy, 2012). This process of deterritorialization 
carried out through the Pinochetist agrarian counter-reform would 
worsen the phenomenon of Mapuche migration to urban centers, 
most of them to Santiago, a matter we will review later. As a result of 
the neoliberal policies implemented by the dictatorship and continued 
during the so-called Concertation governments in the following 20 
years, four companies hold two-thirds of the forest plantation territories 
throughout Chile (Levil, 2006). Alongside this process of accumulation 
sponsored by the state, the Mapuche nation have suffered an enormous 
territorial loss, which has pushed them to a greater and more radical 
mobilization for the recovery of land usurped.
Mapuche mobilization and state repression
The return to democratic life in 1990 meant the initiation of dialogue 
between the state and the Mapuche nation (as with other indigenous 
peoples of the country), which was unimaginable during the 
dictatorship. Nevertheless, this circumstance was not the beginning 
of their demands; on the contrary, it came at a time of acute crisis 
due to the almost disappearance of land owned by the Mapuche 
communities by that time. Within this agenda of state openness, 
the Law 19,253 (October 1993), known as the Indigenous Law, was 
promulgated and the National Indigenous Development Corporation 
(CONADI) and the Indigenous Lands and Waters Fund were created 
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during the government of Patricio Aylwin (Franch, 2013). It is worth 
highlighting some actions promoted by the CONADI in favor of 
the development of the Mapuche people in the first decade of the 
Concertation governments:
 1 The destination, through different plans and programs, 
including the transfer of fiscal lands, the acquisition 
programs of properties in conflict and grants from 
the Land and Water Fund of Conadi, of around 
75,000 hectares of land for Mapuche individuals and 
communities between 1994 and 1997.
 2 The support, through the Conadi Development Fund, 
for the implementation of indigenous economic, social 
and cultural development initiatives.
 3 The constitution of three areas of indigenous development 
(ADI), two of them in the Mapuche territory (Alto Bio 
Bio and Lago Budi) and the allocation of resources for 
their implementation. (Aylwin, 2000, p.284)
Yet these actions were far from making a noticeable difference in the 
situation of the Mapuche people. The balance of these years reveals 
the great limitations of the indigenous law. Aylwin (2000) points out 
that, for example, in 1996 of the 1,357 mining concessions to national 
and foreign companies in Chile, 144 were on lands of Mapuche 
communities and 75% of the rights of surface water available in this 
territorial space had been granted to non-indigenous individuals and 
only 2% corresponded to the Mapuche communities. During the 
period of President Eduardo Frei (1994–2000), the dialogue between 
the Mapuche and the Chilean state was fractured as a result of the 
contradiction between what the indigenous law states—for example, 
article 13 states that “Indigenous lands will not be alienated, seized, 
encumbered or acquired by prescription, except among communities 
or indigenous people of the same ethnic group” (in Franch, 2013). 
Conversely, in the end the government granted the ENDESA-Spain 
consortium the Ralco hydroelectric project in the Alto Bio-Bio where 
lands inhabited by Pehuenche4 communities are located without any 
consultation or agreement.
This long-term conflict—between 1996 with the beginning of the 
“negotiations” and 2004 when Endesa finally flooded the reservoir—is 
one of the most paradigmatic in terms of the tense relationship between 
the Mapuche nation and the Chilean state. It signals the profound 
meaning of the reality that exists in Chile currently: the subordination 
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of the society and the state to the demands of productivity imposed 
by the neoliberal system in this country. The imperative production 
of electricity (founding part of modernity) promised by Endesa’s dam 
scheme—a Chilean company privatized in the framework of neoliberal 
measures during the dictatorship—in the Alto Bio-Bio represented a 
project that the state was not willing to stop, although it had to go 
over the rights of Mapuche communities in the area (Morales, 1998); 
rights that were approved in Congress just three years before. During 
the negotiation stage between the company, the government, and the 
Mapuche people, the resolution of the Pehuenches was that they did not 
want the dam installed. In a June 1996 letter addressed to the Director 
of the Environment National Agency (CONAMA), a state entity that 
had to decide whether to approve the megaproject in relationship with 
the environmental impact (relying on a study carried out by Endesa 
itself), Mapuche representatives argued from different angles what the 
proposed relocation would be for those affected by the flood of lands:
• Moving some families would affect the integrity of the entire 
community because the division will cause the discontinuity of 
traditions in which all the members of the community should 
participate.
• The project would flood old cemeteries of the community.
• The project would fracture a life trajectory linked to the land where 
they lived.
• Endesa had breached promises in a previous project (Pangue).
• The lands that were offered to them in exchange did not have the 
conditions to sustain the Pehuenche mode of traditional productivity.
• The offer of jobs does not compensate for the loss of their culture.
Their list of reasons closed with the most valid argument possible: 
“For all the above, the Project Ralco proposed in the study presented 
by Endesa must be rejected, because we want to continue living in 
our lands according to our culture as we have always done.” And 
maybe thinking that the conditions in the country had changed with 
the constitutional confirmation of being a multicultural state, they 
finished the letter this way: “We hope that this time our opinion will 
be taken into account and not ignored as usual is” (in Relmuán 1998). 
One year after receiving this letter, CONAMA approved the project, 
not only against the will of the Pehuenches, but also bypassing the 
recommendations of a group of scholars from the Universidad de la 
Frontera that served as advisor (among others) of the CONAMA. 
The dramatic outcome of this conflict was that in April 2004 Endesa 
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authorized the filling of the reservoir one month sooner than expected 
without notifying the Pehuenche communities flooding their cemetery 
(Franch, 2013). That is to say, “as usual” the Mapuche people decision 
was ignored in favor of a profitable project for the business sector, for 
the state, and for Chileans. Moreover, this net of socio-political actors 
through the law and the media would label as terrorists those Mapuche 
who were radicalizing their protests upon the unstoppable advance of 
neoliberal modernity and progress.
A particular event in 1997—connected to the big forestry companies, 
the other great threat to Mapuche territories—illustrates how the 
democratic Chile would deal with the Mapuche mobilizations, 
enabling the usual repressive strategy of the neoliberal state of our 
times: emergency rule against the threat of terrorism. On December 1, 
a group of Mapuche protesters scorched three trucks belonging to the 
forestry company Arauco. The detainees were judged under the anti-
terrorist law and were sentenced to many years in prison (Duquesnoy, 
2012). The special trial prosecution followed that
the Regional Mayor of that time, Oscar Eltit, qualified the 
felony as serious, of terrorist connotation, for which he 
opened a requirement in the Court of Appeals of Temuco 
under the Law of Internal Security of the State to those 
who are responsible. (Franch, 2013)
Pedro Cayuqueo denounced in 2007 how the emergency rule 
applied to the Mapuche protesters was disproportionate and unjust, 
pointing out that “ten years after the arson attack in Lumaco, 300 
Mapuches, among them women, the elderly and children, were still 
imprisoned after having passed through several prisons in the country” 
(in Duquesnoy, 2012). If prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment 
under the anti-terrorist law is the most visible and severe face of state 
repression, the punitive program that the government has taken against 
the mobilizations and protests extends the emergency rule toward the 
entire Mapuche community with indiscriminate exercise of police 
violence. A report of the Human Rights Observatory for Indigenous 
Peoples describes common abuses committed against the Mapuche 
people by Carabineros, the National Police Corps, “in the line of duty:”
Extremely violent detention. / Violent eviction of 
Mapuche commoners. / Unlawful beating during arrest and 
detention. / Shots during raid injuring several Mapuche 
people. / Freedom of movement impediment to people 
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within a community by actions of registration and control. 
/ Mistreatment during detention. / Entering farms and 
extraction of livestock belonging to Mapuche people. / 
Shotting against houses of a community by an unknown 
group that is suspected to be personal of Carabineros. / A 
driver accompanied by a Carabineros official tried to run 
over a member of the Mapuche community. / Physical and 
verbal maltreats (racist and discriminatory epithets) during 
raids. / Systematic harassment during research (permanent 
identity checks, follow-up on the leaders). / Arrests with 
heavily armed personnel. / Eviction and detention of 
numerous people in the morning, including women, the 
elderly and children. / Shots with anti-riot shotguns during 
raid, injuring a 12 years-old child impacted with 7 shots. 
/ Punches and racist insults during detention. / Detention 
and beatings of students during a peaceful protest. (Beaudry, 
2009)
In this repressive context, the Mapuche people have also been 
radicalizing their protests, in particular those related to the recovery 
of ancestral community lands, with actions that include occupation of 
premises, in which they are particularly exposed to police repression 
and in some cases even to death. Franch refers to the case of two 
community members who were killed by Carabineros:
22 years-old Matías Catrileo on January 3, 2008 and 24 
years-old Jaime Mendoza Collío on August 12, 2009... The 
investigation of the two murders confirm that the shots were 
received by the Mapuche commoners when they turned 
their backs to police officers. (Franch, 2013)
Furthermore, in 2010 there were 58 Mapuche people prosecuted 
and/or convicted under the charges of “terrorist arson, frustrated 
homicide with terrorist character, terrorist threat and terrorist illicit 
association,” these cases denote the application of the anti-terrorist 
law exclusively to members of the Mapuche nation during the decade 
2000–10 (Franch, 2013).
The severe and unjust prison sentences caused by this legal framework 
have given rise to Mapuche protest within prison confinement that 
runs parallel to the mobilizations (peaceful or violent) in the streets—
hunger strikes have been initiated by several Mapuche prisoners under 
preventive detention or convicted under the anti-terrorist law. This 
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political action has had a double functionality in the spectrum of the 
Mapuche mobilization: on the one hand, it has affected public opinion, 
dismantling to some extent the negative and condemning vision of 
the Mapuche movement built from the media and state discourses. 
The peaceful and particularly dramatic nature of this type of protest, 
in addition to its long-time extent, has had positive repercussions since 
it has made the Mapuche struggle visible and favored the involvement 
of other social and political actors such as NGOs and the Catholic 
Church. On the other hand, the hunger strike as a political strategy 
has been constantly articulated by the Mapuches from an angle that 
emphasizes the community character of their struggle. Thus, in 2010, 
34 Mapuche commoners held a collective hunger strike for more than 
80 days demanding that their legal cases were not double prosecuted by 
ordinary and military courts. Among the achievements obtained was an 
international protest in favor of the Mapuche struggle in several Chilean 
embassies abroad, in addition to the government examination of aspects 
for the applicability of law 18,314 (Franch, 2013), achievements that, 
in the political-judicial framework that we have described, represent 
significant advances. Moreover, the domestic visibility of the protests, 
mobilizations, extreme persecution, and condemnation, along 
with the hunger strikes, has had an effect not only on Chilean and 
international public opinion, but also on the identity awareness of 
many urban Mapuche people, and has promoted an expansive claim for 
the Mapuche nation in recent years. This has been creating an urban 
movement parallel to the mobilizations in the ancestral territories of the 
south—not without conflicts, as we shall see later—which highlights 
the other side of the extreme deterritorialization the Mapuche people 
has suffered for decades: migration, discrimination and acculturation 
related to the urban exile phenomenon.
Migration: From deep fracture to identity 
reconstruction
From the 1930s, due to the increasingly adverse conditions suffered 
by the reservation communities in southern Chile, Mapuche people 
began to migrate to urban centers especially to the city of Santiago. 
This phenomenon worsened in the following decades, especially 
with Pinochet’s agrarian counter-reform. In this situation of gradual 
and continuous territorial and economic disadvantage, the Mapuche 
people also have had to face a nation state and a society that historically 
have ignored the legitimacy of the ethnic and cultural claim of the 
Mapuche. With modernity’s arguments—which decidedly declares 
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that “there is no doubt that they resigned to ancestral rights, that 
they accepted domination and that, adapting to it, they have looked 
to the future” (Villalobos, 2000, p.A2)—the Chilean homogenizing 
discourse assumes that the displacement (exile) of the Mapuche from 
their communities to the city would provoke the slow but inevitable 
Westernization (acculturation) of the indigenous people and their 
consequent insertion in the national project. However, historical reality 
has shown that despite the contact, exchange and cultural adaptation of 
the Mapuche people—that is, their historical and forced negotiations 
with Western modernity—in the city (nation), their place in the 
imagined community that is Chile still is relegated to peripheral spaces.
In general, the conditions that historically have pushed the Mapuche 
people out of their communities are poverty and insufficient land for 
its inhabitants. A migrant says in this regard: “Ten years ago, in the year 
1990 I came because of lack of work, the land is not the same as in the 
past, not anymore, the land is diminished and in addition there is little 
and unproductive” (Abarca, 2005). As in almost any other migratory 
context, the conditions Mapuche people face arriving in the city are 
usually very adverse:
Here [in Santiago] they must share their misadventures 
with other isolated groups, which usually are unqualified 
workers, with humble and intermittent jobs, who live in 
overcrowding houses, giving space to promiscuity and a 
series of indicators that describe extreme poverty. In the 
capital of Chile, in places like those described, lives the 
greatest concentration of the Mapuche population of the 
country, which had to leave their impoverished homeland 
to look for some job that would allow them to survive. 
(Paillalef, 2012)
Faced with this unfavorable situation many Mapuche migrants in 
Santiago have opted for civil organization in the city. Still being aware 
that some will not return to the south they refuse to surrender their 
roots, as explained by a migrant who has been in the capital city for 
50 years:
I always worked for the unity of the people … To work 
for the development of the urban Mapuche. Because for 
us it is difficult to return to the south, some may perhaps, 
those who have land but I no longer have any. The little 
land that my father had was something of 25 hectares and 
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we were several brothers. We inherited 5 hectares each, so 
we agreed and we left everything to the two brothers who 
were there, who worked the land. (Aravena, 2008)
Even without land, for this migrant, uprooting does not mean the loss 
of identity because he maintains contact with the ancestral territory as 
a form of belonging to the Wallmapu, which means the whole space 
of the Mapuche nation:
I did not ask for land in the distribution and I do not have 
land, but that does not mean I’m not Mapuche. No, because 
we are always cooperating with people who have problems. 
I’ve made eight trips to the Alto Bio Bio bringing help to 
the people, clothes, food. (Aravena, 2008)
At the same time as that relationship with the southern community has 
been maintained, over the years there has been a parallel promotion 
of a solidarity consciousness toward the Mapuche people of the city, 
although without neglecting the aspect of cultural conservation:
So here we are more dedicated to the urban Mapuche 
because we have many people who live in very poor 
peripheral communities, so we want them to have decent 
housing, education and health, all those things … I wish I 
could prosper, that is our hope. Another one is not to lose 
our culture, to spread our language. For example, I still 
speak Mapudungun (Mapuche language) but young people 
do not. (Aravena, 2008)
The return trip—even if it is temporary to visit relatives, or so that the 
children of Santiago have contact with the community, the landscape, 
and traditions—is persistently repeated in the testimonies because 
it is part of an imaginary that strengthens the identity of the urban 
Mapuche: “We go back to see our people and to visit those places 
where one came from, where I used to run when it rained and I went 
out to look for birds, I went fishing and when I go there I like to do 
that” (Abarca, 2005). As Geraldine Abarca explains, after carrying out 
several workshops with Mapuche migrants from La Pintana collective, 
in Santiago, the memory and the idea of the place of origin, of the 
ancestral mapu (territory) is vital for the migrants in Santiago because:
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The people of the land have left in the south a sort of 
“cultural niche” where they find their ancestors, their 
relatives, the Mapudungun language, the memories associated 
with the rites and the practices they were part of in that way 
of life linked to agricultural work. (Abarca, 2005)
Despite the conscious efforts to maintain their heritage, discrimination 
in Santiago suffered by migrants or their children born in the city 
has often led to the denial of culture and origin. One aspect of this 
phenomenon of acculturation is the weakening of the intergenerational 
transmission of Mapudungun. Some parents decided not to teach their 
language to children to avoid ethnic or employment discrimination. 
Sakin, a Mapuche girl from Santiago, explains: “I think they did not 
teach us Mapudungun because of a very racial question, they realized 
that the Mapuche were very badly looked at.” In another example of 
this issue, a migrant father explains the case of his children: “None of 
them can speak our language, they do not want to, I have not taught 
them either, however when going to school they treat them as Indians, 
but we are not Indians, we are just Mapuche” (in Abarca, 2005). At 
this point we must emphasize the role of cultural claims and promotion 
that civil organizations have had within the collectives of Santiago. 
Partly thanks to the financial support of the Chilean government, 
partly due to a revitalization of the Mapuche identity as a result of the 
mobilizations of southern Mapuche communities in the capital city 
demanding the repossession of ancestral territories and the consequent 
visibility in the media and urban society, from the 1990s began the 
creation of projects of cultural recovery among the Santiago collectives, 
in which the use and teaching of Mapudungun has a special place next 
to the celebration of Mapuche religious rites.
The case of Mrs E.H., born in Santiago, is paradigmatic and at the 
same time an echo of many others. She comments: “From the year 
1995 I began to internalize about the Mapuche people for what came 
out on television about them. There I also learned about CONADI.” 
(Aravena, 2008) The “internalization” she mentioned is actually a 
process of rearticulation of her cultural and ethnic identity, which had 
suffered a significant deterioration throughout the years, particularly 
since the early death of his mother when she was eight years old. 
Despite living for a time in a community in the south, and maintaining 
contact with her family, whom she used to visit, the isolation she 
suffered in Santiago and the alienation in an adverse society “froze” 
in her, so to speak, the use of their mother tongue:
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Of course, I remembered my language and used to speak 
it by myself. But it was a suffering, because it hurt my 
soul not to be able to talk with some else … Sometimes, 
I also went to the south by train, to see my father. When 
I was in the rural buses, I was catching up everything the 
Mapuche who were sitting in the buses talked about, but 
I never practiced it. (Aravena, 2008)
Although E.H. expresses in a dramatic way her estrangement from 
Mapudungun, her testimony highlights a feeling of personal pain that 
shows just part of the more complex side of this phenomenon—the 
intergenerational and regional conflict between the southern Mapuches 
and those from Santiago. In general, for those who were born in the 
southern communities, who learned and spoke Mapudungun daily, and 
who continued to use it after their migratory experience to the capital, 
the fact that a Mapuche from Santiago does not speak the language is 
cause for reprobation when not of discrimination. Geraldine Abarca 
comments on how this problem was presented in the workshops of La 
Pintana collective when she requested a translator during an exercise:
In this single fact, I observed that the speakers of 
Mapudungun rebuked those who were born in Santiago 
for not having learned to speak their parents’ language 
and the non-speakers answered that their parents had not 
taught them. Somehow, they represented their parents at 
the table of migrants. In the end, they recriminated each 
other talking all at the same time and shouting from table to 
table. Allegorically, I observed the break between migrant 
parents and children born in Santiago. (Abarca, 2005)
Returning to the case of E.H., she finally founded an organization in 
the commune of Lo Prado and comments on her personal experience 
in relation to Mapudungun language:
I am the founder of my organization that today is called 
Nehuen (which means strength) and then I start to well 
recover the language because at first it seemed as a poorly 
spoken Spanish because of so much time passed in which 
I did not practice our way of speaking, then I recovered it, 
but still not 100% (in Aravena, 2008).
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Beyond her individual story is a remarkable case where from this 
personal “internalization” would emerge a collective cultural 
recovery project that touches other urban Mapuche migrants and 
their children. Doing so they are proclaiming “we too have our own 
language, our way of speaking, we want society to see that we are 
alive and present.” (Aravena, 2008) Another significant aspect of this 
identity amending is that it is articulated from multiple angles and 
positions from the Mapuche community in urban exile (and also from 
rural areas). Although the process of transmission-reconstruction of 
Mapuche memory and identity we reviewed here has arisen in the 
domestic environment, it runs parallel to the intensive work of artists 
and intellectuals that together helped in the positive self-evaluation 
of the difference to the Western-mestizo culture and, consequently, 
has allowed the Mapuche nation to position themselves before the 
Chilean society.
Artists and intellectuals re-imagining the Mapuche 
nation
In contrast to the reiteration in the present of the fossilized history and 
stereotypes carried out by the state and the Chilean media renewing 
them before public opinion to delegitimize, make invisible, or discredit 
any ethnic, cultural, or territorial claim by the Mapuche people, for 
several years a new generation of Mapuche journalists, writers, and 
scholars have carried the task of refuting the negative view of the 
Mapuche history written by Chileans. Therefore, they have undertaken 
the project of rewriting their history but, perhaps more importantly, 
they have devoted themselves to the task of presenting it to Chilean 
society in general, and to their own people in particular. In 2012 an 
editorial note from a Mapuche journal (Revista Rufián) in a special 
issue dedicated to the urban Mapuche migrants—which are called 
Warriache by the “real” Mapuche from the south as a way to distance 
them—they state who they really are and how their struggle is the 
same as the one of the whole Mapuche nation:
We, the Mapuche of the 21st century, are the grandchildren 
of those grandparents who migrated to Santiago in the 60s, 
to leave the impoverishment that left years of usurpation 
to the Mapuche territories … Most of us are the first to 
have university studies and we dare here in the city where 
we have established ourselves within local communities … 
to every day form our identity as Mapuche people, dealing 
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with Westernization, with capitalism and other evils of 
consumer societies. Warriache they call us, and we proudly 
dare to write of ourselves and our people, of our struggles, 
of the poverty that exists in the south, and of our beloved 
people, who refuse to disappear. (Revista Rufián, 2012)
In this sense, as a social minority par excellence, the Mapuche urban 
community—certainly also the rural one, although with a different kind 
of activism, for example in relation to the social and political struggle for 
the recovery (peaceful and violent) of ancestral territories in the Chilean 
south—has been building a movement of cultural and ethnic claiming. 
In the first place, distancing itself from the folklorist vision, which is 
alienating and reductionist, placing them in an anachronistic past and 
present of a premodern character; and on the other hand, resisting the 
discourse that tries to condemn them to the margins of a society that 
continues to perceive the acculturation and acceptance of the model 
of Westernized Chile—economic, cultural, political, legal, religious, 
social, ecological, linguistic ways—as the only form of integration.
In another example of the Mapuche claim in the city, some 
contemporary poets situate themselves more directly in the process of 
appropriation of the new space in which they live or were born. With 
the poem entitled “Mapurbe,” David Aniñir (2009), a Mapuche poet 
born in Santiago, positions Warriache people in the city at the same 
time as he claims to belong to the Mapuche nation:
We are concrete Mapuche
Under the asphalt our mother sleeps
Exploited by a bastard.
But the identity is not only linked to the exploited land of its people, 
under the asphalt, but the poem resorts to other element extremely 
important for the Mapuche cultural identity, the lineage:
Mother, old Mapuche, exiled from history
Daughter of my benevolent village
From the south you came to birth us
…
We are the children of the children of the children
We are the grandchildren of Lautaro taking the bus
To serve the rich
We are relatives with the sun and thunder
Raining over the stabbed earth. (Aniñir, 2009)
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Aniñir enunciates a violent criticism about the conditions faced by the 
Mapuche people in urban exile, not only with a disadvantaged position 
at work—the common jobs accessed by the Mapuche migrants are 
as baker, construction worker, gardener, laundress or maid, “serving 
the rich”— but in general about their experience in the city which is 
marked by ethnic and cultural discrimination that often leads to self-
denigration and sometimes to the denial of their origin. This situation, 
for example, caused close to a thousand Mapuche people, between 
1970 and 1990, to legally change their names and/or surnames for 
fear of discrimination in the city:
In this name-changing, Mapuche self-definition is expressed 
as an extreme process of denial of the Mapuche cultural 
identity... In this sense, the cases that we identify as rejection 
of identity show us how discrimination, dispossession 
and distortion of the Mapuche history and cultural codes 
make the subjects deal with their identity in a painful way. 
(Millaray, 1995)
Besides, maybe still dealing with their historical memory in a painful 
way, the contemporary Mapuche writers and intellectuals are looking to 
repair the damage that master narratives, as that of the Chilean National 
History, have inflicted in their people. One paradigmatic example of 
this work is that of Pedro Cayuqueo, a Mapuche journalist mentioned 
previously, who has been constructing a counter-narrative in his 
chronicles to confront the official history and its nationalist founding 
discourse. He replies to a famous historian, “General Cornelio Saavedra, 
the great architect of the occupation of the Mapuche territory in the 
second half of the 19th century,” who coined the official phrase “The 
Pacification of the Araucania” and its connotations: “Three centuries 
of war with Spain, the Araucanians [Mapuche] finally accepted the 
call of civilization and progress” (Cayuqueo, 2012). His answer does 
not hide a hint of anger and resentment:
At what point did Chilean official history begin to bother 
me for real? I suspect that when I took my university 
admission test and found, in the specific area of History 
and Social Sciences, the phrase of Saavedra again … How 
could historians call “pacification” a brutal genocide, an 
ethnic cleansing authorized by the Congress and financed 
with funds from the public treasury? (Cayuqueo, 2012)
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If, on the one hand, Cayuqueo explicitly exposes the distorted view of 
the official history, on the other hand, his chronicle proposes arguments 
different from the official ones so that the readers of his column (written 
in Spanish), or the readers of the collections of his chronicles—Sólo 
por ser indios of 2012 and Esa ruca (house) llamada Chile of 2014—can 
understand the reason for some issues that are generally condemned by 
Chileans. For example, to the constant question of why the Mapuche 
people insist on differentiating between Chilean and Mapuche, if they 
are not also Chilean, another well-known Mapuche writer, Elicura 
Chihuailaf, responds in the following way:
I was born and raised in a Mapuche community in 
which our view of the everyday life and transcendence is 
assumed from our own way of understanding the world: 
in Mapudungun and in the imposed Spanish; in the skin-
browness in which we recognize ourselves; and in the 
memory of the irruption of the Chilean State that “gave 
us” its citizenship. Invasion verifiable in the proliferation 
of latifundia surrounding the reservations where we were 
displaced. (Chihuailaf, 2012)
But the condemnations made by the Mapuche writers not only refer 
to the imposition of the Spanish language but perhaps even more to 
the Chileans lack of will to recognize Mapuche culture and language 
as part of their nation. As Cayuqueo (2012) explains in another of his 
chronicles:
Two peoples, two societies that speak different languages, 
can get to dialogue as equals? For now, the Mapuche 
people take the job of learning yours. In it, without going 
any further, I write this column. Will you speak or write 
ours one day?
Obviously, the question is rhetorical, the author of the chronicle knows 
the answer beforehand, not because it is directly answered by the society 
or the Chilean State–which since the Pinochet dictatorship, has actually 
taken steps (at least legal-administrative) toward an improvement of 
the situation of the indigenous people but which has not yet changed 
the structural adverse situation of the Mapuche in Chile.
Such a situation—linguistic subalternity aggravated by physical 
repression and territorial dispossession, undoubtedly all linked to 
an ethnic-cultural context—reveals what Walter Mignolo (2000) 
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calls the “colonial difference,” a notion that unmasks many of the 
myths of the intercultural relations of contemporary neoliberal states 
with their indigenous peoples. In this sense, the Mapuche nation, 
whatever degree of sociocultural negotiation they have achieved with 
Chilean modernity, are situated (not only geographically but also) 
epistemologically in the subalternity of the Mapuche communities 
from the south. But Cayuqueo does not lose the opportunity to remind 
the Chileans, and the Mapuche people, that historical facts prove that 
this situation is not, as it never was, “normal,” but positioned in the 
national consciousness since the hegemonic discourse of the Chilean 
state, and curiously not since colonial times:
There was a time when being an authority and not 
speaking the language of my grandparents was not only 
politically incorrect in Chile. It also made you useless 
when dealing with “Kingdom’s affairs”. On the contrary, a 
good command of our language could well open the gates 
of Heaven. Or Lima, the capital of the Viceroyalty. Don 
Ambrosio O’Higgins knew it, the governor of the General 
Captaincy, Bernardo’s father, another of our acquaintances, 
who also learned fluently Mapudungun during his childhood 
in Chillan … To speak the language of your main border 
adversary and business partner was an inevitable requirement 
if you wanted to come to power. (Cayuqueo, 2012)
The Mapuche chronicler, as other Mapuche writers and intellectuals 
do, constantly builds bridges in his texts between the silenced historical 
events of the Mapuche past, individual and community stories, myths 
and traditions, and the present of his people in today’s Chile, full of 
injustice and of contradictions, as well as a determined and renewed 
Mapuche insurgence.
Conclusions: a better future?
The identity reconstruction of the urban Mapuche represents one of 
the resistances of the Mapuche nation to the neoliberal state. It is a 
reaction that tackles one of the most persistent aspects of a problem 
that has worsened in the later decades: The acculturation process when 
migrating from the ancestral territories to the city. Paradigmatic in 
this sense, this cultural strategy is not disconnected from more violent 
aspects of the struggles the Mapuche nation is currently carrying out 
and which frames more radical actions such as taking land by force 
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and the consequent state repression. Besides conflicts and internal 
fractures within the movement due to geographical or generational 
disagreements, the Mapuche people have the great challenge of 
being able to articulate a political project of autonomy within the 
Chilean state. Remarkable in this context is the work of the Mapuche 
intelligentsia with sociologists, historians, professors, artists, among 
others, who undertake a triple task: first, they have initiated a dialogue 
with scholars—domestic and international—to encourage a debate 
around the Mapuche conflict; second, they are carrying out a formal 
reconstruction of the Mapuche history, but this time from within, 
leaving behind the classic ethno-cultural approach from Western 
anthropological vision (from outside); and finally, this production of 
knowledge can have repercussions in Chilean public opinion, as in the 
Mapuche community, which can benefit now from accessing not just 
the family or community level oral tradition but also materials that can 
reinforce their identity reconstruction from positions of social prestige 
such as publishing circuits of national scope.
For example, to mention just one of these intellectual projects, in 
the book suggestively titled Listen, Winka...! Four essays on Mapuche 
National History and an epilogue about the future (2006), three historians 
and a sociologist programmatically address the historical reconstruction 
of the Mapuche people against the grain of Chilean national history. 
With a vision from within, and not for that reason lacking objective 
rigor, the authors promote knowledge and debate around the causes 
of the conflict between the Mapuche nation and the Chilean state. But 
above all, the text seeks that this knowledge does not get isolated from 
the current actuality. Particularly in the last section, that paradigmatic 
“epilogue about the future,” there is a lucid balance of what Chile´s 
return to democracy has meant for the Mapuche struggle:
Today we cannot say that a certain political bloc is our 
potential ally. For some time, it was thought that the 
Concertation government could be, because the opposite 
right wing (Alliance for Chile) has shown its intolerance 
on the subject, a lack of knowledge of history and a denial 
of the rights that we have as people. But the Concertation 
learned well from the dictatorship to repress social 
movements, to undermine their bases and delegitimize 
demands; They have learned to handle populism and keep 
his population in ignorance. (Marimán et al, 2006)
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But beyond the profound criticism of the state, the authors constantly 
allude to the possibility of an exit to the problem built on dialogue, 
overpassing the state’s irresponsiveness to structural changes demanded 
by subaltern minorities as indigenous peoples are. They propose 
dialogue and debate with Chilean society as a whole:
However, it is more strategic to call the ordinary citizens 
and invite them to reform things from their own space, to 
generate demands from everyday life. This may lead to a 
political movement with more organized groups that can 
make projects and demand changes. Let’s talk, discuss, agree, 
recognize our prejudices and our ignorance of the other, 
because, apparently, a shared project to shake off those who 
oppress us can bring us closer to the well-being we all seek. 
(Marimán et al, 2006)
In this sense, the final proposal of the authors allows us to understand 
that the confrontation between the Mapuche nation and the 
Chilean neoliberal state now represents the summary of a problem 
and a phenomenon that the national states in Latin America have 
historically postponed: a relationship of respect and equality with the 
indigenous peoples of the continent. The Mapuche resistance—like 
so many other struggles of indigenous communities today, and of 
many other collectives extremely affected by neoliberalism in various 
countries—is proof that, despite the bicentennial efforts of nationalist 
homogenization, ours continues to be a region where multiple cultures 
and ethnic groups coexist. We just need to act accordingly to make 
it more just.
Notes
1  As in many other countries in Latin America, the childish term for indigenous 
people as ‘indito’ (little Indian), in this case the ‘mapuchito’ Cayuqueo points out, 
refers to a verbal strategy used by Europeans to diminish natives’ subjectivity to a 
child-like state that persists until our times.
 All the in-text citations in this chapter come from Spanish-written sources and 
will be our English translation.
2  Which was a false argument as, thanks to the parliaments of Quillin (1964) and 
Negrete (1726), the Mapuche nation and the Spanish Crown agreed that the 
territories to the south of the Bio-Bio river were sovereign and therefore were 
not part of the territory of the new independent Chile (Bengoa, 2007).
3  Winka in Mapudungun, the Mapuche language, means foreigner. It was used 
originally to name the Europeans but today in Chile is used mostly to reference 
Chileans, both white or mestizo.
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4  Pehuenches, Mapuche people that inhabited the South-Central region on both sides 
of the Andean Mountain range.
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Neoliberalism and the 
Negotiation of the American 
Dream in Contemporary Latina 
Narratives
Jenifer A. Skolnick and Emmanuel Alvarado
Latinos and the persistence of the American Dream
The present chapter seeks to contribute to this volume by examining 
the ways in which elements of neoliberalism are presented and 
assessed in the works of contemporary Latino fiction writers in the 
US. Although it is possible to often find competing definitions of 
neoliberalism in the media and academic literature, we broadly define 
neoliberalism here as an economic philosophy that favors free market 
competition, limited or minimal government intervention in economic 
and social affairs, and unrestricted international trade and finance as 
the best way to achieve economic growth and economic prosperity 
(Palley, 2004; Harvey, 2005). In the US, neoliberalism’s earliest, most 
vocal and prominent supporters included the Business Roundtable, 
the Heritage Foundation, the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 
Milton Friedman, and the Chicago School of Economics (Harvey, 
2005). Since the 1980s neoliberalism has been, to varying degrees, 
the leading economic philosophy in American political life (Monbiot, 
2016).
Neoliberalism’s influence in the US has not been limited to economic 
policy. As an economic ideology, neoliberalism has had a profound 
impact in modern American cultural life due in part to its overlap with 
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some of the basic tenets of the American Dream cultural narrative. As 
a utopian ideal, the American Dream narrative has historically served 
as a central ethos of American aspirations about class mobility and 
economic success. Novelist Thomas Wolfe emphasized this possibility 
of material gain as a central component of the American Dream in 
You Can’t Go Home Again:
So, then, to every man his chance—to every man, regardless 
of his birth, his shining, golden opportunity—to every man 
the right to live, to work, to be himself, and to become 
whatever thing his manhood and his vision can combine 
to make him—this, seeker, is the promise of America. 
(Wolfe, 2011, p.508)
Although there has been much criticism as to whether the promise 
of class mobility and financial success embedded in the dream could 
be reached today, or whether it was ever realistically attainable by the 
majority of the US population, the American Dream remains a potent 
narrative in contemporary America. This dream continues to inspire 
many citizens and immigrants alike to work hard and aspire to attain a 
higher income, a prestigious job, home-ownership, as well as economic 
security and independence (Hochschild, 1995). Neoliberalism has 
blended well with the American Dream in emphasizing self-reliance, 
personal responsibility, and individual risk as part of the common 
sense fabric of everyday life and as needed beliefs and behaviors to 
achieve economic independence and social mobility (Rank et al, 2016; 
Winslow, 2017).
The American Dream and its promise of economic achievement 
continues to be an influential ideal for members of the Latino 
community in the US, both among the second and third generation 
Hispanics as well as more recent immigrants. A recent poll conducted 
by Atlantic Media and Pearson Opportunity and a 2014 survey done 
jointly by the Washington Post and the University of Virginia found that 
Hispanic Americans lead, while compared to other ethnic groups in the 
US, in their support for the basic premise of the American Dream—that 
anyone who works hard still has a fair chance to succeed and live a 
comfortable life (Vasilogambros, 2016; Constable and Clement, 2014). 
The polls suggested that, among Latinos, the confidence in the belief 
of merit-based economic success was most palpable among recent 
immigrants and second generation Latinos who observe economic 
success among their peers and in the generations that follow. However, 
this faith in economic meritocracy and advancement contrasts sharply 
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with the harsh realities of life for many Latinos in the US. For Latinos 
in the US, these realities include incomes and college graduation rates 
well below the national median and the persistence of urban poverty 
in many Latino-majority neighborhoods.
This discrepancy between the economic aspirations and realities 
of Latinos in the US is a theme that has been underexplored in 
the scholarship on contemporary Latino literature. Other themes, 
such as biculturalism, the hybridity of identity, migration, as well 
as cultural assimilation and fusion, have traditionally received more 
attention in academic research and literary criticism about recent 
Latino American narratives (Kevane, 2003). To bring more attention 
to the socioeconomic dimension of these narratives, the purpose of 
this chapter is to analyze the way in which neoliberalism, through 
its embedment in the American Dream, is portrayed and adapted in 
selected examples of contemporary Latino fiction. Two literary works 
that exemplify how perceptions of neoliberalism adapt when viewed 
through the lens of the American Dream are Dreaming in Cuban and 
The House on Mango Street. Both of these novels have received favorable 
critical reviews and, through expanded readership over time, have 
positioned themselves as influential contemporary Latina fiction novels 
(Kevane, 2003). In these novels, Christina Garcia and Sandra Cisneros 
develop themes on how the American Dream and neoliberalism are 
experienced. The literary work of both Latina authors was written in 
and portrays contemporary times in which the effects and implications 
of neoliberalism have been palpable. In addition, these novels capture 
perceptions of neoliberalism that are emblematic of experiences that 
occur among two important subsets of Hispanic populations in the 
US—Cuban Americans and Mexican Americans. The following 
subsections explore the aspirational socio-economic themes and 
propositions developed within these two novels.
Economic dreams in Dreaming in Cuban
First published in 1992, Dreaming in Cuban tells the story of three 
generations of women and their individual responses to the Cuban 
Revolution. The novel has been well received by Latino American 
scholars and helped establish Cristina Garcia as an influential writer 
of the contemporary Cuban American experience (Kevane, 2003; 
Stavans, 2008). The New York Times book review of Dreaming in Cuban 
acknowledged the favorable reception of the book by commending 
the hybridity in language and style evidenced through its narration of 
events happening in the US and Cuba:
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Dreaming in Cuban is beautifully written in language that 
is by turns languid and sensual, curt and surprising. Like 
Louise Erdrich, whose crystalline language is distilled of 
images new to our American literature but old to this land, 
Ms. Garcia has distilled a new tongue from scraps salvaged 
through upheaval … It is the ordinary magic in Ms. Garcia’s 
novel and her characters’ sense of their own lyricism that 
make her work welcome as the latest sign that American 
literature has its own hybrid offspring of the Latin American 
school. (Davis quoted in Garcia, 1992) 
Beyond its appealing hybridity in language and narrative style, the novel 
is uniquely valuable for the purposes of this chapter because its plot 
and central characters offer competing perspectives on socioeconomic 
ideology as well as contrasting interpretations about the value of the 
American Dream.
In a similar fashion to Isabel Allende’s The House of Spirits and Julia 
Alvarez’s How the Garcia Girls Lost Their Accent, Garcia’s Dreaming in 
Cuban narrates the story of a family whose life is transformed by broader 
historical events. The broader historical event in this case is the Cuban 
Revolution. The story, told in the first and third person, is mostly 
presented from the perspective of three strong female characters: Celia 
del Pino (mother of Lourdes), Lourdes Puente (mother of Pilar), and 
Pilar Puente. Celia is a staunch defender and believer of the Cuban 
Revolution, its ideals, and the leadership of Fidel Castro. Celia is 
also suspicious of the selfishness of capitalism and feverishly opposes 
American intervention in Cuba. Lourdes, on the other hand, flees 
Cuba as a result of the revolution, opens a bakery shop in New York, 
and becomes a successful entrepreneur. She believes in the neoliberal, 
free market system, in the opportunity that immigration to America 
brings, and seeks to defend the US from the spread of socialism. Pilar 
is caught in the middle between her mother and her grandmother. She 
becomes a young aspiring artist in the US who is critical of the excesses 
and superficiality embedded in modern capitalism. She continuously 
reminisces about the sayings and memories of her grandmother to 
contrast herself with her mother’s ideals. Pilar goes to Cuba seeking to 
find what she believes is a missing part of herself and her own identity, 
which can only be found with the company of her grandmother, Celia. 
In the end, Pilar discovers on her own the repressiveness of communist 
Cuba. She decides to come back to the US after realizing that her own 
artistic freedom would be compromised in a Cuba where all art and 
cultural expression must serve only the purposes of the revolution.
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Throughout the novel Celia del Pino’s socioeconomic views are 
shaped by conditions prior to the Cuban Revolution. We learn through 
Celia’s letters to Gustavo, a former Spanish lover, of the glaring social 
inequality and misery of the poor in the Cuban countryside prior to 
the Cuban Revolution during the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista 
from 1952 up until his overthrow by the revolution in 1959:
I’d forgotten the poverty of the countryside. From the trains, 
everything is visible: the bare feet, the crooked backs, the 
bad teeth. At one station there was a little girl, about six, 
who wore only a dirty rag that didn’t cover her private 
parts. (Garcia, 1992, p.54)
This passage highlights Celia’s sensitivity to the plight of Cuba’s most 
economically vulnerable populations and her dissatisfaction with Cuba’s 
status quo during the Batista years. In another letter to Gustavo, in 
which Celia reminisces about their time together in Havana, Celia also 
reflects about her perceived failure of the capitalist economy under 
Batista, about the inequality it created, and about the emptiness of the 
materialism embedded in it:
I remember our spring walks through Havana. The destitute 
were everywhere, spread out on the benches in the Parque 
Central, asleep on yesterday’s newspapers. Remember the 
young woman with the dangling wooden leg and the single 
oxford? The beggar families from the countryside looking 
for work in the iron-fenced mansions of Velado? The smart 
couples in their convertible driving by without a second 
glance? … Why is it that most people aspire to little more 
than comfort? (Garcia, 1992, p.98)
As the story progresses, we learn that these views become central to 
Celia’s support for the revolution and Fidel Castro.
The novel skips over the actual battles that occurred during the 
Cuban Revolution and, instead, resumes its plot once Fidel Castro 
has taken over as the new leader of Cuba. The revolution brings new 
hope to Celia as she internalizes many of its promises. In contrast to 
the first part of the novel in which Celia appears trapped in distant 
memories of Gustavo, her Spanish lover prior to her marriage with 
Jorge del Pino, Celia’s life is recharged with the revolution’s aspirations 
and socioeconomic changes brought by the communist takeover: “No 
one is starving or denied medical care, no one sleeps in the streets, 
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and everyone works who wants to work.” (Garcia, 1992, p.117) In 
another passage, Celia adds that the hardest part of the early years of 
the revolution was not the rationing of goods and services but rather 
the need to contain her excitement from her anti-Castro husband Jorge:
Those first years were difficult, not because of the 
hardships or the rationing that Celia knew were necessary 
to redistribute the country’s wealth, but because Celia 
and Javier had to mute their enthusiasm for El Líder. Her 
husband would not tolerate praise of the revolution in his 
home. (Garcia, 1992, p.118)
In these two passages, we also observe Celia’s support for government-
led redistributive economic policies associated with communist and 
democratic socialist governments as the best way reduce poverty 
and misery, in contrast to the trust placed in the efficiency of free 
markets and limited government interference traditionally advocated 
by neoliberalism.
Celia’s support for the revolution gradually grants her a more 
prominent role in the communist regime. Celia becomes a local judge 
presiding over the People’s Court in her local neighborhood and a 
coast guard against foreign invaders and enemies of the revolution:
Three nights per month, too, Celia continues to protect 
her stretch of shore from foreign invaders. She still dresses 
up for these all-night vigils, putting on red lipstick and 
darkening the mole on her cheek, and imagines that El Líder 
is watching her, whispering in her ear with his warm cigar 
breath. She would gladly do anything he asked. (Garcia, 
1992, p.112) 
Celia’s intellectual and emotional attachment to the revolution 
transform her primary social role from being a mother and housewife 
to becoming one of the communist regime’s ideological and physical 
gatekeepers.
The Cuban Revolution has the opposite effect on Celia’s oldest 
daughter, Lourdes. Shortly after the revolution, Lourdes immigrates 
to the US with her husband Rufino and their daughter Pilar. While 
they arrive in Miami, Florida, eventually they relocate to New York 
City. Lourdes is happy to adopt the US as her nation and she sees her 
migration as an opportunity for rebirth and as a chance to prosper in 
America’s market-driven economy:
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Lourdes considers herself lucky. Immigration has redefined 
her, and she is grateful. Unlike her husband, she welcomes 
her adopted language, its possibilities for reinvention … She 
wants no part of Cuba, no part of its wretched carnival floats 
creaking with lies, no part of Cuba at all, which Lourdes 
claims never possessed her. (Garcia, 1992, p.73)
Lourdes’s reinvention through immigration allows her to strive for and 
eventually attain some level of success. She opens her own bakery shop 
called Yankee Doodle in New York and aspires to become a leading 
entrepreneur by franchising it nationwide:
Lourdes ordered custom-made signs for her bakeries in red, 
white, and blue with her name printed at the bottom right-
hand corner: LOURDES PUENTE, PROPRIETOR. 
She particularly liked the sound of the last word, the way 
the ‘r’’s rolled in her mouth, the explosion of the ‘p’’s. 
Lourdes felt a spiritual link to American moguls … She 
envisioned a chain of Yankee Doodle bakeries stretching 
across America to St. Louis, Dallas, Los Angeles, her apple 
pies and cupcakes on main streets in suburban shopping 
malls everywhere. (Garcia, 1992, pp.170–71).
Lourdes exemplifies the ethos of the American Dream, as described by 
Thomas Wolfe in the introduction to this chapter, through her pride 
in her business ownership and her relentless pursuit to transform her 
local shop into a major American franchise. Lourdes’s pride in the 
ownership of her business and in her achievement of the American 
Dream is also manifested through the letters and pictures which she 
sends to her mother Celia back in Cuba. However, these letters and 
pictures about the success of her bakery in New York also let her 
mother Celia know of her relentless support for American capitalism:
Lourdes sends her [Celia] snapshots of pastries from her 
bakery in Brooklyn. Each glistening éclair is a grenade 
aimed at Celia’s political beliefs, each strawberry shortcake 
proof—in butter, cream, and eggs—of Lourdes’ success in 
America, and a reminder of the ongoing shortages in Cuba. 
(Garcia, 1992, p.117)
Just as Celia takes on the role of guardianship against the possibility 
of foreign invaders in the Cuban coastlines, her daughter Lourdes 
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assumes the role of protector of American capitalism. Lourdes serves 
the local police department as a community service officer at night 
and is perpetually concerned about the potential communist threat 
against American capitalism. She perceives the media, the universities, 
and the Democratic Party as sources of potential socialist infiltration 
which must be cautiously followed:
Above all, Lourdes and her father continue to denounce 
the Communist threat to America. Every day they grow 
more convinced that the dearth of bad news about Cuba 
is a conspiracy by the leftist media to keep international 
support for El Líder strong. Why can’t the Americans see 
Communists in their own backyards, in their universities, 
bending the malleable minds of the young? The Democrats 
are to blame, the Democrats and those lying, two-timing 
Kennedys. What America needs, Lourdes and her father 
agree, is another Joe McCarthy to set things right again. 
He would never have abandoned them at the Bay of Pigs. 
(Garcia, 1992, p.171)
As observed, Celia and Lourdes represent opposite sides of the spectrum 
in terms of their socioeconomic views. However, it is Lourdes’s 
daughter, Pilar, who is caught in the middle and symbolizes the 
battleground for the ideological soul of the new generations of Hispanic 
Americans. Pilar left Cuba as a very young girl when her mother, 
Lourdes, and her father, Rufino, escape the island and migrate to the 
US. In contrast to her mother, Pilar views Cuba, and in particular the 
company of Grandmother Celia, as an idealized home and as a source 
of inspiration and hope:
I feel much more connected to Abuela Celia than to Mom, 
even though I haven’t seen my grandmother in seventeen 
years. We don’t speak at night anymore, but she’s left me her 
legacy nonetheless—a love for the sea and the smoothness 
of pearls, an appreciation of music and words, sympathy 
for the underdog, and a disregard for boundaries. Even in 
silence, she gives me the confidence to do what I believe 
is right, to trust my own perceptions. (Garcia, 1992, p.176)
Although Pilar is not in direct or frequent contact with her grandmother 
Celia, we learn that Celia’s views are highly influential in the intellectual 
development of Pilar, in her quest to maintain independence from 
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her mother, Lourdes, and in her pursuit to become an artist. Celia’s 
sympathy for the underdog and commitment to social justice lead Pilar 
to question her mother’s faith in the free market as the best allocator 
of wealth and the notion that greed and ambition should be at the 
core of individual aspirations. These doubts along with the desire to be 
reunited with her grandmother in Cuba prevents Pilar from sharing her 
mother’s zeal for material gain and the traditional American Dream.
Nonetheless, Pilar does not fully adopt the socialist worldview of her 
grandmother either. Toward the end of the novel, Pilar finally has a 
chance to travel to Cuba with her mother when they learn about the 
unexpected death of Lourdes’s sister (Pilar’s aunt) Felicia. During her 
stay in Cuba, Pilar is very happy to be reunited with her grandmother 
but learns first-hand about the limited lifestyle of many Cubans under 
communism:
Abuela doesn’t get any hot water at her house. The ocean 
water is warmer than what comes out of her pipes, but I 
am getting used to the cold showers … I have to admit it’s 
much tougher here than I expected, but at least everyone 
seems to have the bare necessities … I wonder how different 
my life would have been if I’d stayed with my grandmother. 
(Garcia, 1992, pp.234–5)
In this quote, while Pilar does admit that everyone seems to have their 
basic needs met, she also acknowledges that life in Cuba is very limited 
economically just as Lourdes, her mother, had always described. Beyond 
the economic limitations, Pilar is also deeply disappointed when she 
learns that art expression is restricted in Castro’s Cuba: “I ask Abuela 
if I can paint whatever I want in Cuba and she says yes, as long as I 
don’t attack the state. Cuba is still developing, she tells me, and can’t 
afford the luxury of dissent.” (Garcia, 1992, p.235) Pilar’s disagreement 
about the government’s restriction on art content in Cuba is palpable 
as she replies: “I wonder what El Líder would think of my paintings. 
Art, I’d tell him, is the ultimate revolution.” (Garcia, 1992, p.235)
Pilar searches for her own identity while in Cuba and quickly realizes 
that she must return to New York despite her fondness for the vibrant 
and inspirational life next to her grandmother, Celia:
I love Havana, its noise and decay and painted ladyness. I 
could happily sit on one of those wrought-iron balconies 
for days or keep my grandmother company on her porch 
… But sooner or later I’d have to return to New York. I 
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know now it’s where I belong—not instead of here, but 
more than here. (Garcia, 1992, p.236)
While Pilar appreciates the simplicity of life in Cuba and the fact that 
the very basic economic necessities are cared for under communism, 
she ultimately returns to the United States because of the economic 
opportunities and political freedoms for aspiring artists such as herself 
granted under American capitalism.
Interpreting the American Dream in The House on 
Mango Street
In The House on Mango Street, Sandra Cisneros explores themes of 
biculturalism, gender roles, socioeconomic status, and the coming of 
age bildungsroman. While these themes have often been discussed as 
they relate to issues of identity, the study of socioeconomic status as it 
relates to neoliberalism is an important area for analysis in the narrator’s, 
Esperanza’s, development of socioeconomic worldviews. Robin Ganz 
describes Sandra Cisneros’ writing as
the sound of many voices speaking—over the kitchen table, 
out on the street, across the borderlands, and through the 
years … she charts new literary territory, marking out a 
landscape that is familiar to many and unfamiliar to many 
more. And yet, resonating with genuineness, testifying to 
the ability of the human spirit to renew itself against all 
odds, Cisneros’ voice carries across and beyond the barriers 
that often divide us. (Ganz, 1994, p.19, p.29)
Cisneros creates a literary space where identity, particularly identity 
experienced when assimilating into another culture, is both dissected 
and developed. There are generational differences in perceptions of 
the immigrant experience, of those who experience migrating to the 
US and the children who were born in the US. The promise of the 
American Dream and the reality of the American Dream factor into 
these multigenerational perceptions and how the neoliberal experience 
is negotiated.
Through the eyes of Esperanza, Cisneros captures not only the 
perceptions of neoliberalism as it is embedded in the American Dream, 
but the effects of those worldviews on each of the characters Esperanza 
encounters while living on Mango Street, including Esperanza herself. 
The American Dream is an inspirational cultural device that drives 
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many of the characters in their motivations and aspirations, but it is 
Esperanza who redefines her identity as she negotiates her own version 
of the American Dream. She does this as she watches the experiences 
of those around her and, rather than following their footsteps and 
repeating their actions, she develops a separate understanding of what 
it means to be self-reliant in an environment where she learns social 
norms expected of her as they relate to both her Hispanic heritage and 
“the American cultural landscape.” (Telgen, 1997, p.113)
In her depiction of Mango Street, Cisneros sheds light on the 
experiences of Hispanics who struggle with the reality of the American 
Dream when it falls short of its promises:
Esperanza’s community serves as a microcosm of Latinos 
in America, and her own identity is interwoven with the 
identity of the neighborhood. People in the barrio relate to 
one another because of a shared past and current experience. 
In “Those Who Don’t,” Esperanza considers the stereotypes 
and fears that whites have of Latinos and vice versa. (Telgen, 
1997, pp.118–19)
In the chapter Diane Telgen describes here, Esperanza realizes how 
perceptions of others impact the ways in which those within her 
community, and without, deal with conceptions of “the other.” 
Esperanza observes,
Those who don’t know any better come into our 
neighbourhood scared. They think we’re dangerous. … 
All brown all around, we are safe. But watch us drive into 
a neighbourhood of another colour and our knees go 
shakity-shake and our car windows get rolled up tight and 
our eyes look straight. Yeah. That is how it goes and goes. 
(Cisneros, 2009, p.28)
In this moment Esperanza sees the stereotypes through which Latinos 
are perceived by those outside their community, but also the way 
Latinos within the community perceive those “others” outside their 
community: through fear of the unknown, fear of those who might take 
away the dream of a better life, and envy for those who have it. This 
fear is significant as it relates to a neoliberal narrative that emphasizes 
self-reliance and personal responsibility because
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the formation of social character is an inherently 
psychosocial process, in which the “push” of material 
conditions and the “pull” of political ideas and ideologies are 
mediated by the fears, anxieties, and needs which condition 
and determine the affective charge of political and social 
beliefs. (Foster, 2017, p.3)
The fears and anxieties Esperanza describes are indicative of how those 
fears can impact the actions of individuals within her community, and 
perceptions of those outside her community, as they create political 
and social barriers that inhibit upward mobility. These fears lead 
to stereotypes that cast individuals, like those on Mango Street (as 
Esperanza witnesses), into socially defined molds that are difficult to 
escape.
Sandra Cisneros captures one such stereotypical perception, the 
migrant worker, in the chapter titled, “Geraldo No Last Name.” In 
this chapter Esperanza describes a man her cousin, Marin, met at a 
dance, who becomes a nameless, faceless victim of a hit-and-run car 
accident. The man Marin met has no known address and no known 
last name, and no way to discern these things because he does not 
carry any form of legal identification. Esperanza observes:
Only Marin can’t explain why it mattered, the hours and 
hours, for somebody she didn’t even know. The hospital 
emergency room. Nobody but an intern working all alone. 
And maybe if the surgeon would have come, maybe if he 
hadn’t lost so much blood, if the surgeon had only come, 
they would know who to notify and where. But what 
difference does it make? … Just another brazer who didn’t 
speak English. Just another wetback. You know the kind. 
The ones who always look ashamed. … What does it 
matter? They never saw the kitchenettes. They never knew 
about the two-room flats and sleeping rooms he rented, the 
weekly money orders sent home, the currency exchange. 
How could they? His name was Geraldo. And his home is 
in another country. The ones he left behind are far away, 
will wonder, shrug, remember. Geraldo—he went north 
… we never heard from him again. (Cisneros, 2009, p.66)
This man represents the ugly side of capitalism, the faceless, nameless 
migrant worker whose cheap labor we are happy to have, yet do not 
care enough to save when he needs medical attention. Cisneros gives 
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a voice to this man, to this experience, and brings the reality of the 
neoliberal narrative about the free mobility of labor and capital to 
light. The neoliberal narrative provides an opening to migrate to the 
US and the American Dream promises economic opportunity and 
upward mobility. However, as Cisneros demonstrates in the experience 
of Geraldo, the reality of that dream through the neoliberal narrative 
is quite different.
In addition to bringing to the foreground the experiences of migrant 
workers, aspiration for economic independence and freedom is a 
theme that pervades the novel in the experiences of other characters, 
such as Alicia and Esperanza’s mother, as well as Esperanza herself. 
In the chapter “Alicia Who Sees Mice,” Alicia struggles with the 
responsibilities of her home where
a woman’s place is sleeping so she can wake up early with 
the tortilla star … Alicia, who inherited her mama’s rolling 
pin and sleepiness, is young and smart and studies for the 
first time at the university. Two trains and a bus, because she 
doesn’t want to spend her whole life in a factory or behind 
a rolling pin. Is a good girl, my friend, studies all night and 
sees the mice, the ones her father says do not exist. Is afraid 
of nothing except four-legged fur. And fathers. (Cisneros, 
2009, pp.31–2)
The expectations placed on Alicia by her father, who represents 
the patriarchal dominance that saturates her culture, clash with the 
opportunities attending an American university offer. Esperanza calls 
Alicia a “good girl” and “my friend” and admires Alicia’s strength as 
she perseveres in her struggle to change her economic conditions. 
Alicia’s fears, her determination, and her perseverance all contribute 
to shaping her social character. Esperanza acknowledges Alicia’s fears 
of being trapped in a room, “behind a rolling pin,” a traditional task 
for women in her culture, but in the American cultural landscape, this 
tradition becomes deficient. Alicia fearfully defies the cultural norms 
placed on her by her father and embraces the neoliberal edicts for self-
reliance as she strives to place herself into a position where she has the 
independence to choose her economic condition through hard work. 
This example illustrates the optimism inherent in those seeking to 
fulfill the promises within the American Dream, and through Alicia, 
Esperanza is able to see both the potential to fulfill such desires for 
higher socioeconomic status and the struggle to do so when attempting 
to adopt a new cultural narrative in the US.
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Esperanza’s mother expresses similar views in the chapter, “A Smart 
Cookie”:
I could’ve been somebody, you know? … Shame is a bad 
thing, you know. It keeps you down. You want to know 
why I quit school? Because I didn’t have nice clothes. No 
clothes, but I had brains. Yup, she says disgusted, stirring 
again. I was a smart cookie then. (Cisneros, 2009, p.91)
Esperanza’s mother describes how her insecurities, her fears of 
how she would be perceived by others according to her economic 
status, prevented her from pursuing educational opportunities. The 
connection between prejudice and socioeconomic status is not 
uncommon in these populations:
Historically, Mexican American men and women have 
suffered negative stereotyping and prejudices that prevented 
them from securing desirable jobs and being upwardly 
mobile within the society. Therefore, many remain 
concentrated in low-income neighborhoods like the one 
portrayed in The House on Mango Street. Poverty is a reality 
faced by many Mexican American populations living in 
the United States. (Telgen, 1997, p.122)
The insecurities Esperanza’s mother relates in this chapter are an 
example of the very real circumstances of poverty that exist in 
neighborhoods like Mango Street, as well as the negative stereotyping 
that makes educational and economic opportunities seem impossible. 
The experiences of Alicia and Esperanza’s mother illustrate the ways 
in which Hispanic immigrants have had to adapt their worldviews 
toward socioeconomic independence to meet the demands of reality 
in low-income neighborhoods.
The choice Cisneros makes to tell this story through the eyes of 
a young girl still developing her own identity is significant because 
she creates a voice that encompasses the many voices of those 
around her. Esperanza observes the experiences of the women in her 
neighborhood, of her parents, friends, and neighbors, and creates 
her own interpretation of self-reliance and freedom. Janet Sarbanes 
recognizes the significance of Esperanza’s character as narrator:
By making the narrator of her novel a preadolescent girl, 
Cisneros represents Mango Street from the point of view of 
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someone who is not yet placed, not yet put into position. 
Esperanza’s is a voice that can question, a voice of hope 
(Esperanza), a voice of transition. She is not inside the house 
looking out, like many of the other girls and women, nor 
is she outside the community looking in with strange eyes, 
like the nuns. Often she is out in the street, looking in at 
the other women—observing, analysing, evaluating their 
situation. (Sarbanes, 1997, p.125)
Cisneros creates this narrator, a young girl, who can witness the 
experiences others have faced as they struggle with the realities of 
poverty, stereotypes, and lost identity in an environment that promised 
to provide economic success, the US. Esperanza watches as those 
around her adapt that narrative and their perceptions of the American 
Dream, and she develops her own worldview as she finds her voice. 
She wants more than the poverty-stricken reality she has seen her 
parents face.
They always told us that one day we would move into a 
house, a real house that would be ours for always so we 
wouldn’t have to move each year. And our house would 
have running water and pipes that worked. And inside it 
would have real stairs, not hallway stairs, but stairs inside 
like the houses on T.V. (Cisneros, 2009, p.4)
Esperanza associates her home with economic success and yearns for 
a space that will not fill her with shame because it does not meet the 
expectations that American television shows promote. Her parents 
use the lottery as another source of hope for achieving that economic 
prosperity:
I want a house on a hill like the ones with the gardens 
where Papa works. … I don’t tell them I am ashamed—all 
of us staring out the window like the hungry. I am tired of 
looking at what we can’t have. When we win the lottery 
… Mama begins, and then I stop listening. (Cisneros, 
2009, p.86)
For Esperanza, all the dreaming about things they do not have, the 
hope held out for the slim chance of winning a future and home that 
fits the image promised by the American Dream, is unrealistic. She 
only sees the house they have and the place that never adheres to that 
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dream. So, she imagines a house of her own where she can help those 
in need, those “without”:
People who live on hills sleep so close to the stars they 
forget those of us who live too much on earth. They don’t 
look down at all except to be content to live on hills. They 
have nothing to do with last week’s garbage or fear of rats. 
Night comes. Nothing wakes them but the wind. One day 
I’ll own my own house, but I won’t forget who I am or 
where I came from. Passing bums will ask, Can I come in? 
I’ll offer them the attic, ask them to stay, because I know 
how it is to be without a house. (Cisneros, 2009, p.86)
Esperanza refuses to accept the American Dream as it exists in the 
minds of her parents. Her own dream incorporates the realities she 
has experienced in the barrio on Mango Street, and, like Cisneros, 
she seeks to provide a safe space to those who suffer the same reality.
The independence Esperanza grows into makes her feel disconnected 
from her home and ashamed of it, but it allows her to assert a power 
that offers her a greater sense of freedom. She says:
In the movies there is always one with red red lips who is 
beautiful and cruel. She is the one who drives the men crazy 
and laughs them all away. Her power is her own. She will 
not give it away. I have begun my own quiet war. Simple. 
Sure. I am one who leaves the table like a man, without 
putting back the chair or picking up the plate. (Cisneros, 
2009, p.89)
Esperanza’s quiet war is a fight against poverty. It is a fight against 
antiquated social norms that no longer endure in an environment 
where capitalism means banging against walls of cultural stereotypes 
ridden with boundaries that restrict movement between cultures and 
above the poverty line.
When Esperanza meets the three sisters, reminiscent to “the Fates 
of Greek mythology, three old crones who know the fate of all human 
beings” (Sarbanes, 1997, p.126), she resists their prediction of her future 
at first because she still feels ashamed for wanting her own space, a home 
of her own, where she can fashion her own dreams. She feels guilty for 
wanting this, as if wanting such independence would mean she had to 
give up Mango Street and thus give up her cultural connections to her 
family and heritage, which she often associates with shame because of 
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their socioeconomic status. This conflict reveals a struggle between 
associating poor economic conditions with the Latino community and 
economic prosperity with American capitalism. In Esperanza’s mind, 
to be able to attain any kind of prosperity must mean severing ties with 
her Latino community. However, the sisters tell her:
When you leave you must remember always to come back 
… When you leave you must remember to come back 
for the others. A circle, understand? You will always be 
Esperanza. You will always be Mango Street. You can’t erase 
what you know. You can’t forget who you are. … You must 
remember to come back. For the ones who cannot leave 
as easily as you. You will remember? She asked as if she 
was telling me. Yes, yes, I said a little confused. (Cisneros, 
2009, p.105)
Esperanza listens but does not quite understand why leaving must also 
mean coming back, why to be Esperanza also means to be Mango 
Street, or how this place has become as much a part of her as her own 
dreams of being free of it. Yet, the sisters also make the point to say she 
must come back for the others, for those “who cannot leave as easily” 
as she will, for those who cannot escape the weight of poverty or the 
negative stereotypes that prevent them from getting the education 
or the desirable job. This is a feeling we have seen Esperanza already 
express as she did with the bums in the attic and her feelings about 
her first job. It is not until the last chapter, “Mango Says Goodbye 
Sometimes,” that Esperanza realizes what the three sisters meant. For 
while Esperanza
may not accept the house on Mango Street as her home—
that is to say, while she may refuse to accept the self that is 
handed to her—she does ultimately accept Mango Street as 
a part of herself. She comes to identify with the street itself, 
that border space which is within the community (within 
Chicano culture). (Sarbanes, 1997, p.126)
Even as Esperanza comes to a new understanding of Mango Street, as 
the space tied to her cultural roots, she also has gained an understanding 
of what it means to have the freedom to leave that space and build an 
identity beyond her roots. Esperanza reveals that this house she has 
come to accept is still:
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the house I belong but do not belong to. I put it down on 
paper and then the ghost does not ache so much. I write 
it down and Mango says goodbye sometimes. She does 
not hold me with both arms. She sets me free. One day I 
will pack my bags of books and paper. One day I will say 
goodbye to Mango. I am too strong for her to keep me here 
forever. One day I will go away. Friends and neighbours 
will say, What happened to that Esperanza? Where did she 
go with all those books and paper? Why did she march so 
far away? They will not know I have gone away to come 
back. For the ones I left behind. For the ones who cannot 
out. (Cisneros, 2009, p.110)
Esperanza comes to understand that she can leave that street and 
embrace the part of the American Dream that offers the freedom to 
forge an identity of her own, and she realizes that through writing 
she can give a voice to those who have none. She recognizes that 
“storytelling, or writing, is one way to create this relationship between 
self and community, to carve out her own place in the world … 
Like Cisneros, Esperanza will free them with her stories” (Sarbanes, 
1997, p.126). This is how she will return for those she leaves behind. 
Esperanza becomes conscious of her own strength, and because of this 
she can leave; because of this she can create change rather than accept a 
fate of marginalization, poverty, and negative stereotypes. She can break 
the cultural barrier and pursue economic upward mobility to better 
her own life, as well as the lives of those on Mango Street. Her ability 
to do this comes from her art, her writing, as it is within storytelling 
where she finds that the greatest freedom exists. She can free herself 
and others and this interpretation of freedom is her adaptation of the 
neoliberal narrative and the American Dream.
Negotiating the American Dream
In both novels, the leading characters, Esperanza and Pilar, embark in 
life journeys in which they not only develop their self-identities but also 
their socioeconomic views and life aspirations. As part of this process, 
both novels are communicating directly to the younger Latino/a 
generation and provide models for them to come to terms with their 
ethnicity and socioeconomic realities. In the case of Esperanza:
[her] journey is deeply rooted in her observations about her 
barrio. They aid her in coming to terms with her identity. 
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Esperanza’s search for her identity and her coming-of-age 
is universal; most readers will be able to identify with the 
feelings that trouble Esperanza—feelings of not belonging, 
of being other, of “the shame of being poor, of being 
female, of being not-quite-good-enough,” as Cisneros 
states in the introduction to the tenth-anniversary edition 
(1993). The answer to these feelings, according to Cisneros, 
is to recover, celebrate, and always remember one’s roots. 
(Kevane, 2003, pp.55–6)
Early in the novel, we see that Esperanza clearly aspires to move out 
of the neighborhood to live in a nice suburban house and to surpass 
her parents’ low socioeconomic level. However, this changes as she 
internalizes the experiences of others in her barrio and she realizes 
that her economic goals do not force her to leave her roots and the 
plight of others with whom she grew up. In this sense, the novel 
presents Esperanza’s negotiated American Dream in which becoming 
a successful Latina writer does not demand forgetting about her 
cultural upbringing and the social issues which inform her writing, 
such as poverty cycles, immigration, and the persistence of gendered 
disadvantages.
In the case of Pilar, her journey differs somewhat from Esperanza in 
that she is the daughter of Cuban exiles who have been able to achieve 
a middle-class standard of living. Her mother, Lourdes, has fervently 
adopted the traditional American Dream narrative. She believes in 
the value of hard work and risk-taking to climb the socioeconomic 
ladder. Hanson and White describe this belief among many Latinos 
who migrate to the US:
Like other race/ethnic groups that immigrated to the 
United States, there is considerable evidence that Latino/as 
believe in the American Dream and its promise of upward 
social mobility … Like earlier immigrant groups, they 
place high value on education, working hard, and success 
in careers. (Hanson and White, 2016, p.11) 
In fact, Lourdes has worked hard to set up her bakery shop that she 
plans on franchising across the country and dreams about being a titan 
in the American pastry industry. In contrast to Esperanza’s experience, 
Pilar’s negotiation with the American Dream involves resistance to 
what she perceives to be the shallowness of her mother’s greed and 
materialism. Instead, during much of the novel, Pilar romanticizes 
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the involvement and support which her grandmother lends to the 
communist regime in Cuba.
While their experiences contrast in many important ways, at the end 
of both novels both Pilar and Esperanza make conscious decisions to 
accept the freedom of opportunities provided by the American Dream 
in their role as creative artists. While both are aware that the American 
Dream has left many people behind, the freedom of artistic expression 
which is granted to them under American capitalism outweighs the 
harsh reality of social inequality. In the case of Pilar, she realizes that, 
despite the coverage of basic needs for the entire population under 
communist Cuba, her art would have to submit to the advancement 
of the revolution. As a result, she decides to return to the US and 
pursue opportunities as a painter who is free to make her own artistic 
choices, which could include criticism of ongoing and cyclical poverty 
traps embedded in the American neoliberal experience. In the case of 
Esperanza, her aspiration to become a professional writer becomes a 
tool to overcome the oppression of poverty and the historical gender 
role of domesticity:
As [Esperanza] develops both a critical and creative 
awareness, she comes to accept her past and, at the same 
time, transform her present. By developing this strength 
of character, Esperanza finds herself able to move beyond 
assigned, contained, and disempowered mental and physical 
ghettoes, and live a meaningful and fulfilling life. (Sloboda, 
2010, p.95)
While both Esperanza and Pilar are aware that American neoliberalism 
has left the American Dream as unattainable for many in the Latino 
American community, they also realize their own potential to achieve 
it through their artistic talents. This contradiction is ultimately resolved 
in the case of both characters through their deliberate choice to 
participate in American capitalism as artists who are socially engaged 
in the cultural and economic advancement of their own communities.
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Bare Life in Contemporary 
Mexico: Everyday Violence and 
Folk Saints
Jungwon Park
Necropolitics and homo sacer
The postcolonial critic Achille Mbembe offers “necropolitics” as a 
corrective complement to Michel Foucault’s broadly known idea of 
“biopolitics.” Foucault underlines that modern liberal governments have 
moved away from controlling the population through the imminent 
threat of death to use subtler disciplinary techniques to achieve the 
(un)conscious subjugation of the subject and its body. The validity of 
the influence of bio-power rests with the constant reproduction of 
living subjects. However, Mbembe points out that biopolitics is not 
sufficient for explaining how the work of death continues to prevail as 
a technique of governance in the contemporary politics and everyday 
life.1 His arguments lie in that the sovereign, whose role is to defend 
society from potential threats, is still given the power to determine who 
may live and who must die. Thus, the relationship between politics and 
death is essential to understanding “how the state has emerged through 
its reproduction of death and to examine consequent transformations 
in the meaning and representation of death in everyday life for its 
citizens” (Mbembe, 2003, p.16).
To demonstrate the presence of necro-power, Mbembe, unlike 
Foucault’s reliance on Western European cases, draws examples from 
the more politically volatile state of peripheral regions and countries. 
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For instance, in many African states, the political economy of statehood 
has changed drastically over the past few decades. Governments have 
failed to maintain the economic underpinning for political authority 
and order, and in turn have been forced to forfeit their monopoly on 
violence and control over death. Therefore, “other armed forces such 
as urban military, armies of regional lords and private armies all claim 
the right to exercise violence to kill” (Mbembe, 2003, p.26). These 
armed powers share a complicated relationship with the state, at times 
usurping control and undermining state power and at others allying 
with it to eliminate competing armed groups. Rather than writing 
this situation off as a simple “failure of the state,” Mbembe claims that 
this is a form of war in which survival of the fittest governs any and 
all human action, leading to an incessant chain of violence and terror.
According to political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, in such chaotic 
situations, the sovereign power is summoned again to intervene and 
resolve the crisis. The government transforms itself into a war machine 
by proclaiming a “state of exception,” in which constitutional laws are 
superseded to restore the status quo, and military power is mobilized 
and all violence pardoned. Agamben states that homo sacer is reborn in 
this paradoxical circumstance. In ancient Roman law, homo sacer is an 
“accused man” expelled from his own community and deprived of all 
rights and functions, and hence can be killed without the killer being 
punished as a murderer; yet he is still a “sacred man,” in that his life 
maintains sanctity that prevents him from being sacrificed in a ritual 
ceremony (Agamben, 1998, p.27). In this fashion, homo sacer becomes 
a modern-day symbol of subjects who are unprotected in the everyday, 
such as criminals, outlaws, and illegal immigrants, yet are exposed to 
all types of violence in war-like circumstances. The life of homo sacer 
is disposable and replaceable for the sake of society, and their existence 
is tantamount to the “living dead,” whose value as a human being is 
denied and is ultimately destined to die under precarious conditions.
Necropolitics extends itself to other parts of the globe, to 
contemporary Mexico. Melissa W. Wright contemplates the relevance 
of necro-power at the turn of the 21st century by examining the 
infamous femicide that took place in Ciudad Juárez, one of the 
largest border cities of Northern Mexico. The corpses of more than 
300 women who were sexually abused, brutally murdered, then 
dumped across the city not only shows that the local police and federal 
government were unable or unwilling to find the perpetrators, but 
also serves as a visual reminder of imminent danger, justifying unlawful 
government actions taken under the pretense of protecting the lives of 
citizens and residents (Wright, 2011, p.709). However, the violence 
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did not end here. Followed by this tragic chain of female deaths on the 
US–Mexico border, Mexico became the hotspot for unprecedented 
drug violence that made a larger part of its territory a bloody and 
chaotic battleground, and for this very reason, put the entire population 
into a state of panic and fear of death.
Mexican war on drugs
It is well known that the neoliberal economic reforms launched in 
the late 1980s and driven by the administration of Carlos Salinas 
brought dramatic changes in Mexican society. Both positive and 
negative impacts of the reforms are manifested in the aftermath of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994), a symbol of 
globalization and an embracing of the open market. While it brought 
industrialization and relative economic prosperity in the country’s 
northern border region adjacent to the US, NAFTA caused a critical 
impact on the national economy, desecrating rural areas and those of 
lower socioeconomic classes. Consequently, those impacted sought 
to escape their economic predicament in two ways: on the one hand, 
there was a large-scale exodus from rural areas to the northern border 
cities to find work, with many seeking jobs in Maquiladora factories. 
Others went even further by crossing the border and trying to start a 
new life for themselves in the US.
Alongside the massive migration to the north, on the other hand, 
the rapidly growing informal economy has been one of the striking 
results from the neoliberal transformation, in which state intervention 
in the market was reduced to prioritize the national security and 
safety of citizens. Anthropologist Keith Hart coins the term “informal 
economy” while studying emerging urban labor markets in Africa. 
He distinguishes self-employment and small-scale entrepreneurial 
activities including small traders, peddlers, hawkers, street vendors and 
others with no fixed location from waged employment in large firms 
or government agencies. The former activities are referred to as the 
“informal economy” as opposed to the “formal economy” because these 
activities are unregistered and unregulated, and hence operate without 
paying taxes. Robert Neuwirth (2011, p.18) notes that, according to 
the OECD’s 2000 report, half of the workers in the world—close to 
1.8 billion people—work in the informal sector. In many developing 
countries, the informal economy is growing faster than any other part 
of the economy and is a rising force in world trade. During the most 
recent financial crisis and neoliberal transformation, desperate workers 
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in Latin American countries turned to the informal sector in the hopes 
of escaping their destitute conditions.
The informal economy encompasses another business world that 
exists in the criminal underground. The clandestine cartels that traffic 
human organs, drugs, and armed weaponry also operate outside the law. 
They are commonly referred to as the black market or shadow economy 
because these illegal activities are well known to legal authorities and 
chased down by law enforcement. Moreover, this informal sector is the 
target of moral stigma and condemnation. Historically, drug trafficking 
has been one of the largest informal sectors in the Latin American 
economy. Colombia established itself as the hub of the international 
drug industry in the 1980s, supplying narcotic commodities to the 
world, particularly the US—in 1982, 79% of marijuana and 75% of 
cocaine consumed in the US originated from or was processed in 
Colombia (Villar and Cottle, 2011, p.45). Colombia became the target 
for Washington, with the CIA partnering with anti-drug organizations 
to halt the flow of cocaine into the US. For over a decade, the U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was centrally involved in the 
drug wars in Colombia and after the death of Pablo Escobar, legendary 
drug lord, there was a gradual decline in Colombian drug production 
and a decrease in the number of active cartels.
When drug cultivation and manufacturing is pushed out of one 
country it inevitably pops up in another. This so-called “balloon effect” 
shows that as long as there is a market for illicit drugs, production will 
shift to another country or region to meet demand. Colombia began 
to hand over its central position to Mexico, which as one of the main 
entry points to the US, also has had a long history of drug trafficking. 
Local and small-scaled production that formed around the Pacific 
region in the early 20th century transformed into a transnationally 
industrialized business due to US demand for medical marijuana during 
World War II, and since then drug trafficking cartels and organizations 
have expanded to all over the country.
The geopolitical transition of power in the continental drug 
industry alongside the social implications of the free market economy 
implemented by NAFTA reshaped and expanded the narcoeconomy. 
Drug cartels bought bankrupted farms at cheap prices and increased 
the cultivation of poppy and marijuana on lands that used to grow 
corn, bean, and other staple crops. The unemployed found dangerous 
but “well-paying, steady jobs in the recession-proof drug trade 
as farmers, drug couriers, truck drivers, chemists, street sellers, 
informants, sicarios (hired killers), and armed security guards” (Grillo, 
2011, p.56). The election of Vicente Fox in 2000, which broke the 
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Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)’s 71-year hold on power, led 
to the transition of political power and a reorganization of federal 
and state police and political institutions. This effectively ended the 
PRI’s domination and control of the drug trade by dismantling the 
plaza system.2 The failure to impose a structure and order to the 
drug trade by the new administration created a power vacuum that 
was quickly filled by cartels who wanted to act more independently. 
They attempted to negotiate or even intimidate local authorities into 
ensuring the safe transportation of their drug products. The fight for 
control of the international drug market and various transit routes led 
to bloody competition among cartels and an outbreak of violence in 
Mexican society at large. In the meantime, an estimated 77% of cocaine 
in the US traveled through Mexico in the mid-2000s. US officials 
expressed concerns that a “narco state” was emerging in Mexico, as 
both a parallel to the official state and as the de facto force behind the 
official government (Economist, 2009).3
Violence in Mexico only intensified during the presidency of Felipe 
Calderón, Fox’s successor, whose legitimacy was disputed from the 
beginning due to suspicion of election fraud. To avoid people’s attention 
and to firmly establish the legitimacy of his role as commander-in-
chief, one of Calderón’s first endeavors in office was declaring a war 
on drugs. In 2007, the government deployed hundreds of thousands 
of troops to the major sites of drug-related crime such as Tijuana, 
Ciudad Juárez, Michoacán, and Acapulco, which were rumored to 
be occupied by drug-related organizations. However, this militant 
strategy only fueled further violence: on the one hand, the government 
faced heavy opposition from the cartels that did not want to lose their 
clout over the illicit market to local or federal authorities, who in fact 
were as complicit in the illegal drug trade as the cartels. While still 
fighting each other, the drug cartels fought back against local police 
and the federal army to thwart government intervention. Moreover, 
the Mexican military, which has an extensive record of human rights 
violations, rampantly attacked civilians suspected of being accomplices 
to cartel activity. Far from reducing violence and cleansing society of 
crime, Mexico’s war on drugs resulted in a dramatic surge of murder, 
torture, and other appalling abuses, which only exacerbated the 
climate of lawlessness in Mexico (García, 2016). This “war” has not 
been contained to a battle between and among the government and 
criminal organizations but has spread to terrorize civil society with 
unending violence and ever-growing casualties.
Accordingly, the tragic consequence of narcoviolence was the 
construction of the “fear system.” Social activists, intellectuals, and 
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journalists expressed their concerns and anxieties as they sought to 
uncover the truth behind official discourses. Mexico became one of 
the most dangerous places in the world for media workers and activists 
were under the constant threat of death and mysterious disappearances 
(Grillo, 2011, p.287). What was at stake was the freedom of speech. 
The widespread censorship of crime and corruption-related stories 
contributed to the difficulty of estimating the exact numbers killed and 
those who have murdered and maimed with impunity. Mexican society 
was trained to be silent and to turn a blind eye as fear of violence and 
terror grew. Yet, an increasing subset of people continued to confront 
government action and tried to make their voices heard. Movement for 
Peace with Justice and Dignity was one of these efforts. The Movement 
began in 2011, when the poet Javier Sicilla, whose 24-year-old son 
was murdered by alleged drug traffickers, called for social action from 
all citizens of Mexico to push for a stop to the mafia bloodshed and 
for new anticrime strategies and reforms. He organized a march from 
his hometown, Cuernavaca, to Mexico City. The ranks of the rallies 
quickly grew from hundreds to hundreds of thousands, culminating in 
a caravan march through a dozen cities, where family members held 
up pictures of victims of the drug war, asking for open dialogue and 
investigation among all the members of Mexican society.
Folk saints tradition in Mexico
While trying to break the silence in the public sphere, Mexican society 
also looked to religion to cope with this overwhelming situation. In 
fact, despite appearing anachronistic, religious practices have always 
remained a part of even secularized modern life. With the sweep of 
globalization bringing unprecedented vulnerability and uncertainty to 
societies, it is not surprising to see the return of religion as a powerful 
transnational phenomenon. From the colonial period to the present, 
the Roman Catholic Church has had a strong presence in Mexico, 
serving as the de facto official religious institution by intervening in 
the political system and dictating social values. At the same time, the 
Church offered a unique space of consolation and protection for those 
who were persecuted and those whose problems seemed impossible 
to solve in a failing system. Many, if not most, Mexicans pray for 
compassion and forgiveness to the Virgin Guadalupe, who historically 
acts as a symbol for Mexican Catholicism, simultaneously embodying 
national Mexican identity and acting as a defender of the Catholic faith.
Alongside its unique devotion to the Virgin Guadalupe, Mexican 
Catholicism has a long and rich history of revering folk saints. Paul J. 
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Vanderwood explains the appearance of laic saints such as Teresa Urrea, 
Niño Fidencia, and San Judas Tadeo and their popularity in terms of 
intimacy and identification. Folk saints offer an affective connection 
to their devotees—God is glorious and eternal but alien, while folk 
saints are mortals in contact with life and death just like human beings. 
They are worshiped not for being divine but more for being equals to 
us—they are compassionate and mysterious, yet at times flawed and 
imperfect, and unpredictable (Vanderwood, 2004, p.208). The degree 
of affinity that people feel toward these folk saints can also be attributed 
to the perceived lack of care and attention from the government and 
the official church. The cult of folk saints is mainly created and spread 
among those who are excluded by mainstream society. Hence, laic 
saints are far from a sign of stunted development or backwardness. They 
function rather as an inherent and unique part of modern religiosity that 
often reveal the poor’s dissatisfaction with the dogma of Catholicism 
and institutionalized religion (Graziano, 2006, p.11).
As drug violence worsened and fear grew, we see the emergence 
of new folk saints and an upsurge in their following. Jesús Malverde 
and Santa Muerte (Saint Death or Holy Death in English) stand 
out among others as the emblematic figures who bear witness to 
the transformation of Mexican society and underscore the unique 
condition of their followers. They are not accepted by the Catholic 
Church and even rejected within religious communities. Their names 
function as a type of taboo and their devotees are morally condemned 
due to their supposed association with narcomundo (the drug world) 
and crime. Despite being labeled as the non-approved patron saints 
of drug traffickers or prisoners, their cult followings seem to revel in 
this uncomfortable and conflicting image by drawing further public 
attention and provoking controversy in civil society. Could we consider 
these figures as contemporary, alternative versions of the folk saint 
tradition that draws attention to the unjustness and exclusivity of 
the official system? Do they effectively represent the intimate desires 
of those whose lives were made destitute through the lawlessness 
that pervades Mexican society? Or are they yet another example of 
deviant occult practices of Western esotericism that have developed as 
a pathological symptom of the ever precarious 21st century?
Jesús Malverde
The spiritual universe of Malverde has crossed various borders, 
elevating his status to that of a transnational legend associated with 
both narcotrafficking and migration to the US. The mythical saga 
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of Malverde goes back to the turn of the 20th century.4 According 
to the stories in True Tales of Another Mexico (Quinones, 2001), Folk 
Saints of the Borderlands: Victims, Bandits, and Healers (Griffith, 2003) 
and Jesús Malverde: El Santo Popular de Sinaloa (Esquivel, 2009), Jesús 
Malverde was born in the state of Sinaloa around 1870. He lost both 
parents to starvation as a child and took odd jobs in construction and 
the railroads before eventually becoming an outlaw, hiding in the 
mountains. He is remembered as the Mexican Robin Hood, who 
stole from the rich and divided the booty among the needy. Despite 
his fame, he was betrayed by one of his comrades and finally arrested 
and executed by the governor of Sinaloa. It is said that the governor 
ordered that his head be hung from a tree as a warning to his followers 
and forbade the burial of his body. After his death, he became a figure 
of worship among the working class in conflict with state power, with 
his followers conferring the name “Jesús” in the Christian tradition to 
celebrate his martyrdom.
The social injustices that took place before the Mexican Revolution 
allowed Malverde to find his niche within folk religiosity for those who 
looked to the bandit-saint for unclaimed justice. José Genis explains 
this connection with the concept of compadrazgo (godparenthood). In 
addition to compadrazgo being associated with the Catholic tradition 
of having patron saints, compadrazgo also serves as a basis to structure 
“myths about apocryphal saints of folk religion, saints that are not 
accepted by the Church but that popularly receive a special cult” (Genis, 
2003, p.81). The idea of Malverde as being like us brings him down to 
an earthly plane, facilitating social relations among those who identify 
with him. In this sense, devotees who are not favored by the official 
system and may even engage in criminal acts can share in Malverde’s 
mythical condition and feel a sense of affinity. Thus, a social bandit is 
reborn as a religious figure.
The figure of Malverde as a folk saint has evolved further since 
the 1980s, taking on the title of “narco-saint,” who offers special 
protection to those who are involved in the drug business. As the 
informal sector gained power, his name has become more popular and 
influential throughout the northern part of Mexico, spreading to the 
other side of the border to encompass the territory impacted by the 
transnational drug trade. Nowadays, we can find shrines of Malverde 
not only in Sinaloa and Tijuana, but in Los Angeles, California and 
Cali, Colombia (Sada, 2000, p.7). His current international character 
distances Malverde from saints like the Virgin Guadalupe who have 
already been institutionalized within the Mexican religious tradition, 
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causing controversy and criticism as the leaders of cartels try to identify 
with Malverde to assume the image of generous bandit and local hero.
However, Sam Quinones points out that the media has overemphasized 
Malverde’s character as narco’s patron saint. Although it is undeniable 
that he is venerated by drug-traffickers, not all his devotees are linked 
to the drug industry. The cult of Malverde has been uprooted and 
rewritten to reflect the upheaval of the local population of Sinaloa 
(Quinones, 2001, p.230).5 The continental drug trade has led to the 
transformation of this peripheral region into one of the central hubs 
for illicit business. Sinaloa was the cradle of opium cultivation in 
the early 20th century, but demand from the US for its medical use 
during World War II transformed Sinaloa into a strategic point for the 
production and transport of drugs. Consequently, the regional economy 
was reorganized around this illegal business, and local farmers gradually 
adapted to this transnational current and established a powerful cartel 
that administrated the drug market in northwestern Mexico.
Ironically, the development of the drug business clearly stems from 
a stealthy transnational economic project implemented by the official 
order, despite prohibitionist anti-drug policies. Hence the drug business 
in Sinaloa is destined to have a complex and conflicting relationship 
with legality (Astorga, 1996, p.20). For Sinaloa and its residents, this 
condition is perceived as “original sin” that has cast this region under 
the shadows and made it difficult for residents to live within the legal 
system and appeal to it when necessary. Despite corrupt authorities 
including federal government and local police being furtively complicit 
in drug trafficking, association with the drug industry is still heavily 
stigmatized. Those involved benefit economically but at the same time 
are trapped in the wave of violence that accompanies the transnational 
drug industry, which has constructed a landscape of bloody competition 
among the cartels as well as increasing tension with the law. No man 
emerges from this battleground unscathed, from low-level gomeros 
(growers) and minor traffickers to powerful kingpins. In fact, no resident 
of Sinaloa, regardless of their involvement in the drug related business, 
is immune to the threat of assault, kidnapping, and assassination that 
has overshadowed the region.
Life in Sinaloa does not follow any “natural” logic but is driven by 
the logic of the “war on drugs.” The savage battles for control and 
dominance over the illicit market, unpredictable but ubiquitous, have 
entangled the region in a web of chaos, terror, and casualties. This 
situation, unlike a real war, is particularly tragic due to the indiscriminate 
violence that constantly interrupts the daily life of citizens. Sinaloa is 
the privileged place of narcotrafficking within the national and global 
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context and this everyday war consolidates a culture of death (Gómez 
Michel and Park, 2014, p.209). As a local symbol, Malverde represents 
the prevailing precariousness of the region. He is appropriated as the 
religious icon in the process of reconciling this region’s “original sin.” 
People of Sinaloa share with him the fate of living outside the law and 
staying in the margins of Mexican society. They plead for salvation that 
can only come from a supernatural and divine force and, to receive a 
saint’s grace, healing, and protection, they strategically grant Malverde 
patron-sainthood, the role of mediator between the heaven and earth. 
Their devotion to Malverde is connected to a communal strategy that 
attempts to evade imminent and premature death.
It is worth clarifying that even though devotional veneration to 
Malverde is a part of “narcoculture,” Malverde is not a saint exclusively 
to drug traffickers. Since the protective function of Malverde lies at 
the heart of his cult following, his cultural influence is extended to 
the regions and communities across the continent entrenched in the 
booming informal economy and drug-related violence. In this way, 
this local saint acquires transnational resonance and draws a new 
spiritual map of folk religiosity. Malverde performs the dual function 
of maintaining ties to the Christian tradition while also embracing a 
range of elements that lie outside of Catholic dogma (Creechan and 
Herrán-García, 2005, p.8). This strange interweavement of criminality 
and religiosity in his portrayal embodies the people’s desire to call 
for care of and attention to the marginalized. The cult of Malverde 
thus attempts to compensate for the ignorance and neglect of official 
institutions. Among his devotees, Malverde has become an integral 
complementary figure to the Catholic Church, reshaping the religious 
landscape of Mexico and beyond.
La Santa Muerte
While the transformation of Jesús Malverde as a folk saint tells the local 
history of the birth of the drug world and a cry for public attention 
throughout the 20th century, Santa Muerte is a relatively new unofficial 
saint. The very name Santa Muerte, which means “Holy Death” in 
Spanish, explains much about her identity.6 Santa Muerte is depicted 
as a skeleton female figure clad in a long robe, holding a scythe and a 
globe like the grim reaper. The color of her clothes and the flowers, 
candles, and other accessories that adorn the icon vary widely from 
devotee to devotee and according to the region. Her origin can be 
traced to the 20th century, with Oscar Lewis’ classic of Mexican 
anthropology, The Children of Sánchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family, 
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being the first to mention her worshipers (1961, p.306). However, from 
the beginning of the 21st century, the clandestine status of La Santa 
Muerte has quickly evolved. Santa Muerte had her public debut when 
homemaker turned religious crusader Enriqueta Romero initiated a 
large shrine for her in the street of her Tepito neighborhood, known 
to be the informal market for illegal trade and drug trafficking (Villamil 
Uriarte and Cisneros, 2011, p.35). Santa Muerte became even more 
famous through a massive public street ceremony in Mexico City and 
has now reached an unprecedented popularity and following. Although 
condemned and sanctioned by mainstream churches, it is estimated 
that Santa Muerte currently has millions of worshipers in Mexico, 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and the southwestern US.
Interestingly, this saint addresses in her celebrated name a direct 
connection with death. In The Idea of Death in Mexico, anthropologist 
Claudio Lomnitz explores Mexicans’ changing perceptions of death 
and the afterlife from the Spanish Conquest to modern day. Interwoven 
with the religious cultures of Catholicism and indigenous worldviews,7 
the notion of death has been deliberately designed by those in power 
to effectively govern and subjugate the poor, who are trained to accept 
and even embrace their vulnerable condition that lies close to death 
(Lomnitz, 2005, p.83). El día de los muertos (The day of the dead) is 
one of the examples in which Mexicans intertwine life and death and 
intermingle with the dead in their everyday life. Lomnitz views death 
as a national totem in Mexico. From this perspective, he argues that 
the cult of Santa Muerte is a contemporary resurgence of this close 
relationship with death—however, unlike the past, it highlights the 
complete disappearance of the role of the state as the defender of the 
population. Instead what has emerged is the idea of the neoliberal 
penal state. Loic Wacquant (2009, p.8) argues the global trend of “zero 
tolerance” on crime—including smuggling, piracy, drug dealing and 
minor delinquency—emphasizes punishing the misconduct of the 
disposed concentrated in marginalized neighborhoods, while reducing 
assistance to the poor. He notes that Mexico City is no exception. 
Police officers routinely inspect passers-by; street vendors have been 
forced out through frequent raids on informal markets. Bars and 
nightclubs have sprung up rampantly in the more notorious areas 
around the historic center as well as in the outdoor markets. The 
result of massive crackdowns by the government to address the general 
public’s perception of escalating crime rates has been an increase in 
the prison population.
It is therefore no coincidence that those in marginalized sectors seek 
care and protection that they cannot find in the official system. Santa 
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Muerte was reborn in the context of insecurity, anxiety, and state 
violence. She was first adopted by the prisoners as their patron saint, and 
her following expanded throughout prisons including prison officers 
and police. She serves as the bridge between prison-torn families by 
connecting prisoners with their family outside, who pray to her for 
their imprisoned family member’s health and safety. For this reason, 
she is considered by the worshipers as a family member. It is not 
difficult to find the shrines to this skeleton saint in the streets of Mexico 
City’s Tepito area. Her devotees also set private altars in their home 
adorned with candles and colorful flowers around her icon to foster an 
even more intimate relationship with her. Santa Muerte has a special 
association with prisoners and their families, yet this skeleton saint 
has taken on other important roles as she has gained more popularity 
among the urban poor. She acts as a supernatural healer, love doctor, 
money-maker, and angel of death. This flexibility of her powers reflects 
her detachment from the official circuits of the State and Catholic 
Church—she is only subject to individual needs (Oleszkiewicz-Peralba, 
2015, p.106). Santa Muerte is an embodiment of the variety of dreams, 
hopes, and demands from those of low socioeconomic class spanning 
the urban poor, immigrants, blue-collar workers, and minority races.
Considering that most prisoners are males, it is also significant to 
note that the death saint appears as a female figure. Worshipers call her 
mother (madrecita) and godmother (conmadre), among others, but also 
baby girl (nena) and sister (hermana and manita), which is popularly used 
in Mexico to address one’s youngest sister. As a result, Santa Muerte is 
not limited to a singular character and her familial position is not fixed. 
For some worshipers, she becomes a judicial policeman to hinder them 
from crime and foul behavior like drinking, smoking, and negligence. 
In other cases, this saint has a flair for expensive clothes and fine food 
to decorate around her statue and shrine. She is considered benevolent 
and merciful when hearing of her devotee’s fears, anxieties, and sadness. 
Yet some devotees believe she is easily angered and may punish them 
severely if betrayed. Anthropologist Regnar Kristensen points out that 
Santa Muerte takes on a more capricious character than ordinary folk 
saints. Her multiple characters that may appear contradictory embody 
the diverse female roles in the family. Indeed, these characters somewhat 
reflect stereotypes of Mexican women. She is portrayed as a “typical 
temperamental female while also fulfilling the traditional trope of the 
self-sacrificing, silent woman promoted in the notion of marianismo.” 
(Kristensen, 2015, p.558)8
Accordingly, her multiple characters lead to the reproduction of 
ambiguous roles within social relations. As a female member who is 
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humble, merciful, and benevolent, she contributes to the reunification 
of the family by paying attention to other members’ difficulties, 
sharing their emotions and providing them with kinship and comfort. 
If betrayed and neglected, La Santa is transformed into the icon of 
vengeance who is thought to punish the wrong-doers severely without 
tolerance or forgiveness. Her conflicting characters as peaceful but 
violent, an affectionate protector of family but also a potential castigator, 
heroine but potential demon makes her a powerful friend for families. 
Her diabolic energy is taken advantage of by her devotees, who ask 
her for protection and at times plead for her favor to perform black 
spells and seek revenge on their neighbors, competitors, and enemies.
Andrew Chesnut’s study shows that her worshipers use different 
colored candles depending on their request. For example, red candles 
indicate the skeleton saint’s role as love doctor; golden candles refer 
to her role as job finder and angel of economic prosperity; black 
votive candles indicate a desire to harm others. This demonstrates 
the variegated nature of the cult of Santa Muerte. Yet, at the same 
time, Chestnut underscores the fact that the black candle of crime 
and punishment outshines the other colors (Chesnut, 2012, p.187). 
Worshipers not only pray to resolve concrete issues in the family, but 
to curse other people by repeating “death to my enemies,” which 
can lead to an exacerbation of tension and conflict in real life. Since 
her role is not limited to protective work but includes punishment 
and vengeance, Holy Death may also bring negative social effects to 
communities.
In this sense, Santa Muerte carries a double-edged sword. She 
embodies the ambiguous modern Mexican family wherein the 
distinction between good and evil, friend and enemy, formal and 
informal, has become blurred since “people often find themselves 
forced to operate on both sides of the moral chasm in the everyday” 
(Kristensen, 2015, p.564). Their prayers seek an end to the logic of 
premature death from the war on drugs. Yet, at the same time, when 
people take advantage of Santa Muerte to apply the logic of death to 
other individuals, this religious practice leads to the reinforcement of 
an incessant chain of violence and fear. Therefore, the cult of Santa 
Muerte continues to raise ethical dilemmas and moral discussion on 
whether this following is merely an alternative practice of spirituality 
or a dangerous occult practice entangled with the world of crime.
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Living with death or postponing death?
The devotion of folk saints demonstrates that religiosity is inseparable 
from social change and cultural transformation. The current social 
climate driven by the logic of premature death is deeply present in 
people’s everyday life, casting a constant threat of danger and sense 
of insecurity. The western concept of Memeto Mori (“remember that 
you will die”) was introduced in the Americas during colonial times 
and has since been interwoven with ancient indigenous cosmology 
and historically modified by the state, which has appropriated death 
to effectively govern its population. As a result, Mexicans live side-
by-side with death, infusing death into everyday life and celebrating 
it as a harmonious state of existence. However, the extreme insecurity 
that Mexican society faces through its ever-growing drug violence has 
placed this cultural tradition in jeopardy and made its population create 
new religious practices. Unofficial saints are born when they take on 
the role of patron saint for those who were cast aside in the neoliberal 
transformation and excluded from the official system. And the rise 
of new folk saints has divided public opinion between stigmatization 
and celebration.
Malverde and Santa Muerte are considered representative folk saints 
in 21st century Mexico. Both share the role of performing miracles 
for their devotees who are forced to live with death yet desperately 
want to postpone it. However, apart from the fact that La Santa is 
physically more aggressive symbol than that of Malverde, there is a 
crucial difference in terms of their characters. Malverde’s role focuses 
on the healing of damaged spirituality by lending an ear to the 
difficulties and hardships of worshipers. While Malverde solely provides 
mercy and forgiveness, Santa Muerte appears as an ambiguous and 
even contradictory figure. She is affectionate yet punishes and seeks 
revenge if betrayed. She also uses violent power to curse and perform 
black magic toward enemies. Her name has often become associated 
with the drug world as traffickers seek her power to fight against their 
rivals or the government officials. It is in this sense that although her 
character remains ambivalent, it is virtually impossible to avoid at 
least some condemnation of Santa Muerte. Her devotional practice is 
accused of intensifying violence and aggravating the existing volatile 
social landscape rather than spreading a message of peace and solace. 
The media demonizes folk saints and the Catholic Church forbids 
their worship. The Mexican government have demolished nearly 40 
shrines devoted to Santa Muerte on the US–Mexico border since 2009.
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Nonetheless, to forbid worship and criminalize followers may not be 
the solution. The cult of unofficial saints reminds us of the polarization 
within Mexican society and the problematic marginalization of the 
poor, who tend to be abandoned by the state and excluded from 
civil society. Malverde and Santa Muerte are witnesses to bare life in 
contemporary Mexico. It is critical to examine the cult of folk saints 
as a reaction to the crisis of the state and explore its significance as 
an alternative answer to the prevailing culture of death. The future of 
this new religious movement appears bleak because it is difficult to 
separate it completely from the world of violence. However, it offers 
important insights into tenacious ways the people of Mexico wrestle 
with necro-power, endure pervasive fear and terror, and fight against 
the dehumanized conditions of life, even in the darkest hours.
Notes
1  One of the main contributions that Foucault brought into the realm of modern 
politics is to highlight the negative function of modern state and its institutions, 
which at first glance are operating under the consent of its population but are 
used by the dominant power to achieve control over it. The regulatory devices 
and disciplines in modern democracy are the essential technique of governing the 
subject, replacing dictatorship and autocracy. For him death threat is outdated 
and no more efficient, and thereby it is excluded from the possible strategies of 
contemporary politics.
2  Plaza system is crucial to understanding the contemporary Mexican drug war. Since 
1970 narcotrafficking had formerly been integrated into the PRI corporatist state, 
an under-the-table equivalent of labor, peasant, and business organizations. Thus 
it was subject to a certain degree of regulatory control and to unofficial taxation 
in return for the de facto licensing of smuggling. However, the abandonment of 
this furtive structure with the introduction of the PAN government contributed 
to the independent growth and power of organized crime syndicates followed by 
their conflictive relation with the state and local police.
3  In covering an increasing drug business and violence, the mainstream media tends 
to underscore the failure of state that has lost control over the illegal organizations 
and cartels. Yet, this perspective often leads to an easy conclusion in which Mexican 
government should recover its power and sovereignty on the civil society.
4  Malverde in Spanish literally means “bad green.” In fact, verde can refer to the 
green of marijuana, as well as the green of dollar bills. He appears as a mustached 
middle-aged man in a white suit, showing he is an ordinary man like his devotees.
5  Literary representations of Malverde also focus on the locality of this folk saint. 
The Horseman of the Divine Providence (Oscar Liera, 1984), Every Breath You Take 
(Elmer Mendoza, 1991), The Queen of the South (Arturo Pérez-Reverte, 2002) 
and The Curse of Malverde (Leónidas Alfaro Bedolla, 2004), among others, draw 
Malverde’s origin and character in association with local history of the state of 
Sinaloa by highlighting that this patron saint is dedicated especially to this region.
6  Santa Muerte has various nicknames such as Skinny Lady (la Flaquita), Pretty Girl 
(la Niña Bonita), White Girl (la Niña Blanca), and Bony Lady (la Huesuda). Her 
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devotees sometimes refer to her as a “cabrona,” which is equivalent to “battle-ax” 
in English, to express their identification and intimate relation with this unofficial 
saint.
7  Perla Fragoso attempts to see the origin of Santa Muerte from the pre-Hispanic 
tradition and religious practices (2011, p.6). In Mesoamerica there had been a long 
history of the cult of death that unlike Judeo-Christian culture was not the end of 
earthly life, rather a part of the circle of constant renovation. In this sense the cult 
of Santa Muerte can be understood as an example of Latin American syncretism 
that inscribes indigenous cosmology and ideas in western Christianity.
8  Santa Muerte is secular and profane rather than sacred although her figure represents 
modern day sanctity. Therefore, unlike the Virgin Guadalupe who maintains a 
coherent image of generosity and mercy, the uncanny combination of contradictory 
female elements provides her with a special position in the Mexican religious 
landscape.
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Ongoing conflicts between neoliberal and 
post-neoliberal politics have resulted in 
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